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1 Introduction 
Trade and financial liberalization, intellectual property protection and privatization 
have been the recommended recipe for economic development in the past four decades 
(Chang, 2002; 2011). However, no developing countries have managed to make the 
transition to an advanced industrial economy during the past thirty years. The exception to 
this pessimist landscape is China, which even though still far from the economic frontier 
in per capita terms, has been growing at a seemingly unstoppable rate. China has embedded 
herself in global trade and investment flows at an accelerating pace since the 1980s, but at 
the same time has intervened repeatedly to advance its industrial development, in a similar 
manner to that of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan before it (Nolan, 2001). China’s use of 
industrial policy instruments, that at times contravene World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
rules, have created mounting tension with China’s biggest trading partner, the United States 
(U.S.). In contrast to the Chinese ‘miracle’, the U.S., once a bastion of free trade, has 
witnessed widespread popular discontent with globalization and the ensuing loss of 
manufacturing jobs. Rapidly increasing offshoring and outsourcing practices, especially 
since the 1990s, have reduced demand for U.S. labour and have contributed to a decline on 
average real wages (Milberg and Winkler, 2013). These developments have sparked 
renewed attention by policy-makers and academics on industrial policy and its 
implementation in a highly globalized and connected world (OECD, 2013; Bianchi and 
Labory, 2006, 2018).  
Despite the re-introduction of industrial policy into mainstream discourse, the 
expansion of Global Value Chains (GVCs), particularly since the 1990s, is seen as a critical 
obstacle in its contemporary implementation. It has been suggested that in the context of 
GVCs, industrial policy requires a radical rethink, with the state’s role confined to 
facilitating integration, foregoing interventionist measures such as vertically-integrated 
‘national champion’ initiatives (Milberg et al, 2013; Gereffi and Sturgeon, 2013; Yeung, 
2014, 2016; Coe and Yeung, 2015) or tariffs, that could discourage GVCs from taking root 
(Baldwin, 2014). However, a systematic theoretical examination on the role of industrial 
policy within GVCs is lacking, especially one that takes into account the diversity of 
industrial policy interventions and their multiple rationales. Moreover, industrial policy 
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continues to be implemented in various ways in regions that have integrated into GVCs – 
regardless of the advance of trade and investment liberalization - and these constitute a 
source of empirical evidence that has not been examined by the literature.  
This thesis aims to fill these gaps by creating a theoretical framework to link the theory 
of industrial policy with that of GVCs with insights from the innovation economics 
literature. Using a mixed methods approach (interviews to key actors, archive research, 
analyses of official documents and descriptive statistical analyses), the framework is then 
used to examine the empirical case studies of industrial policy in the electronics industry 
in Guangdong province of China and in Malaysia.  
The next sections discuss: the development of the electronics GVC to provide 
background for the two case studies included in this research (Section 1.1); a brief summary 
of the arguments presented (Section 1.2); the methodology used (Section 1.3) and the 
structure of the thesis (Section 1.4).  
1.1 The Electronics Global Value Chain 
The global electronics industry has been the object of many studies in the literature on 
GVCs (Ernst, 1992, 2006, 2016; Hobday, 2001; Gagnes and van Assche, 2011; Sturgeon 
and Kawakami, 2011; Sturgeon, 2002; Yeung, 2007), industrial policy (Matthews and Cho, 
2000; Ning, 2009) and innovation (Yap and Rasiah, 2017; Lee and Malerba, 2016). This is 
because the electronics industry is highly integrated in global networks (UNCTAD, 2013), 
is technologically sophisticated, especially when it comes to semiconductors, and almost 
all of the East Asian ‘miracle’ economies successfully created lead firms or first tier 
suppliers in it.  
The electronics industry was one of the first to be organized in the form of complex, 
sprawling GVCs, spanning several countries. Ernst wrote in 1985: “inside almost any 
electronic product – whether it is a computer or a consumer item – components can be 
found which have been made in more than a dozen factories in at least half a dozen 
countries. Even one subassembly may be the result of an odyssey” (Ernst, 1985:25). A 
rather simplified representation of the electronics GVCs is presented in Figure (1.1). The 
most sophisticated component, and the one that makes electronics ‘tick’, is the 
semiconductor or chip. Discrete semiconductors are simpler than integrated ones. 
 14 
Integrated semiconductor firms both design and manufacture chips (e.g. Samsung), but this 
process is increasingly undertaken by firms who design the chips (e.g. ARM) and outsource 
their manufacture to companies known as wafer fabs or foundries (e.g TSMC). The 
function of the chip in the final product is decided by the lead firm that often conducts 
product R&D and design. A final product requires not only several different chips, but also 
a myriad of other components, which are manufactured and assembled by several suppliers 
in different tiers. Chips are usually assembled into systems by second tier suppliers, while 
simple non-electronic components are undertaken by lower tier suppliers and final 
assembly is undertaken by first tier suppliers.  
 15 
Figure 1.1 The electronics global value chain 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration drawing on https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/electronics-value-chain-infographic and Sturgeon 
and Kawakami (2011). 
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The governance and spatial organization of the electronics GVC has evolved over time, 
owing to entrants from new regions and advances in product and process technology.  
Electronics GVCs started emerging in the end of the 1950s, when US-based electronics 
firms gradually established product assembly first in Japan and later in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. Assembly of semiconductors was offshored in 1970s and that of hard disk drives in 
the 1980s (Ernst, 1985, 1997c). Japanese firms quickly rose to prominence towards the end 
of the 1970s, providing low-cost, miniaturized and customizable consumer electronics 
based on the application of Just-in-Time supply management and lead production 
techniques (Ernst, 1994). Japanese firms also started to offshore production following the 
sharp appreciation of the yen in 1985, often bringing their own suppliers to overseas 
production locations (Ernst, 1994). The rapid growth of export platforms for MNCs (e.g. 
export zones or free trade zones) in many locations such as Singapore, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong in the 1970s and in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Caribbean, China and Sri Lanka in the 1980s facilitated the expansion of electronics GVCs. 
They key decision factor for offshoring was cost; according to some estimates the overall 
cost of p roducing in Southeast Asia was 30% of that in the US (Ernst, 1985b).  
The governance pattern of electronics GVCs changed rapidly in the 1990s, particularly 
for US firms (Sturgeon, 1997; see also Chapter 2). The growing attention of lead firms on 
core competences encouraged outsourcing of capital-intensive and mature production 
stages. The suppliers who started undertaking production on behalf of lead firms were 
created either as spinoffs of the original electronics lead firms (for example Celestica which 
was span off from IBM), or with existing parts suppliers purchasing production facilities 
off lead firms (for example Flextronics and Selectron expanded by purchasing facilities 
from IBM and HP) (Sturgeon, 2006). These suppliers are referred to as ‘contract 
manufacturers’, ‘electronics manufacturing service (EMS) firms’, ‘original design 
manufacturers (ODM)’ and ‘first tier suppliers’ with the terms used interchangeably in the 
literature. The growth of first tier suppliers facilitated the emergence of lead firms that were 
never involved in manufacturing but focused on software development and branding, such 
as Sun Microsystems and Cisco (ibid.). Compared to their US counterparts, Japanese and 
South Korean lead firms are still more hierarchical, preferring to retain some production 
activities in-house (Sturgeon, 2006; Ernst, 1994).  
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Contract manufacturers have to pool customers together in order to be profitable, 
reducing the asset specificity of their investments. They also need to have a global presence 
to serve the lead firms and operate at very low margins. To maintain profitability, contract 
manufacturers usually add a range of high value-added services, such as assembly, 
packaging, testing and design (Sturgeon, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002). In this way, the de-
verticalisation of lead firms has been followed by increasing vertical integration by first 
tier suppliers. The contract manufacturing market is now dominated by firms from the US 
and firms from Taiwan, notably Foxconn, which expanded by adding assembly locations 
in China.  
Even though firms from the US remain dominant in the electronics value chain, new 
firms have entered the leading ranks, although these come from only a handful of countries 
(Table 1.1). South Korean firm Samsung is perhaps the most notable exception, having 
become a global brand in consumer electronics and having developed frontier capabilities 
in semiconductor production and design. By contrast, Taiwanese firms Asus, Acer and 
HTC have struggled to establish a strong brand presence in the US (Sturgeon and Lester, 
2004; Ernst, 2013). More recently, Chinese firms Huawei, Oppo, Vivo, ZTE and TCL have 
become big brands in mobile phones and other consumer electronics segments (with 
Huawei and ZTE also leading in telecommunications equipment), while the country has 
developed some capabilities in semiconductor design (Ernst and Naughton, 2012).  
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Table 1.1 Top 10 vendors in key electronics value chain segments, 2016 
Semiconductor 
Vendors1 
 
Market 
Share  
by 
Revenue 
(%) 
Fabless 
semiconductor 
firms  
Market 
Share by 
Revenue 
(%) 
Contract 
Manufacturers2 
Market 
Share  
by 
Revenue 
(%) 
Smartphone 
Vendors  
Market 
Share 
by  
Units 
(%) 
Computer 
Vendors2 
2016 
Market 
Share 
by 
Units 
(%) 
Intel  
(USA) 
15.7 Qualcomm 
(USA) 
17.0 Foxconn  
(TWN) 
31.9 Samsung  
(KOR) 
20.9 HP  
(USA) 
20.8 
Samsung  
(KOR) 
11.7 Broadcom 
(SGP) 
15.3 Pegatron  
(TWN) 
7.0 Apple 
(US) 
14.5 Lenovo 
(CHN) 
19.9 
Qualcomm  
(USA) 
4.5 MediaTek 
(TWN) 
9.7 Flex  
(USA) 
5.7 Huawei 
(CHN) 
9.3 Dell  
(USA) 
15.6 
SK Hynix  
(KOR) 
4.3 Nvidia  
(USA) 
7.0 Wistron 
(TWN) 
4.5 Oppo 
(CHN) 
6.3 Apple 
(USA) 
6.9 
Broadcom  
(SGP) 
3.8 Apple  
(USA) 
7.1 Jabil  
(USA) 
3.7 Vivo 
(CHN) 
5.1 Asus 
(TWN) 
6.6 
Micron 
(USA) 
3.8 AMD  
(USA) 
4.7 Quanta 
Computer 
(TWN) 
3.5 ZTE 
(CHN) 
3.9 Acer 
(TWN) 
6.3 
Texas 
Instruments 
(USA) 
3.5 HiSilicon  
(CHN) 
4.3 Compal 
Electronics 
(TWN) 
3.2 LG 
(KOR) 
3.7   
Toshiba  
(JPN) 
2.9 Xilinx  
(USA) 
2.5 Inventec 
(TWN) 
1.6 Lenovo 
(CHN) 
3.6   
NXP 
Semiconductors 
(NLD) 
2.7 Marvell  
(USA) 
2.6 TPV 
Technology 
(HKG) 
1.4 Xiaomi 
(CHN) 
3.6   
MediaTek 
(TWN) 
2.5 Unigroup3  
(CHN) 
2.0 Sanmina-SCI 
(USA) 
1.3 TCL 
(CHN) 
2.6   
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Notes: Parentheses include the country firms are based in. Hong Kong: HKG, JPN: Japan, KOR: South Korea, NLD: Netherlands, 
SGP: Singapore, TWN: Taiwan, USA: United States of America. 1Includes integrated IC vendors and fabless firms  2 Data for 2014 
1Only top 6 vendors available. 2Includes firms Spreadtrum and RDA. 
Source: Data from Gartner (2017a, 2017b), IC Insights (2017, 2018), MMI (2015).  
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1.2 GVCs and industrial policy in Guangdong and Malaysia 
While integration into GVCs can provide opportunities for upgrading, developing 
country firms often find it difficult to accumulate enough capabilities to operate at the 
technological frontier, even after decades of supplying lead firms. Drawing on three 
literatures (industrial policy, GVCs and technological capabilities), this thesis argues that 
in the absence of industrial policy it is difficult for firms to overcome the market failures 
associated with industrialization and technological learning and achieve sustained 
upgrading. Industrial policy can complement the endogenous incentives firms have for 
investing in innovation by improving the innovation system (e.g. science and technology 
infrastructure) and by directly shaping prices (e.g. R&D subsidies) (Lall, 1992; Pack and 
Westphal, 1986; Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009). Industrial policy can also be used to 
promote integration into desired GVCs (e.g. tax incentives for FDI) that are deemed to 
offer better opportunities for technological learning. By investing in capability 
accumulation, firms are then better able to harness integration into GVCs to upgrade.  
Guangdong and Malaysia were chosen as two case studies to highlight the dynamics of 
industrial policy, innovation and GVCs in contemporary industrial development.  
Guangdong province actively pursued integration into global, trade and production flows 
to achieve industrial development. It is also one of the main production bases of electronics 
in China and is home to some of the most dynamic local firms in the industry, although it 
still hosts vast labour intensive operations. These features make Guangdong an excellent 
case study for the role of GVCs and industrial policies in industrial upgrading. Choosing 
another Chinese province would no doubt have illustrated a different industrial 
development path compared to that of Guangdong, shaped by the specific policies and 
patterns of integration followed in that province, but the study would then run the risk of 
being too China-specific for a framework that aims to be widely relevant. For this reason, 
Malaysia was chosen as the second case study. Malaysia also developed primarily by 
attracting FDI in the electronics industry and has experienced some upgrading, albeit 
limited as the country has not developed any brand firms or first tier suppliers of its own, 
and subsidiaries do not engage in frontier innovation activities. The active pursuit of 
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integration of Guangdong and Malaysia into electronics GVCs and their mixed track 
records means that the two case studies have the potential to illustrate ways in which 
industrial policies complement upgrading within GVCs, and ways in which policies fail to 
stimulate it.   
This research argues that in the case of Guangdong, industrial policies by the central, 
provincial and local governments created rents for learning for domestic firms. These rents 
allowed firms to build their capabilities and use integration into electronics GVCs to 
upgrade, creating a virtuous circle. Policies evolved over time, pushing firms to integrate, 
then expand in scale and finally, to become innovative. Nevertheless, weaknesses persist 
related to low investments in public higher education and basic research, as well as in 
providing access to credit for the burgeoning private sector.  In the case of Malaysia, 
industrial policies did not create adequate incentives for indigenous firms to invest in 
technological learning and investments in the innovation system did not leverage linkages 
with already-established local firms.  As a result, Malaysia’s small domestic electronics 
sector took advantage of within-GVC opportunities to learn and grow, but has stagnated.  
1.3 Methodology 
This research uses an eclectic methodology. The overall approach is qualitative, relying 
on two case studies - Guangdong province of China and Malaysia (Chapters 4 and 5) – to 
illustrate the relevance of the theoretical framework built in Chapter 3. The case studies 
were constructed by tapping into five main sources of qualitative and quantitative 
information that facilitated triangulation:  
 Original policy documents at country and regional level and government reports on 
implemented policies. Most documents consulted are available online in government 
websites. In the case of Guangdong, policy documents were also collected from 
collected volumes published by government agencies and annual yearbooks.  
 Relevant information reported by the press. The online database Factiva, which offers 
a rich variety of press sources, including of specialist publications that report on the 
electronics industry, was used extensively for this research. The database is accessible 
through the University of Cambridge Library.  
22 
 
 Semi-structured field interviews with policymakers, business people and other experts. 
In total, 31 interviews were carried out in Guangdong and Beijing over a period of six 
months  (January to April 2015, November 2015 and March 2017) and 30 interviews 
were carried out in Malaysia over a period of three months (February to April 2016). 
Interviews lasted on average for an hour to an hour and a half. Notes were always taken 
by the author during these interviews and voice recordings also exist for nine interviews. 
All interviewees have been anonymized for this research. Approximately 12 of the 
interviews were conducted in Mandarin with the author. A research assistant that is 
fluent in Mandarin was present to ensure that there was no miscommunication. The 
research assistant also provided interpretation services for an additional two interviews 
conducted in Cantonese.  
 Statistical data obtained online and through archival research. In the case of 
Guangdong, information was collected from the following annual statistical yearbooks:  
the Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, the Guangdong Industrial Statistical Yearbook, 
the Guangdong Yearbook, the Guangdong S&T Yearbook, the China Electronics and 
Information Statistical Yearbook, the China Electronics Industry Yearbook and the 
China Industrial Statistical Yearbook. The Chinese database CNKI contains online 
copies for most of the reference years. As it is not accessible from the University of 
Cambridge Library the author obtained the information during fieldwork in China. For 
reference years not available online, the author collected information from volumes 
contained in the Sun Yat-Sen University Library in Guangzhou, China and from 
purchased material. In the case of Malaysia, information was collected from the Annual 
Industrial Surveys, the Annual Manufacturing Surveys and the MIDA Annual Reports. 
As few of these are available online, the author obtained most of the data from research 
in the Library of the Department of Statistics Malaysia and the MIDA Information 
Centre. Time series was constructed based on the cleaned collected data and any 
caveats, such as statistical breaks and changes in reported firm size over time, are 
reported in the relevant chapters.  
Case studies have been used in economics and development studies, particularly in the 
fields of political economy, innovation and industrial organization, including global value 
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chains (Starr, 2014). Case studies allow for an in-depth exploration of complex phenomena 
that may display multiple causalities that are hard to define and measure. They also allow 
the researcher to deviate from testing hypotheses that result in zero/one judgments or test 
for causality, towards answering “how” certain phenomena have unfolded (Yin, 2014 
[1994]). Multiple case studies offer the potential to ‘test’ the understanding that a 
researcher has of a phenomenon against a larger amount of evidence. In this research, the 
two case studies of Guangdong province of China and Malaysia permit an evaluation of 
the framework on industrial policy in the context of GVCs developed here. This is a first 
step to future work that will include more case studies.  
However, it should be noted that the method here is not that of a comparative study. 
The use of the latter in studies of political economy often has the objective to compare and 
contrast experiences of countries or regions that are similar in certain respects (e.g. natural 
endowments) but show a diverging performance in terms of economic development (for 
example Haggard, 1990). The comparison allows the researcher to locate the factors that 
differ across the case studies and may account for the divergence in economic performance. 
In contrast to the comparative method, this research applies a theoretical framework across 
two case studies in order to provide richer evidence to support its validity and usefulness 
(as in Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990; Kohli, 2004). Nevertheless, a brief comparison of the 
findings of the two case studies is presented in the conclusion of this research.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 summarizes the debate on industrial policy. It reviews the main rationales that 
have been put forward including infant industry arguments and the nature of technological 
capability accumulation.   
Chapter 3 puts forward the theoretical framework adopted by this research. It starts by 
a historical review of the GVC literature and critically reviews the role of the state in the 
context of GVCs. It then goes on to use insights from the innovation literature to build a 
framework for the role of industrial policy in integration and upgrading within GVCs.  
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the role of industrial policy in achieving integration and 
upgrading in the electronics industry in the province of Guangdong, China and Malaysia 
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respectively. Both of the Chapters follow a chronological approach discussing the different 
policy phases and their respective results.  
Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions of this thesis.  
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2 Why Should We Care About Industrial Policy? 
2.1 Introduction 
Industrial policy is firmly back on the agenda in developed countries, aiming to stem 
the trend of deindustrialization, find and support new growth areas, accelerate the 
development of environmental technologies and respond to the rise of BRICS, and China 
in particular (Naudé, 2010; OECD, 2013; Aiginger, 2007; Bianchi and Labory, 2006). For 
example, the US launched the Advanced Manufacturing Partnership in 2011, a strategy of 
rejuvenating manufacturing in the US by coordinating investment efforts of industry, 
universities, and the federal government in emerging technologies, such as robotics, 
nanomanufacturing and advanced materials. Actions also include federal funding of 
research projects in manufacturing technologies as well as of a network of 14 
Manufacturing Innovation Institutes to bridge the gap between early stage research and 
commercialization (Bonvillian, 2017).    
The benefits of industrial policy have been debated many times in the past and there 
exist comprehensive reviews on its theoretical justifications as well as a rich body of 
empirical work documenting its successful implementation in the East Asian “tigers” 
(Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Chang, 1994). However, industrial policy 
still remains a current topic, with exciting areas to be explored both theoretically and 
empirically. For one, as economic theories evolve, our understanding of why industrial 
policy is necessary and under what conditions it can be successful also changes and 
becomes more complex, even as the basic intuition remains the same. Moreover, the 
emerging opportunities and challenges that arise from shifts in the organization of trade 
and production and the moving technological frontier have an impact on industrial policy 
rationales and implementation. Finally, the shifting domestic political economy landscapes 
also require new responses. For example, demographic ageing, popular reactions to an 
uncontrolled globalisation that has failed to compensate the ‘losers’ and the weakening of 
trade unions paint a new context for industrial policy compared to he post-war period.  
The main object of inquiry of this research is the theoretical and empirical exploration 
of how industrial policy should respond to the expansion of global value chains (GVCs). 
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The first step in this direction is a holistic review of the rationales for industrial policy that 
have been offered so far in the literature, presented in this Chapter.  
Not all policies that come under the rubric of ‘industrial policy’ share the same aim. 
From initiating industrialization in a subsistence economy, to shifting resources towards 
sectors with higher productivity potential in an industrialized economy, to propping up 
‘sundown’ industries, the aim can vary at different stages of development. However, what 
unites all these perspectives is the understanding that production specialization in 
manufacturing can provide more long-term potential for sustained economic development 
than specialization in simple primary production or services (Chang et al, 2013; Szirmai, 
2012). Moreover, market forces do not necessarily bring about the desired specialization, 
making government action necessary. The definition of industrial policy that more closely 
aligns with our perspective is that of Chang’s (1994), who defined it as a policy ‘aimed at 
particular industries (and firms as their components) to achieve the outcomes that are 
perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as a whole’ (p. 69). Several different 
instruments can fall under this umbrella, defined by their domain of action (Table 2.1) 
The next sections of this chapter will elaborate on the different rationales for industrial 
policy. In Section 2.2 the case for free trade will be presented first, as industrial policy can 
be better understood as a departure from faith in free markets. Section 2.3 will explore the 
arguments for supporting infant industry on the basis of externalities. Section 2.4 will 
extend the industrial policy argument to structural issues domestically and internationally. 
Section 2.5 will look specifically at technological development as the goal of industrial 
policy, a view that encompasses many of the previous rationales. Section 2.6 will briefly 
review the institutional basis for implementing industrial policy and finally Section 2.7 will 
mention the reduction of policy space and the expansion of global value chains as 
contemporary challenges for the implementation of industrial policy.  
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Table 2.1 Industrial policy domains, instruments and rationales  
Domain Instruments Rationales 
Product Markets Creating and promoting 
national champions 
Nationalisation/Privatization 
Output and export subsidies 
Public procurement 
Tariffs and Non-Tariff Trade 
Barriers (NTBs) 
Product and technological 
standard-setting 
 
Increase scale of firms 
Invest in sectors that private 
capital is hesitant to enter 
Promote sectors that have 
significant externalities 
Provide demand for 
domestically-manufactured 
products  
Protect firms from foreign 
competition (on the condition 
that they invest rents in 
learning)  
Human capital 
accumulation 
Investments in education at all 
levels, often for targeted skills 
Training subsidies 
High wage policies (e.g. raising 
minimum wages, or imposing 
levies to firms that hire foreign 
unskilled workers) 
Increase the availability of 
skilled workers  
Push firms to rely on high skills 
rather than low wages 
Induce firms to provide on-the-
job training 
Physical capital 
accumulation 
Loan guarantees 
Corporate tax holidays and 
discounts  
Capital allowances for 
industrial investments  
Financial market regulation 
Strategic investment funds 
State owned banks 
Subsidise finance for promoted 
industries 
Correct informational 
asymmetries in capital markets 
Make financing available for 
risky/uncertain technological 
development 
Spatial 
agglomerations 
Creation of special 
development zones 
Cluster infrastructure 
Special incentives for location 
in clusters/zones 
Increase spatial agglomeration 
to capture benefits of proximity. 
Technological 
Development 
R&D tax credits and grants 
Appropriate IPR regime 
Public procurement for 
domestic high-tech products 
Establishment of R&D centres 
Output/export subsidies for 
high-tech products 
Promote investment in 
technological capability 
building. 
Encourage firm-university-
government linkages. 
 
 
Information 
generation, 
collection and 
provision 
Collective institutions of 
communication 
State export marketing agencies 
Government-sponsored market 
research institutes 
To provide general overview 
To provide ‘focal points’ for 
action (including coordination 
between complementary actors’  
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Source: Based on Warwick (2013).  
2.2 The Case for Free Trade 
The debate on whether development is best achieved by imposing tariffs or by 
maintaining free trade is as old as economics itself (see contributions in Jomo and Reinert, 
2005). There are four main theoretical strands that we examine here: free trade as a way to 
encourage specialization in activities with comparative advantage (Section 2.2.1), free 
trade as a means to encourage accumulation and achieve dynamic comparative advantage 
(Section 2.2.2), new trade theories (Section 2.2.3).  
2.2.1 The Theory of Comparative Advantage 
One of the most influential defenses of free trade has come from the theories of 
comparative advantage. The first formulation was made by David Ricardo (1817). In an 
elegant exposition, Ricardo argued that in a model of two goods, two countries and one 
factor of production (labour), both countries would gain from trade if they specialised in 
producing the good in which they have higher relative productivity. A later version of 
comparative advantage was expressed in neoclassical terms by the Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) 
model (Hecksher 1919; Ohlin, 1967 [1933]; Stolper and Samuelson, 1941), which relied 
on relative differences in factor endowments to make a similar point. In a model of two 
goods, two countries and two factors of production, it was argued that both countries would 
gain from trade if they specialised in producing the good that uses more intensively the 
factor that they possess in relative abundance.  
In both cases, the message was powerful, as trade could be ‘win-win’ for both countries, 
even if one had the absolute advantage in producing both goods. In this context, industrial 
policy would distort the efficiency gains brought about by the pursuit of activities with 
comparative advantage, making countries worse-off compared to under free trade policy.  
While a lot of research has been undertaken on extending these models, combining 
them, testing them under relaxed assumptions and proving their empirical validity, not 
much has changed in terms of the core propositions. Perhaps the most interesting addition 
Production of plans, white 
papers, “visions”  
To provide information that 
individual firms/industries do 
not have  
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is that of Wood (1995), who formalized the argument that skills should be considered a 
factor of production1. Wood showed that treating human capital as a separate factor could 
explain wage inequality in the global North as a result of international trade. A second 
extension that has been helpful, although not very different conceptually from standard 
models, is the reinterpretation of trade models to include trade in components or tasks that 
make up a final good (for example Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; see also Milberg 
and Winkler, Chapter 3 for a critical review).  
Unsurprisingly, the theories of comparative advantage have been the subject of fierce 
debate. A major problem lays in their unrealistic assumptions, such as perfect competition, 
international immobility and internal mobility of factors, constant returns to scale in 
production, no externalities and, most importantly, equal technological capabilities that 
allows all countries to make use of the same technologies. That is not to say that the models 
cannot be tweaked to incorporate these elements, but if they do, the results are at best 
weakened (Deardorff, 2005) and at worst countries could even be worse-off after free trade 
(Evans, 1989). Especially problematic is the assumption of labor mobility within countries 
and a lack of attention to asset specificity in economic activities. This implies that 
adjustment can happen fully and with no cost, while reality is starkly different (Lin and 
Chang, 2009). Additionally, if capital is mobile internationally, then we can easily imagine 
capital going to wherever labor is more productive, making absolute advantage the 
determining factor (Milberg and Winkler, 2013, chapter 3). Finally, a crucial problem is 
that when we allow for different economic activities to have different potentials in terms 
of economies of scale or technological learning, the static gains from specialisation might 
be overshadowed by dynamic problems of specialisation in low-potential activities 
(Reinert, 2009), a theme that is recurrent in this Chapter.  
Empirically, the results are also difficult to interpret. The H-O is extremely simplified 
and thereby difficult to test with real world data (Deardorff, 1984), and performs poorly on 
predicting patterns of trade (Teffler, 1995; Baldwin, 2008). The evidence for the factor 
                                                 
1 Leontieff (1953) had first suggested that the reason that the U.S. exported more labour-
intensive goods than predicted by the H-O model, must be that U.S. labour is more productive than 
foreign labour.  
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price equalization predicted by Stolper and Samuelson is also elusive (see for example 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). Additionally, the increase in intra-industry trade since the 
early 1980s among countries with similar factor endowments was left completely 
unexplained by theories of comparative advantage. Moreover, statistical results proving 
beneficial effects from trade is not enough to verify theories of comparative advantage, as 
gains from trade can be derived from multiple theories (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995).  
2.2.2 Dynamic Comparative Advantage  
One of the criticisms levelled at the theory of comparative advantage is that it is static. 
Τrade leads to specialisation, which yields static efficiency gains and that is the end of the 
story. However, this contrasts sharply with the historical evidence of structural 
transformation in advanced economies and with the dynamic experience of post-War 
development of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in East Asia and Latin America. 
The shifting export structure of the NICs, from primary products to increasingly capital-
intensive and complex manufactures begged for an explanation.  
This problem was dealt in the mainstream with the development of theories of ‘dynamic 
comparative advantage’, although a precise definition of the term remains elusive. Most 
works in this direction see comparative advantage as evolving through time, but the 
mechanism that leads to this evolution is not so much related to trade but to endogenous 
factors that draw on developments in new growth theory.  
In one of the first formulations, Balassa (1979) looked at the changing ‘revealed 
comparative advantage2’ in manufacturing in a sample of 36 countries and argued that this 
changed progressively over time from labor-intensive to capital-intensive industries. This 
lent credence to a stage view of comparative advantage3, where advantages change over 
                                                 
2 The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) was an index developed by Balassa, defined as 
the ratio of the share of exports of a product in a country’s exports over the share of the world 
exports of this product in world exports.  
3  Akamatsu (1962) also saw the process of development as one of continuous shifts in 
comparative advantage (although not using that term) between developed and developing countries, 
as a result of colonialism, competition, and nationalism. As wages rose in the advanced country 
industries started to locate in less advanced countries, and then as these also faced increasing costs, 
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time, as countries accumulate physical and human capital. The specific mechanisms of 
accumulation were not explored much in Balassa, but he argued that export promotion, in 
the sense of providing an overall neutral, free trade regime, enabled the observed 
accumulation of factors of production in successful NICs, such as South Korea and 
Taiwan4.  
A very similar point was made more recently by Lin (2011), who discussed how factor 
endowment (to which he includes infrastructure) changes over time, continuously moving 
the optimal industrial structure towards more skill- and capital- intensive industries. The 
rationale is similar to that of Balsassa; when firms specialize in the industries in which a 
country has a comparative advantage, they can obtain a larger market share and maximize 
their economic surplus. This surplus can be (although it may not be) reinvested in physical 
and human capital. With a competitive price system, allocation will be optimal and the 
technology chosen appropriate for the level of the country’s development. However, unlike 
Balassa, Lin advocates a very limited but important role in fixing the informational 
externalities that are created by pioneer firms (see also section 2.3.2) and in addressing 
coordination market failures that may arise for firms in undertaking complementary 
investments in assets, such as skills and hard infrastructure (see also section 2.4.2).  The 
failure of governments to undertake this role prevents countries from upgrading their 
industrial structures and as a result they get stuck in the so-called “middle-income trap” 
(Lin, 2017).  
Dynamic theories of comparative advantage shift the explanatory burden of 
development from trade to what causes growth, itself a hotly debated issue. Increasingly 
since the works of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986), the mainstream has recognized that 
accumulated investments in human capital and R&D are characterized by increasing 
returns and can thereby accelerate growth, encouraging a closer look at innovation as the 
driver of growth. The ‘technological capabilities’ literature, drawing on Schumpeter’s view 
                                                 
industries developed in yet less advanced countries. This led to the formation of the famous ‘flying 
geese’ pattern, with Japan on its head, and Korea and Taiwan behind it.  
4 The thesis of a “neutral” trade regime in Taiwan and South Korea has been extensively 
criticized by Wade (1990). Essentially, what appeared as neutral regimes were industrial policies 
that used protection strategically to build capabilities in sectors with export potential.  
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of innovation as the driver of development (1962 [1934]), has strived to show that the use 
and development of technology requires extensive learning on the part of the firms 
(reviewed in Section 2.5). This effort is far from the automatic diffusion assumed in models 
of dynamic comparative advantage and opens the door for the consideration of government 
policy in making such learning possible (see also Lin and Chang, 2009). Simple learning-
related market imperfections, such as learning-by-doing, can alter the results of dynamic 
comparative advantage models to show how government intervention can shift 
comparative advantage over time (Redding, 1999).  
2.2.3 New Trade Theories, Same Advice 
New trade theory models were developed mainly to explain the rise in intra-industry 
trade among advanced economies during the post-War period (Krugman, 1992). These 
models incorporate several market failures and structural dualities that had long been 
recognised in classical development economics but not formalised in a general equilibrium 
framework before, and show that comparative advantage does not determine intra-industry 
trade. In many cases, the solutions are not unique and there is a possibility of growth 
divergence between countries after trade, since trade could lead to specialisation in sectors 
with different potentials for increasing returns to scale or externalities. Even if these results 
could support government interventions, these models have been included in the section on 
free trade, because the main representatives of this school still support a free trade 
approach. On the one hand, they argue that comparative advantage still applies at the 
aggregate inter-industry level (Krugman, 1992). On the other hand, fears over government 
failure (see also Section 2.6.1) have made mainstream economists sceptical that the first-
best policies according to the new trade theory models could work in practice, except 
perhaps for where production externalities are beyond doubt (Krugman, 1992; McCulloch, 
1993).  
It would be useful to review the main types of new trade theory models, as some of the 
concepts come up frequently in the literature on infant industry protection as well. 
Krugman (1985) has grouped them in three categories, summarised here.  
The first set of models incorporate positive production externalities. These can arise 
because of the development of specialised skills or technological spillovers as an industry 
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grows. New entrants do not need to invest as much as earlier entrants in developing skills 
or technology because they can benefit from the investments made by earlier entrants, 
bringing down their average costs of production. This leads to increasing returns to scale 
at the industry-level. Even though trade models had tried to incorporate these in the theory 
of comparative advantage since Graham (1923), it was only with the work of Ethier (1982) 
that a real step forward was made, according to Krugman. In these models, a larger 
industrial output implies lower unit costs, leading each country to specialise in the good in 
which its industry is larger. In such a setting, several equilibria can arise, even ones that 
make countries worse-off when trading, depending on the assumptions made regarding the 
respective size of industries and labor force.  
A second set of models includes those that incorporate imperfectly competitive market 
structures. The basic approach taken (for example Helpman and Krugman, 1985), builds 
on the work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976), who modeled product 
differentiation under monopolistic competition. Again, multiple equilibria are possible, as 
each country will specialize in different varieties of the same good, but which variety and 
in what proportions depends on specific assumptions. Trade will be beneficial if the 
varieties and the scale of output after trade are larger than in autarky. In Krugman’s review, 
which country produces what variety does not matter from a global welfare point of view, 
but it is possible that different varieties display different potentials for future unit cost 
reductions and face different demand elasticities. This again shows that future divergence 
is possible. 
Finally, the third type of models are based on oligopolistic competition, drawing from 
a variety of game theoretical set ups. Depending on the assumptions, any number of things 
could happen in such a setting. In a Cournot oligopoly, the removal of trade barriers could 
increase the total number of market players, increasing the perceived demand elasticity for 
each firm. This will lead all firms to expand output and reduce prices. However, it is also 
possible that increased competition may drive some firms out of the market, leading to a 
structure that is more concentrated after trade, characterized by the existence of larger firms 
that compete more than before trade (Dixit and Norman, 1980). In a much-cited 
contribution, Brander and Spencer (1985) argued that there could be some benefits from 
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export subsidies in an oligopolistic setting, opening the door for considering strategic 
government intervention in trade.  
Unlike with earlier trade models, no one-size-fits-all policy advice can be derived from 
new trade models, as even small changes in assumptions could give different results. 
However, it is also clear that intervention is not necessarily welfare-reducing as in earlier 
trade theories.  
2.3 Infant Industry and Externalities  
As explained in Section 2.2, in the context of market imperfections at the firm level or 
the industry level, specialisation under free trade might not be optimal. In this section, the 
reasons for this are further explored. Section 2.3.1 briefly discusses the infant industry 
argument and describes a range of externalities that could prevent an industry to emerge 
and achieve cost competitiveness. Some of the critiques made to the infant industry 
argument are critically evaluated in Section 2.3.2.  
2.3.1 Infant Industry Arguments: From the Firm to the Industry 
Infant industry arguments emerged as a critique to the dominant ‘school’ of Adam 
Smith. Smith’s support of free trade as the road to development was criticised most notably 
by Hamilton (1791) and List (1983 [1885]), who argued that a domestic industry in a 
developing economy might not become immediately as competitive as foreign imports 
(Chang, 2002; Bairoch, 1995). Domestic firms need to gain experience and skills in 
production, and make investments to raise their productivity, in order to drive their 
production costs below those of their competitors. A period of temporary support5, either 
in the form of a tariff to raise import prices or in the form of a subsidy to match the price 
gap, would make the domestic producer able to compete. Support can gradually decrease 
as unit costs fall down over time, until eventually it is removed when the industry becomes 
globally competitive. For protection to be the optimal choice, the total costs of protection 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that both Hamilton and List did not only mention tariffs but had in mind a 
more holistic package of support (see Ho, 2005; Irwin, 2004). Nevertheless tariff protection 
emerged as the key concept from this debate, perhaps because notable economists such as Mill 
(1996 [1848]) and Torrens (1841) singled out tariffs for infant-industry as the only acceptable 
exception to the optimality of free trade.  
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should also be outweighed by the discounted future benefits of protection, according to the 
so-called Mill-Bastable criterion (Kemp, 1960). 
While the infant industry argument found support even among mainstream economists, 
it was not easy to square the logic of learning-by-doing with the perfectly competitive 
equilibrium universe. A solution was given by Marshall, who focused on external 
economies of scale at the level of the industry, while assuming that firms operate under 
constant returns to scale (see Hart, 1996).  Marshall focused on production externalities 
that induce the industry-level long-run average costs to fall with output due to a variety of 
spillover effects, especially prevalent in skill- and capital- intensive industries, such as the 
development of specialized skills and the diffusion of knowledge. Firms cannot fully 
internalize the benefits of, for example, developing skills by training their labor or 
developing knowledge that is diffused, as other firms do not get charged for using these 
inputs. As firms cannot internalize the spillovers arising from their activities, there is a 
possibility that they underinvest in the generation of skills and knowledge. Without a 
subsidy to raise the private return in line with the social return and without shielding the 
industry until costs have gone down compared to competition, a country could fail to 
specialize in industries that feature such spillovers. We look more closely into some of 
these externalities below.  
2.3.2 Learning By Doing  
Arrow (1962), in his seminal contribution, was one of the first economists to emphasize 
the external returns to scale arising from an increasing stock of knowledge as production 
experience accumulates6. Such learning-by-doing has been incorporated in trade models, 
formalizing the infant industry argument within a general equilibrium framework. In these 
models, there are usually two sectors considered, one featuring learning-by-doing and one 
with no such learning, with one of the countries (the developed one) already producing in 
the former sector. With its early start, the developed country has achieved learning by 
doing, and under trade it has a comparative advantage in that good and specializes in its 
                                                 
6 Arrow’s work was also an inspiration for later endogenous growth theories (Lucas, 1988; 
Romer, 1987). 
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production. Under these conditions some form of protection (tariffs or subsidies) would 
make it possible for the developing country to achieve the required production quantity for 
learning to take place, eventually being able to specialize in that good (Bardhan, 1971; 
Clemhout and Wan, 1970; Young, 1991; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2006).  
Informational Externalities 
Another production externality that has gained some attention relates to the 
informational externalities generated by pioneer entrepreneurs (Rodrik, 2004). The act of 
searching for activities that can be profitable under local conditions carries significant 
costs, but if pioneers succeed, then others can emulate them, thus presenting a significant 
informational externality (see also Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). A subsidy to the initial 
investor subject to performance requirements can help compensate for that externality. On 
the other hand, first movers can reap significant benefits as they enjoy a temporary 
monopoly, which is a strong incentive for firms to compete to innovate (see Schumpeter, 
1911 [1934]). Whether a pioneer is discouraged or not to innovate may then depend on the 
extent of barriers to entry to that market and the capabilities of competitors.  
Apart from production-related informational externalities there are also consumption-
related ones. For example, Grossman and Horn (1988) considered the case where 
consumers do not have enough information for the domestic product. In this case, 
protection might be able to induce consumers to purchase the product and thereby learn its 
qualities7 . Bagwell and Staiger (1989) similarly considered that an export promotion 
subsidy to high-quality firms who cannot signal their quality to foreign consumers, because 
foreign consumers are unaware of their brands and the only way for them to learn of the 
quality of these firms is to consume their products. In this setting, an export subsidy can 
raise national welfare.  
                                                 
7 In that specific model Grossman and Horn found that protection exacerbates the quality 
problem, as marginal firms enter the industry, dragging quality down. However, as it happens with 
many such models, the result is very specific to the assumptions of the model on firm entry.   
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Knowledge Spillovers 
Knowledge spillovers between firms and industries can also be a significant externality 
(see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2006). Protecting the industry that generates the spillovers can 
increase the productivity of the rest of the economy, making it possible for all firms that 
receive the positive spillover to be able to compete better in the future. There are two 
policies related to this that have received more policy attention in developing countries, 
subsidizing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and promoting geographical clusters in 
sectors with potential for spillovers.  
While support for attracting FDI is based on a long list of empirical and theoretical 
arguments (UNCTAD, 1999), one that has particular relevance here is the local knowledge 
spillovers from FDI operations (Lall, 2004). Foreign firms can be the source of superior 
managerial skills and technological knowledge related to production, organization, 
marketing and research to the local economy, especially if there are linkages developed 
between foreign and domestic firms. However, given that these benefits cannot be 
internalized fully by foreign firms, the latter might not be adequately incentivized to 
undertake activities that could lead to knowledge spillovers. In this case, government 
regulations could use ‘a carrot and stick’ strategy to increase knowledge diffusion by 
attracting FDI that would otherwise not have been made. On the one hand, fiscal incentives 
can attract relevant MNCs to produce locally. These incentives can be targeted to particular 
sectors or activities (for example if they depend on a certain amount of R&D or ratio of 
technical personnel). On the other hand, government regulations can also accelerate some 
of this diffusion by stipulating local content requirements, encouraging supplier-buyer 
linkages by offering match-making services or handing out tax incentives to firms that 
engage in MNC-local firm linkages and restricting the employment of foreign managerial 
personnel to encourage localization of management.  
Additionally, there is a spatial dimension to technological spillovers. The booming 
literature on clusters and industrial districts has revived Marshall’s original insight into the 
importance of geographical proximity for technological spillovers8 (Porter, 1990; Piore and 
                                                 
8 Clusters also offer potential for other production externalities, such as the development of 
specialized skills and suppliers and reductions in transaction costs. 
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Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990; Schmitz, 1995; Markusen, 1996; Morrison et al, 2013; Balland et 
al, 2015). Promoting clustering in sectors that benefit from such spillovers can improve 
collective efficiency and make an industry globally competitive. Policy support can include 
measures such as investment in relevant infrastructure (e.g. airport, port and rail 
infrastructure to increase connectivity, or shared facilities for treatment of waste from a 
particular economic activity prevalent in the cluster, the establishment of institutional 
channels of communication and networking between firms, the creation of specialized 
R&D and local training centes (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996; Ketels and Memedovic, 
2008).  
Critiques of the Infant Industry Argument 
The infant industry argument has been the subject of various criticisms. First, it has 
been argued that, related to the firm-level learning-by-doing, the initial period of losses 
could be covered by the firm, as firms can recover this cost with their future profits and the 
return is private. Second, at the industry-level externalities, protection might not actually 
eliminate the incentive problem. For example, if a subsidy is given to a firm for engaging 
in productivity increasing activities so as to catch-up with foreign competitors but the 
benefits of that can spread freely among later entrants that can capture market share, then 
the incumbent might still not be incentivized to do so (see Kemp, 1960; Baldwin; Krugman 
and Horn, 1988; Grubel, 1966). In other words, if the externality can be internalized, then 
the state should not intervene, and if it cannot be internalized, then intervention instead of 
altering incentives, will just make marginal firms enter an industry.  
The above critiques force us to look closer at the infant industry argument, but they do 
not provide a credible basis on which to dismiss it. First, the subsidy should be just enough 
to compensate the firm that generates the externality, even knowing that spillovers will 
happen. In any case, incumbent firms can still gain significant advantages even in the case 
of partial non-appropriability, as there is a strong tacit element to knowledge. Second, we 
are very often talking about developing economies with pervasive market failures, not least 
in the financial sector (Stiglitz, 1987), which makes it difficult for firms to raise equity or 
borrow funds to undertake these costs, even if they wanted. For example, finance for long-
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term investments might not be available or there could be need for complementary 
investments to make investments profitable (see section 2.4.2 on coordination failures).  
Other critiques have been mostly empirical, trying to see if protected sectors have 
indeed displayed total factor productivity growth (see a review for East Asia in Noland and 
Pack, 2003), or if there is a relationship between tariffs and sectoral growth (Nunn and 
Trefler, 2007), pointing out that there is no general correlation between protection and 
growth. However, these studies, especially cross-national ones, suffer from methodological 
and conceptual problems (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000; Chang, 2011). How can one find 
a consistent pattern, when institutional and policy quality has varied tremendously among 
countries that have protected their infant industries in the past? While free trade is an easy 
option that can be applied anywhere, industrial policy is highly context specific and can 
succeed only under certain conditions. Yet, if it is not applied at all, the chances for catch-
up are very slim. Finally, looking at protection is only half the story of successful 
development. Detailed studies of the East Asian NIC experience show that protection needs 
to go hand in hand with compulsion for technological learning (Amsden, 1989; 2001).  
2.4 Industrial Policy and Production Structures 
The shock of the Great Depression in the 1930’s was accompanied by a wave of 
criticism of the dominant classical liberal paradigm in economics9. Keynes (1936) provided 
a powerful critique of the theory of self-equilibrating markets, showing that investment, 
either stimulated by monetary policy or by means of fiscal policy, can increase aggregate 
demand and alleviate unemployment, thereby smoothing cyclical problems. The path-
breaking works on imperfect competition by Sraffa (1926), Robinson (1932) and 
Chamberlin (1933) also provided a critique of classical supply-side microeconomics. In 
this context, not only was there doubt that the economics of perfect competition could deal 
successfully with economic phenomena in developed countries, but these also came to be 
seen as irrelevant in developing countries, where markets did not exist or where secular 
unemployment was rife.  
                                                 
9 The dominance of liberalism in the economics discipline did not stop the now advanced 
countries from systematically using tariffs to develop manufacturing though (Chang, 2002).  
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The development economics discipline that was born around that time considered the 
structural transformation of countries as of paramount importance. The development of 
industry represented a structural change that was not only about changing the mix of 
economic activities from agriculture to manufacturing but also about progressing from a 
backwards, subsistence economy to a modern, capitalist one that obeyed the laws of 
markets. The role of the state was to hasten and guide this transformation where markets 
could not deliver, by using a vast array of industrial policy instruments at its disposal.  
In this section we consider three different issues related to this. Section 2.4.1 discusses 
the role of the state as raising the capital necessary for investment. Section 2.4.2 discusses 
the problem of structural transformation with coordination failures. Section 2.4.3 puts the 
structural problem in its international dimension by considering Latin American 
structuralist and dependentist theories.  
2.4.1 State-Led Resource Mobilisation and Investment  
Following Keynes’s influential critique of neoclassical economics (1936), attention 
shifted from supply-side issues to the impact of investment on aggregate demand. 
Economists Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) also developed the highly influential Harrod-
Domar model, where the growth of real GDP was proportional to the share of investment 
in GDP. The higher the savings and the lower the capital to output ratio, the higher the 
growth rate would be. This simple but powerful prescription meant that growth was a 
problem of increasing savings.  
The question of where the capital stock would come from to provide the necessary 
investment was also present in models that dealt with the structural dualities in the 
developing world  (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Johnson, 1971). The subsistence 
sector by definition did not really produce a surplus, and industrial workers were deemed 
unable to save as they consumed most of their income on necessities. This left the capitalist 
class as the most likely source of investment capital (Lewis, 1954).  
However, in the cases where such a class did not exist, was not able to save enough or 
spend the surplus that it appropriated on imported luxuries instead, the state could act as a 
surrogate capitalist by using its power to tax, borrow and spend in order to concentrate 
capital resources and invest. Therefore, in addition to using policy measures to guide 
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private investments, the state was also to become an investor, especially in sectors with 
high capital requirements for entry (for example energy and heavy industries), sectors in 
which it is politically unfeasible for private investors to operate in (for example defence) 
or in sectors deemed strategic but with no private investments forthcoming10.  
The early post-War period was sympathetic to an increased role for state ownership in 
the economy, not only in the advanced world, as evidenced by the wave of nationalizations 
in Europe, but more so in developing countries, which were seen as lacking in private 
capital and entrepreneurship (Leff, 1979).  
This trend was sharply reversed in the aftermath of the so-called neoliberal revolution. 
For developing countries, the heavy borrowing in the 1950’s and 1960’s to finance 
investments also turned sour. The widespread debt crises a couple of decades later led to 
the adoption of IMF/World Bank structural reform packages, which pushed for 
liberalisation and privatization (Palma, 1998). Nevertheless, SOEs in strategic sectors have 
remained a key pillar for industrial policy mainly in emerging countries like China (Nolan, 
2014) and Brazil (Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2015) and less so in advanced countries, with 
the notable exception of Singapore (Chua, 2016), Taiwan, Norway and France to an extent 
(see Christiansen, 2011 for OECD countries).  
2.4.2 Coordination Failures 
Another important role for industrial policy has been to solve the pervasive 
coordination failures that can arise in the process of structural transformation. Coordination 
failures arise when there are interdependencies between economic sectors and their 
development fails to be coordinated on by market signals. This is not uncommon in the 
industrial sector, where there are complementarities between economic activities, in the 
sense that they are profitable when undertaken simultaneously; in other words, social and 
private returns diverge. These failures open the door for state intervention, either in 
coordinating or in undertaking some of these investments.  
                                                 
10 This is in addition to the classical argument that state ownership is preferable in cases of 
natural monopolies, such as utilities.   
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The earliest full account of the extent of such failures was by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan 
(1943) and was a big topic in early development economics, especially in the debate of 
balanced versus unbalanced growth (Nurkse, 1953; Scitovsky, 1954; Fleming, 1955; 
Hirschman, 1958).  
Rosenstein-Rodan argued that due to externalities, a ‘balanced’ industrial strategy was 
needed, investing in multiple industries at once, otherwise known as the Big Push. The 
following points were important in this rationale: 
1. There are economies of scale internal to the firm (the need to reach a minimum 
efficiency scale) and at the industry level as a growing industry allows for a finer 
division of labor across firms and this can increase productivity11. These cannot be 
exploited due to the small size of the domestic market.  
2. There are complementarities of industries. Workers in a large industrial unit would earn 
more than subsistence wages and this surplus would create demand for more goods. By 
investing in several such industrial units, it is possible to create enough local demand 
to sustain an industrial system. However, without these complementary investments, a 
sole industrial unit may lack a large enough local market.  
Rosenstein-Rodan argued that integrated state investments and the establishment of 
state-led coordinating units was necessary to implement a Big Push and solve the 
complementarity problem. Others, like Nurkse and Hirschman were more sceptical of state 
intervention and put emphasis in encouraging entrepreneurs. Hirschman (1958) even 
argued that an ‘unbalanced’ approach would provide more incentives for entrepreneurs to 
mobilise resources in order to solve identified bottlenecks, and thus a more effective 
strategy for development.  
The idea of coordination failures resurfaced in economic literature at the end of the 
1980’s. Murphy et al. (1989) elaborated a formal model arguing that policy intervention 
can help an economy coordinate to reach a desirable equilibrium (industrialisation). Most 
                                                 
11 Adam Smith (1999 [1776]) with his now famous pin factory example had first posited that a 
larger market provides the opportunity to firms to specialize and raise productivity. Young (1928) 
and Kaldor (1961) also elaborated the dynamic linkages between demand and specialization: 
growth increases demand, which leads to more specialization, which in turn increases productivity 
and growth – a virtuous circle.  
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models in this direction see the coordination problem as arising because the intermediate 
goods sector is non-tradable and displays increasing returns and therefore does not get 
established in the absence of the final goods sector (Rodrik, 1996; Matsuyama, 1992; 
Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996). The need for government intervention is evident in these 
models, either in the form of subsidies or in providing demand through procurement 
policies to the intermediate goods sector.  
It has also been suggested that with free trade foreign markets can provide the necessary 
demand to intermediate goods sectors, thereby alleviating some coordination problems 
(Trindade, 2005). However, there are at least two problems with a free trade solution to 
coordination failures. First, in the presence of production externalities and imperfect 
market structures the allocation under free trade will not necessarily be optimal, as was 
discussed in Section 2.2. Second, coordination problems will exist even under free trade 
with respect to non-tradable factors like infrastructure, skills, and technological 
capabilities.  
Finally, another way we can look at coordination is from a new institutionalist 
perspective. In game-theoretical terms, if the optimal outcome depends on many agents 
communicating and negotiating, then agents might incur significant transaction costs, 
especially if different players have a strong preference for different coordinated outcomes. 
The state can step in to reduce the transaction costs involved, either by encouraging large 
groupings of players so as to reduce the numbers of players negotiating, by for example 
stipulating the creation of business associations, or by providing a focal point to guide 
coordination, as it happens with indicative industrial plans (see Chang, 1994 Chapter 2). 
Arguably some of the institutionalized channels of communication between state and 
business in NICs had precisely this function.  
2.5 The international dimension 
2.5.1 Structuralism 
The classical development economists saw a developing economy as qualitatively, 
structurally different from a developed country. Central to their ideas was the duality in the 
domestic productive sectors, namely traditional agriculture and handicrafts, and 
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manufacturing. The move of resources from the former to the latter was considered key for 
growth (Lewis, 1954).  
Structuralism, a ‘school’ associated with the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLAC), retained this view, but argued that these dualities are an outcome of the 
developing countries’ integration into the world capitalist system and there are strong 
socio-political dimensions to it (see Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007). 
As the name indicates, structuralism was meant to convey that structures within the 
country and within the global system condition the type and the pace of development. In 
line with structuralist currents in other sciences, there was an effort to dig down and find 
these ‘deep’ structures, often represented as a binary (Jameson, 1986). Indicatively, the 
asymmetries between advanced countries (the core) and developing countries (the 
periphery) are summarized by Jameson (1986) below: 
1. They produced different types of products. The core had a diversified productive 
structure, characterized by industries with increasing returns. The periphery was 
characterized by structural dualities, featuring export-oriented undiversified primary 
goods sectors with higher productivity but few linkages and other domestic-oriented 
sectors featuring low productivity and unemployment.  
2. The industry in the core was characterized by oligopolistic structures both in its 
industry and in its factor markets (trade unions). This allowed the core to retain high 
prices during cyclical downturns and appropriate larger amounts of profit.  
3. The core had better access to technology compared to the periphery. 
4. The core used more protectionist measures than the periphery. 
5. The center with its advanced capitalist structures was prone to cyclical instability that 
had a negative impact on demand for the periphery’s products. The interruptions of the 
Great Depression and the Second World War were indicative of this.  
6. The periphery was characterized by low savings, low rates of capital formation and 
high inflation. 
7. There was a lower standard of living in the periphery.  
Structuralism is a theory of development and as such it would be too broad to review it 
here. What is relevant for this research is the justification it brought for industrial policy. 
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As a result of points (1) and (2) above and given the fact that primary commodities have a 
lower income elasticity of demand (Engel’s law), the leading structuralist economist 
Prebisch (ECLAC, 1950) argued that there was a secular decline in the terms of trade of 
primary commodities vis-à-vis manufactures. A similar trend was observed by Singer 
(1950) and this came to be known as the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. 
In this context of non-beneficial mutual trade relationships with the rest of the world, 
it was argued that development via primary commodity exports would not lead to growth 
and development. What was needed was industrialization and, since the existing domestic 
institutions were unable to spur it, the state was meant to take an active role in pursuing 
import-substituting industrialization.  
Another important dimension of the structuralist contribution to the industrial policy 
debate is the inclusion of political variables. Structuralism used historical-institutional 
analysis to understand the contemporary problems of development and offer solutions 
within this context. In this sense, the protracted inward orientation of ISI in Latin America, 
which has been the subject of much criticism, was not a theoretical necessity, but could 
also be interpreted as a pragmatic response to the prevailing international conditions at the 
time. According to Prebisch (1964), there was no lack of understanding that export markets 
could offer economies of scale for capital- and technology- intensive goods, but the high 
tariff walls of advanced countries until the late 1950s pushed Latin American countries to 
adopt an industrialization path that relied on the domestic market. However, the emergence 
of industrial classes through ISI that captured the state (Kay 2002) made it difficult to 
change course when ISI had run its course.  
As problems in applying ISI policies mounted and the international economic 
environment changed, ECLAC intellectuals adapted their thinking towards a more 
integrationist (and much less interventionist) approach, dubbed ‘neostructuralism’ 
(ECLAC, 1990; Fajnzylber, 1990; Katz, 2000a, 2000b; Ocampo 2002, 2005). This 
approach combines structuralism with the neo-Schumpeterian school and is discussed in 
Section 2.6.  
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2.5.2 Dependency Theory  
Dependency theory emerged partly due to the frustration with the lack of further 
progress in industrialisation, despite a couple of decades of ISI policies, in Latin America 
and partly due to the inspiration of the Cuban socialist revolution (Palma, 1978). While 
dependency theory was generally rather pessimistic about development in general and 
about the role of the state in industrialisation in particular, it is included here because it 
forms the background for the emergence of the Global Value Chains (GVCs) literature, 
explored further in Chapter 2.  
The basis for dependency analysis was the previous Marxist theories of imperialism 
(reviewed in detail in Palma, 1978). While in orthodox Marxism the development of 
capitalism in developing countries was seen as inevitable, dependency theory questioned 
whether such capitalist development was feasible at all. They argued that a continued 
situation of underdevelopment might be in the interest of local elites and large capital in 
the advanced countries, whose alliance would work to suppress development. Three 
different views emerged with respect to the role of the state in dependency theory (see Lall, 
1975).  
The first view and the more widely criticized was the strong position of Andre Gunder 
Frank (1967), arguing that dependency not only precluded development but would also 
lead to ‘immiserization’. The solution was to initiate a revolution and install a socialist 
regime. The second view was more moderate and was associated with Furtado (1964), 
Sunkel (1973) and dos Santos (1970), who argued that stagnation was the logical outcome. 
Similarly, Frobel (1981) in his thesis on the new international division of labor (NIDL) that 
emerged in the late 1960’s was pessimistic about the prospects of industrialization for 
developing countries. While in the NIDL Multinational Corporations (MNCs) started to 
locate manufactures in developing countries, this was only limited to enclaves. In this 
analytical universe the states were accommodating to market conditions and simply 
facilitated the status quo (Wallerstein, 2000).   
The third view is associated with Cardoso  (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) and with the 
early work of Evans (1979). The argument here is that development in the periphery is 
possible but this will be of the ‘dependent’ type, meaning always subservient to 
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developments in advanced countries. Notwithstanding the ambiguousness of the concepts 
of autonomy and dependency in a world of interdependent economics systems, this 
dependentist branch made some interesting points on the political economy of 
development, similar to structuralism. Evans (1979), for example, argued that development 
is shaped by an alliance of interests, comprising the domestic political and economic elites, 
as well as foreign elites, through their interests in the domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms. 
This alliance of interests did not necessarily prevent development altogether, but would 
result in reduced autonomy for the state in pursuing industrialization. Such an analysis 
opens the door for considering industrial policy, not strictly in the context of the nation 
state, but extending research to the study of global interests. This becomes more important 
when the domestic industrial sector depends to a large extent on FDI or when domestic 
firms insert themselves in GVCs, as is the case with many developing countries nowadays.  
2.6 Industrial Development and Technological Capabilities Accumulation 
The importance of technological development for growth had been articulated by 
Schumpeter (1911; 1934) and by prominent economic historians such as Gerschenkron 
(1962) and Abramovitz (1986). However, the issue of technological development in 
developing countries had been somewhat ignored or unexplored until the late 1970’s, partly 
because innovation and technical change were considered to be the purview of developed 
country firms that engaged in formal R&D efforts. Neoclassical economics assumed that 
technologies existed in some metaphorical ‘shelf’ and that firms could choose the 
technology that is most appropriate for their countries’ factor endowments and then 
costlessly apply it. Classical development economists also portrayed developing countries 
as the passive recipients of technological diffusion, often embodied in blueprints, manuals 
and capital goods or argued, like Gershenkron (1962), that the use of advanced 
technologies in developing countries was being prevented by lack of capital rather than of 
capabilities to use them. In this context, technological mastery was just an outcome of 
capital accumulation and production, as ‘learning by doing’ often implied. Developing 
industries, and especially capital goods sectors, would be the fastest way to productivity 
growth and technological development.   
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Firm Behaviour, Technology and Innovation Systems 
A series of works emerged in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s that strongly questioned 
the above assumptions, based on empirical work in technological development in NICs 
such as Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina (see Lall, 1992, 1993; Katz, 1984; 
Katz [ed], 1987; Pack and Westphal, 1986; Amsden, 1989; Kim, 1997). It was shown that 
contrary to what had been assumed, developing country firms engaged in significant 
learning in order to develop technological capabilities, a necessary precondition not only 
for effectively absorbing technology from abroad but also for engaging in minor 
innovations (see also Ernst et al, 1998).  
This new approach to technological development in developing countries was driven 
to a large extent by the nature of firm behaviour and competition as perceived in the 
evolutionary economics literature (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al, 1990). In this 
paradigm, firms neither try to optimize a profit function rationally nor do they have a well-
defined choice set. They focus instead on developing ‘routines’, to carry out functions, to 
make decisions, and to guide them in their search for new solutions. Routines are embedded 
in the institutions (firms) and the people within them, are historically determined and 
usually change when there is an expected positive impact on profitability.  
The efficacy of these routines depend on the skills within the organisation and are an 
important building block of an organisation’s capacity to respond to competitive pressure 
by innovating in the broad sense (developing new technological capabilities). Firms with 
routines that lead them to make on average choices with a positive on average impact on 
profitability are able to survive the competition and those that do not die out. In this context, 
growth comes from firms that compete with each other not on the basis of prices but on the 
basis of innovations (Lazonick, 1993). However, firms can only develop these capabilities 
gradually and cumulatively, progressing from simple, less risky areas to increasingly more 
complex tasks. In other words, firms develop capabilities in an evolutionary manner (Katz, 
1984). 
Additionally, technology markets do not work in the way it has been portrayed in the 
neoclassical paradigm. Technology has aspects of a public good but is also partly 
appropriable and it displays increasing returns to use. Moreover, there is significant 
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uncertainty in the distribution of the results of technological search efforts, so that full sets 
of insurance markets are difficult (or impossible) to emerge (Katz, 1984). Additionally, 
one cannot just simply buy or copy a technology and immediately acquire the technological 
capabilities; there is a strong element of tacitness in knowledge, meaning that the right 
skills to use it effectively need to be developed over time. For firms, the task of developing 
technological capabilities can be hard and requires deliberate firm effort (Nelson, 1987).  
Firm-level learning is also highly influenced by the institutional fabric in which firms 
operate. This has been most notably studied in the context of the ‘Innovation System’ 
literature (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Freeman, 1995), which aims to capture the 
relationship between important actors in an economy with respect to innovation, their 
interactions, and their impact on the direction and rate of the economy’s technological 
learning. Institutions, by shaping the incentives firms face, as well as by determining the 
density, quality and type of interactions between firms, academic institutes and the 
governments that significantly affect the development of technological capabilities. While 
in advanced countries these systems focus largely on science and technology institutions 
that encourage radical innovation, in developing countries such systems include the 
productive sphere, where major learning in production takes place (Lundvall et al, 2011). 
Arguably, the productive structure should also be a concern for developed countries as 
well, as the recent re-emergence of industrial policy shows (Aiginger, 2007).  
Industrial Policy for Technological Development  
The difference in technological maturity between developing and developed countries 
means that different kind of interventions are required. In advanced countries, where the 
emphasis is on radical innovations and on launching new sectors, industrial policy has been 
mostly about government funding of basic research and defence-related projects as well as 
fiscal support of R&D efforts (Mazzucato, 2014), areas where there would be 
underinvestment by private actors due to the inappropriability of returns. Other 
interventions mostly focus on subsidizing the accumulation of human capital, providing 
relevant infrastructure, encouraging interaction between relevant agents, and providing 
access to risk capital and long-term financing (see also Block and Keller [eds], 2015 for 
industrial policy in the US).  
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In developing countries, the focus of interventions should be on developing basic 
capabilities in production first and then gradually progressing to capabilities for more 
medium and advanced innovation, as defined by Lall (1992).  As Lall (1992, 1993 and 
2004) has argued, the government needs to pay attention to: shaping the incentive structure 
firms face  (macroeconomic and trade policies) so that firms find it more attractive to invest 
in new technology and learning; increasing the availability and quality of factors of 
production (skills and capital) by spending on higher education and subsidising capital 
investments; and increasing the availability of technical information and support services. 
Many of these interventions are not dissimilar to measures for infant industry ones and 
some could be considered general in nature as opposed to selective. However, Lall’s 
suggestions focus on supporting innovation and on counterbalancing protection with 
competition.  
Learning and Productive Structures 
As was mentioned at the start of this chapter, industrial policy is essentially selective, 
based on the rationale that certain economic activities offer better potential for long-term 
development. While standard economic literature cites the differences in increasing returns 
and externalities, evolutionary economics stresses different potentials of different activities 
for technological learning.  
This rationale is most readily seen in neostructuralist contributions that have emerged 
as an analytical merger between the technological capabilities approach and structuralism 
(see Section 5.4.1) (Fajnzylber, 1990; Katz, 2000, 20001; Ocampo 2002 and 2005). In these 
works, both the type of productive structure present in developing countries and the 
international environment still play important roles, as in earlier structuralist approaches, 
but now the emphasis has shifted to the impact of these two factors on further technological 
transformation. For neostructuralists, the specialisation of Latin American countries in 
activities with low technological density and lack of linkages, such as primary commodity 
production and assembly activities, mean that there is little productivity growth, making 
convergence with core countries difficult (Bielschowsky, 2008).  
Typically manufacturing has been suggested as an economic activity that offers 
potential for steep learning curves (Lall, 2000; Chang, 2010), although other capital- or 
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technology- intensive sectors could also be encouraged, such as agro-industry with 
biotechnology applications or capital-intensive processing of primary commodities. The 
tacit knowledge that builds up over time in the workers and entrepreneurs involved in such 
ventures can in turn create the conditions for investing in even more complex activities. 
Such a process of cumulative causation could probably also explain wider statistical 
patterns, correlating certain exports with higher productivity growth (Hausmann et al, 
2007). Additionally, the potential for learning in a sector is also influenced by the specific 
technological and regulatory institutions that operate in the sector (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1996; Malerba and Nelson, 2010) or the specific global value chain governance structures 
that national firms engage with (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011).  
In conclusion, the relationship between technological capabilities and production 
displays a kind of circular causation. Capabilities determine what a firm can produce, but 
what it produces has impact on its capabilities (Nübler, 2014). Government policy can help 
by both encouraging firms to develop their capabilities and steering them into products 
with higher potential for learning.  
2.7 The Institutional Basis for Industrial Policy 
While the previous discussion was reviewed mostly in terms of theoretical arguments 
for industrial policy, it is worth spending some time to have a closer look at the institutional 
basis of a successful industrial policy. While in theory the reasons for intervening are 
multiple, one would expect that the success of such interventions would depend at least on 
the vision of the government and its capacity to successfully implement policy.  
It is not our intention here to review the large literatures on neoclassical political 
economy or institutionalist approaches that explore the nature of government and the state. 
We will only briefly review two relevant discussions on industrial policy, the mainstream 
neoclassical arguments for government failure (Section 2.7.1) and the theory of the 
developmental state (Section 2.7.2). While the former adopts a cynical view on the ability 
of the state to successfully implement industrial policy, the latter has strived to analyse the 
conditions that have allowed states in the past to succeed in this task, especially in the East 
Asian NICs.     
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2.7.1 Government Failure 
It is not only markets that fail, but governments, too. This is not a surprise. 
Governments, like other organizations, might suffer from lack of relevant capacity, 
inadequate funds and inter-agency coordination and monitoring problems (Stiglitz and 
Heertje, 1989). Given that solutions to these issues could be plausibly found, as it happens 
in other organisations (see for example Chang, 1994 chapter 2), the mainstream posits two 
further problems that require more thought; the informational burden of the government in 
designing policy and the problem of rent-seeking. These are described below.  
Informational Problems 
As we saw in previous sections, industrial policy can be an optimal solution in a 
neoclassical setting, but this optimality rests on the assumption that the subsidy will be just 
adequate to correct the market failure that exists. It has been argued that this would require 
an impossibly large amount of information on the part of the government as well as great 
capacity to collect and process it in order to make decisions. Thus, even though it would 
be technically possible in the world of models to design optimal subsidies and tariffs, the 
informational burden in reality is prohibitive. Pack and Saggi (2006) include a long list of 
the information that would need to be collected, such as which firms and industries exhibit 
knowledge spillovers, which ones benefit from dynamic scale economies, the sectors with 
long-term comparative advantage, what is the potential competitiveness of firms, the nature 
and extent of market failures, the magnitude and direction of inter-industry spillovers and 
so on. They argue that it is unrealistic to expect the government to know these issues better 
than firms or investors, so non-intervention might work better than the ideal first-best 
policy solution.   
However, this criticism relies purely on assumptions of agent behaviour that are only 
found in models. In reality, no one behaves in the way neoclassical economics wants us to. 
For example, when a firm conducts R&D it does not have a precise distribution of R&D 
outcomes, as many models assume. When a firm tries to find a supplier, it most definitely 
does not look at a global supplier list and judge every single offering on a comparative 
cost/quality basis. The way market agents behave is with ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 
1979; see also discussion in Chang, 1994 chapter 2). We follow rules to guide us in 
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decision-making that require much less informational input, than what is required by 
idealized neoclassical models.  
In this sense, the government does not need to go out and measure spillovers in every 
single sector of the economy; it can rely on information gathered through government-
business channels or it could simply chose sectors that have been proven to have some such 
potential elsewhere. It is also not unimaginable that in a small developing country the 
government can have good information on the capacity of firms and their interaction. If 
researchers are able to discern this with a few months of fieldwork, governments (and more 
so local governments) could have the information needed to make good decisions. 
Moreover, the optimality of real policy needs to be measured against the optimality of 
actual agent behaviour. It is not unthinkable that firms, especially developing country 
SMEs, could have a lot less information than specialised government departments (see for 
example, Humphrey and Shmitz, 1996).  
However, as in most cases, a thoughtful criticism like this is a good springboard to 
understand to what extent the lack of information could be a problem and how it could be 
solved. Generally, institutional channels that allow governments to discuss and develop 
policy with the private sector and other key agents would be a good way to collect and 
disseminate relevant information. In Japan and Taiwan Deliberation councils and business 
associations have been used as a way to deal with this informational barrier (Evans, 1995) 
and in the European Union, public private partnerships (PPP) are driving strategy and 
funding decisions in the development of advanced digital technologies (European 
Commission, 2017). During my fieldwork in Malaysia, some firms also reported that the 
relevant government departments often visit them to discuss how they can help them grow 
or hold public forums to gather stakeholders together. 
Rent-Seeking 
Another problem surrounding the implementation of industrial policy frequently 
mentioned is that of rent-seeking. Rent-seeking is often used synonymously with 
corruption but it is defined as the ‘expenditure of resources and effort in creating, 
maintaining or transferring rents’ (Khan, 2000, p. 70). The size of the rent is not part of the 
rent-seeking cost (if agents value it in the same way, it does not matter who receives it), 
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but the cost is only about the resources spent in order to acquire the rent. Corruption can 
be defined “as behavior which deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the 
actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives 
such as wealth, power or status” (Khan, 1996, p.12).  Even though the two concepts are 
distinct, they can also occur together. For example, the bribe that a firm offers the 
government in return for a rent is not only part of the rent-seeking cost, but it is also corrupt.  
The first models on rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975; Buchanan, 1980) 
showed that the cost of creating and maintaining a monopoly did not only encompass the 
small deadweight losses of monopoly rents, but also included the much larger cost of the 
resources spent bidding for the rent. In this sense, industrial policy, by creating and re-
distributing rents (which would be bid upon), thus investing resources in resource transfer 
rather, than resource creation, could be incredibly wasteful from a welfare point of view. 
However, the costs of rent-seeking can vary significantly depending on assumptions about 
the nature of the bidding process and the number of agents bidding (Murphy et al, 1993). 
Indeed, if the original distribution of rents is inefficient, then rent-seeking could 
(implausibly but potentially) even lead to a more efficient outcome (see discussion in Khan, 
2000).  
Khan (2000) offers a more holistic approach. He argues that, to fully understand the 
impact of rent seeking we need to take into account both the rent-seeking costs and the rent 
outcomes. If for example, a rent has the ability to induce learning in a firm and the rent-
seeking cost is low, then industrial policy, can have an overall positive net outcome.  This 
view is corroborated by looking at successful and unsuccessful developers, where the types 
of rents distributed and rent-seeking costs are similar, but the outcomes are very different. 
The successful cases, like Japan or Korea have managed to discipline rent-recipients so 
that rents are used for learning, contributing to future competitiveness (also in Amsden, 
1989).  
The answer then to the problem of rent-seeking is not to wholesale liberalise and 
privatise to eliminate rents, but for the government to devise institutional configurations 
that will allow it to discipline rent recipients and reduce rent-seeking costs.   
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2.7.2 The Developmental State 
The Developmental State can be seen as the antithesis of the pessimistic view of the 
corrupt, information-constrained state that the mainstream has put forward. As a theoretical 
construct, it was derived by looking at the nature of state interventions in the successful 
industrialised countries of Northeast Asia (Japan, Korea, Taiwan), so much that the two 
have almost become synonymous (Johnson, 1999; Hayashi, 2010). The impressive 
development of these countries, especially in contrast to the disappointing economic 
performance of Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries since the mid-1970’s, 
called for a theoretical explanation.  
While the mainstream posited that the so-called ‘East Asian miracle’ was the outcome 
of a free-market approach to development (Balassa, 1991; World Bank, 1993), a wealth of 
evidence showed that all these countries had intervened extensively in the economy and 
that these interventions were plausibly connected to economic success (Deyo, 1987; 
Haggard and Moon, 1983; Lim, 1983; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). This raised an obvious 
question; why, when industrial policy had been implemented in several countries around 
the world, had it succeeded to that extent only in East Asia? The answer for a group of 
researchers lied in the nature of the state.  
The definition of the developmental state varies, so it is hard to come up with a list of 
definite characteristics (see Stubbs, 2009; Öniş et al, 1991). Nevertheless a few features 
have stood out: 
1. There is a transformative goal: While this is somewhat obvious, it is worth stressing. 
The state should perceive economic development as a top priority (Hayashi, 2010; 
Weiss, 2000; Leftwich, 1995). This often arises because the governing elites need to 
legitimise themselves or even protect the sovereignty of their countries by ensuring 
national economic development.  
2. There is a cohesive set of institutions: In the Northeast Asian examples, authors have 
identified key agencies that pursued the stated objectives, and these were able to 
implement their policies.  
3. The bureaucracy is highly skilled and experienced: The ‘Weberian’ ideal has often been 
projected into the bureaucracies of the successful industrialized states. However, while 
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certainly good capacity to understand the problems of industrialization as well as to 
design and implement policies are important, it should be noted that this is a capacity 
that can be built over time (Chang et al., 2002).  
4. There is state autonomy: Due to various historical and institutional circumstances, the 
state can enjoy a degree of autonomy from other social groups, and thus is able to act 
on its own interests and discipline rent recipients. This quality has often been associated 
with authoritarianism, which characterised all three countries at the time of their high 
growth 12  (Haggard, 1990), but there is no general relationship between 
authoritarianism and developmentalism (Haggard, 2015). Some work has tried to show 
how developmentalism can thrive under democratic conditions (White, 1995).  
5. Leadership is embedded: The ‘embededness’ of the state in business and other networks, 
formal or informal, meant that the policy design was relevant and that the targets of 
policy shared the same transformative goals (Evans, 1995).  
However, the theory does not come without problems. First, the version of the state-
society relationship put forward is often highly idealized and does not easily square with 
high incidences of corruption (although in less critical sectors for economic development, 
such as defense and construction) and the political squabbles that have plagued the NICs 
(Kang, 1995). Second, other countries in Southeast Asia and China grew fast for certain 
periods despite not featuring the same state-business relationships and without having the 
same bureaucratic quality (Hayashi, 2010). It seems that there is a danger of identifying 
the particular institutional structures that prevailed in Northeast Asia as the only ones 
conducive to industrial development, when we should be looking for attributes that could 
be replicated with other institutional forms. For example, Chang (1999) argues that the 
state needs to be able to carry out the following functions:  coordination of investment for 
systemic change, provision of a vision to serve as a focal point, institutional building 
through adaptation and innovation and conflict management over resource allocation. 
These broad considerations both describe many of the attributes of the developmental state 
                                                 
12 Indicatively, South Korea was under military rule from 1961 to 1987, Taiwan from 1949 to 
1996, and in Japan the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was continuously in charge from 1955 to 
1993. 
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and can serve as guides for other institutional solutions that might be more suitable to 
prevailing conditions.  
2.8 Contemporary Challenges 
While there are tens of countries that have partially industrialised and could 
comfortably be described as ‘middle income’, there are no countries that have reached the 
technological frontier after Korea, Taiwan and Singapore did, and even among these 
countries there is significant variation in terms of income per capita 13. This means that 
discussions on successful industrial policy often draw from the same group of countries. 
One of the bigger problems with this is that policy advice could risk becoming outmoded 
as the global economy evolves. A key question that has emerged in the literature, and one 
which this thesis is attempting to answer, is to what extent the lessons that have been 
distilled from the theory and practice of industrial policy can be applied within the current 
global economic context. Two central issues have attracted attention, the question of policy 
space and that of global value chains (GVCs). Given that the latter is the central question 
of this research and the focus of our next chapter, the discussion here will be kept simple 
aiming to provide a summary for the purposes of this broad review of industrial policy.   
2.8.1 Policy Space 
The issue of policy space relates to the evolving global governance and what this means 
for domestic policy options. It has been defined by UNCTAD (2014) as “the combination 
of de jure policy sovereignty, which is the formal authority of policymakers over their 
national policy goals and instruments, and de facto national policy control, which involves 
the ability of national policymakers to set priorities, influence specific targets and weigh 
possible trade-offs” (p. VII). Starting from the broad conditionalities on macroeconomic 
and governance reforms attached to IMF/World Bank structural adjustment loans in the 
1980's, policy space has been continuously shrinking, particularly in the area of trade and 
industrial policies (Chang, 2006).  
                                                 
13 For example in 2015, GDP per capita in 2005 constant US$ was US$37,950 in Japan and 
US$37,923 in Singapore against US$25,272 in South Korea and US$22,454 in Taiwan (UNCTAD, 
2017).  
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The launch of WTO in 1995 marked a watershed in this direction, by enshrining into 
its agreements the curtailment or prohibition of certain practices that had previously been 
staple instruments of industrial policies, including some of those that have been found to 
be most effective. Not only have tariffs been reduced substantially across the world, but 
also specific subsidies are banned (the SCM agreement), as are measures to promote local 
content in FDI (the TRIMS agreement). Intellectual property regulations are also severely 
tightened (the TRIPS agreement). Signatories to the Procurement Agreement also cannot 
use government procurement selectively to promote domestic production. More recently, 
the wave of US and EU bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) have produced an even more restrictive environment (Gallagher, 2008).  
Of course some flexibility remains under WTO, although much less under bilateral 
FTAs, for developing countries. The least developed ones are subject to Special and 
Differential Treatment (SDT), which means that they are allowed to not reciprocate fully 
some measures, although eventually they are expected to comply. Some countries have 
also bound their tariffs at relatively high rates (Akyüz, 2009), although few of them make 
full use of this limit, even after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Additionally, a number 
of important measures are still available; some production subsidies might be actionable 
but not prohibited outright and those for environmental and research reasons are allowed. 
Preferential export credits and some entry conditions on foreign investors are also allowed. 
Finally, adopting a more pragmatic approach, some countries that have international clout, 
such as China, often circumvent the WTO rules and protect their industries anyway; after 
all, it can take years before a ruling is reached and in the meantime the subsidy has already 
been in place for a while.  
It has been suggested that the willingness with which many developing countries sign 
on to WTO agreements and the FTAs is not simply an outcome of pressure by developed 
countries. It has taken place mainly because countries are offering policy and regulatory 
commitments in order to entice FDI flows and join global value chains (GVCs) (Baldwin 
et al, 2014; Orefice and Rocha, 2014). However, as will be explained further in Chapter 2, 
this quick recipe for basic foreign-led enclave industrialization cannot substitute for 
sustainable indigenous industrial development, which will be harder if not impossible to 
come by without industrial policy.  
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2.8.2 Global Value Chains  
The second development that requires a rethinking of industrial policy is the expansion 
of GVCs. These can be defined as the “full range of activities which are required to bring 
a product or service from conception, through the different phases of production (involving 
a combination of physical transformation and the input of various producer services), 
delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.4). 
This range of activities is organized according to a global or at least regional division of 
labour, spanning multiple production sites, where different production and post-production 
activities take place, which are usually coordinated by lead firms based in developed 
countries.  
The question of industrial policy within the context of GVCs has been raised only in 
the last few years (Gereffi and Sturgeon, 2013; Milberg et al, 2013; Yeung, 2016). Some 
of the more important issues that have been put forward are the fact that tariffs could be 
inconsistent with a strategy of attracting export-oriented FDI (Baldwin, 2014), that it is 
even more difficult now for developing country firms to become global leaders given the 
global market concentration in lead firms (Nolan, 2014) and that sectoral measures do not 
make sense in the current pattern of specialization in tasks rather than products (Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Due to the above, it has been suggested that industrial policy 
instruments might not be effective enough or they might hurt industrialization efforts.  
However, as we will see in the next chapter there are no strong theoretical arguments 
against supporting a domestic industrial base while pursuing a GVC-led development 
strategy, although the lack of policy space could be more of a hindrance to such efforts.  
In addition, when we take GVC expansion into account, more rationales for industrial 
policy also appear. First, in a more structuralist interpretation, industrial policy can improve 
bargaining power of low-end suppliers in developing countries against the more 
oligopolistic lead firms, even if such help has limits. Second, the locational decisions of 
GVCs and their historical evolution lend even more credence to critiques of theories of 
comparative advantage. Factors like capacity for conducting R&D and specialized 
infrastructure, affect the geographical pattern of GVCs and the competitiveness of suppliers 
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in them. In such a world, competitive advantage is created rather than given, and industrial 
policy can still play a role in delivering that.   
Nevertheless, a detailed theoretical exploration of these issues is missing from the 
literature and few case studies have been put forward to show how industrial policy has 
been implemented while pursuing GVC-led development. This research aims to fill 
precisely this gap by undertaking a theoretical review on the subject in Chapter 3 and then 
presenting two relevant case studies in Chapters 4-5.  
2.9 Conclusion  
This chapter reviewed various rationales for implementing industrial policy. The key 
conclusions that emerge are that industrial policy is needed mainly for three reasons: 
1. To prevent specialization in sectors with low economic potential by correcting for 
market failures, such as the existence of learning-by-doing, informational asymmetries 
and externalities and technological spillovers, which might lead to underinvestment in 
sectors with greater positive social welfare.  
2. To take an active role in structural transformation by investing in sectors that show 
potential for learning, productivity growth and spillovers and by coordinating 
investments, directing financing, granting subsidies, employing protection measures to 
promote domestic manufacturing.  
3. To help firms engage in technological capability development by making rents 
conditional on learning, investing in science and education and innovation-related 
infrastructure (e.g. research institutes, testing and certification centres).   
This thesis takes the view that a focus on technological capability development is both 
inclusive of other rationales that have appeared in the literature and also more appropriate 
for the study of industrial upgrading, which has an evolutionary character.  
The last two sections highlighted that the success of industrial policy will depend on 
the capacity of the state to implement it and the overall nature of domestic institutions, as 
well as the policy space afforded by the international governance structures.  
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3 Industrial Policy, Innovation and Global Value Chains – an 
Integrated Framework  
3.1 Introduction 
The central thesis of this research is that traditional industrial policy instruments remain 
necessary, even in the context of GVC-led development. The perceived tension between 
the goals and instruments of industrial policy and those of development in a GVC context 
dissipates once we incorporate the insights of the evolutionary economics school (see 
Chapter 2, Section 6). A firm’s effort to accumulate technological capabilities is greatly 
influenced not only by its engagement with other firms within the GVCs it participates in, 
but also by the structure of incentives created by industrial policy. The interaction of these 
factors, which are not independent of each other, will shape the conditions for the 
accumulation of technological capabilities and subsequent upgrading.  
To the author’s knowledge, the only other approaches that try to consider GVCs, 
evolutionary economics and industrial policy together are those of Ernst (2002) and 
Breznitz (2007). However, while Ernst was eager to show that the international leg of the 
equation is important, our aim is a mirror opposite, trying to meaningfully integrate 
industrial policy in discussions of GVCs and innovation. This research also goes further 
beyond Breznitz by offering a more integrated and systematic framework, building on work 
that has been published since. 
The Chapter begins with Section 2, giving a brief overview of the emergence of GVCs. 
Section 3 goes on to discuss the different frameworks that have emerged to analyse 
transnational production networks, spending more time on the concepts of governance and 
industrial upgrading found in the GVC literature. Section 4 critically evaluates the analysis 
so far regarding the intersection of GVCs and industrial policy. Finally, Section 5 presents 
the framework used in this research.    
3.2 The Emergence of Global Value Chains  
The emergence of transnational production networks is linked to the growing 
deverticalization of firms during the post-war era. The large integrated and diversified 
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corporations that characterised industrial development in the US from the 19th century until 
the 1970’s (Chandler, 1977, 1990), were products of an era of mass production, leveraging 
economies of scope and scale within the firm. Backward and forward integration allowed 
firms to have high capacity utilization rates, dominating the large domestic markets of the 
US and Europe.   
However, the opening up of global markets, further advances in information technology 
(IT), the emergence of modular components and the formidable challenge of the Japanese 
lean system of manufacturing, have changed the landscape (Langlois 2002; Sturgeon, 
2003; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Increasingly since the mid-1980’s corporations started to 
focus on their core competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), by outsourcing and/or 
offshoring their non-core functions. In certain sectors like electronics, textiles or footwear, 
lead firms have shed production activities entirely, becoming ‘fab-less’ (Sturgeon, 2002). 
Simple assembly and production tasks have been largely offshored to developing country 
locations, while firms in developed countries have focused on high value-added activities, 
such as design, R&D, branding and marketing. That said, increasingly a number of 
traditionally knowledge-intensive tasks (such as design and certain kinds of R&D) are also 
being commoditised and offshored (Howells, 2002; Ernst, 2009). At the same time, an 
explosive increase in M&As since the 1980’s has led to unprecedented degrees in global 
concentration in the narrower fields of activity of lead firms (Nolan, 2001, 2014). 
The large scale restructuring that took place primarily in the US and to a lesser extent 
in Europe and East Asia, led to sharp increases in the demand for independent suppliers 
that could offer substantial cost reductions or cost-efficient export platforms for relocation 
of production activities. East Asian and Central American locations emerged as top 
destinations for such investments, giving rise to GVCs. The latter have signified a 
qualitative shift in the nature of the globalisation of production; from establishing 
subsidiaries that produced similar products but for different markets, the goal for lead firms 
has shifted to coordinating dispersed production activities, mainly for export to advanced 
markets (Baldwin, 2014). Moreover, it has been observed that even in cases when these 
productive activities are not undertaken by subsidiaries owned by lead firms, but by other 
suppliers, there is a significant degree of coordination undertaken by the lead firm, who 
influence heavily the business operations of their suppliers (Nolan, 2001). The combination 
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of a global dispersion of fragmented productive activities, coupled with the role of real 
firms in orchestrating production by suppliers, is what differentiates GVCs from simple 
transnational investments.  
The phenomenon of GVCs, although micro-economic in nature, is detectable on 
aggregate indicators. The share of exports in GDP for most countries has been rising 
rapidly in the past few decades, especially since the mid 1980’s. The share of exports in 
GDP of middle-income countries rose faster than that of high-income countries, from 8.4% 
in 1967 to a peak of 33% in 2006, falling gradually to 25.3% in 2015 (Figure 3.1). However, 
the rise in exports masks a growing reliance on imported goods to export. It is common for 
products to cross borders several times, with only a portion of the final value added in each 
stage. Globally, about 57% of world exports were part of a multi-stage trade process14 
between 2005-2010 (UNCTAD, 2013a).  
Figure 3.1 Share of exports in GDP (%) by country group, 1960-2015 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2017  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Share of foreign value added in exports, selected countries and years 
                                                 
14 This percentage is calculated by adding the foreign value added used in a country’s exports 
(upstream perspective) plus the value added supplied to other countries’ exports (downstream 
perspective) and dividing by total exports (UNCTAD, 2013a, p. 11).  
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Not all countries participate in GVCs to the same extent and their level of participation 
varies over time (Figure 3.2). For Germany, Japan, Korea, the United States, India and 
Thailand, the extent of their participation in GVCs has increased between 1995-2011. For 
China, Mexico, Malaysia and Singapore, the share of foreign value added in exports 
increased at first and subsequently declined. The reasons for this decline could be that some 
countries build their own capabilities over time in exported products (as in China and Brazil 
in Lee et al., 2017) or that countries lose their status as preferred export-oriented hubs for 
Trans-national Corporations (TNCs).  
Finally, in terms of sectors, the electronics, electrical equipment and transport 
equipment sectors have featured some of the highest shares of foreign value added, mostly 
organized along regional chains, in East and Southeast Asia, North America and Europe 
(Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2013; Sturgeon and Memedovic, 2011). 
3.3 A Review of Global Value Chains 
3.3.1 Competing Frameworks 
Until now we have used the term GVC to mean a transnational production network in 
general. However, as we see in this chapter, the term is also associated with a particular 
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theoretical framework. A number of other frameworks have also been developed to study 
the same phenomenon and their definitions are given in Box 1.  
Each framework speaks to the particular discipline it came out of. Global Commodity 
Chains (GCC) has sprung up from sociology, Global Production Networks (GPN) from 
critical geography, Fragmented Production is found mainly in economics, while the Global 
Business Revolution is mostly associated with studies of the firm. The more wide-ranging 
GVC framework emerged in an effort to develop a common concept to unify the research 
strands above, although significant differences remain.  
Box 3.1: Definitions of key frameworks  
Global Business Revolution  
‘Through the hugely increased planning function undertaken by systems integrators, 
facilitated by recent developments in IT, the boundaries of the large corporation have 
become significantly blurred. The core systems integrators across a wide range of sectors 
have become the co-ordinators of a vast array of business activity outside the boundaries 
of the legal entity in terms of ownership. The relationship extends far beyond the price 
relationship. In order to develop and maintain their competitive advantage, the systems 
integrators deeply penetrate the value chain both upstream and downstream, becoming 
closely involved in business activities that range from long-term planning to meticulous 
control of day-to-day production and delivery schedules. Competitive advantage for the 
systems integrator requires that it must consider the interests of the whole value chain in 
order to minimize costs across the whole system’ 
Nolan, 2001, p. 44 
 
Global Value Chains 
‘[The] full range of activities which are required to bring a product or service from 
conception, through the different phases of production (involving a combination of 
physical transformation and the input of various producer services), delivery to final 
consumers, and final disposal after use’ 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.4 
 
Global Production Networks 
‘[An] organizational arrangement, comprising interconnected economic and non-
economic actors, coordinated by a global lead firm, and producing goods or services 
across multiple geographical locations for worldwide markets”  
Coe and Yeung, 2015, pp.1-2 
 
‘[An] organizational innovation that enables network flagships to combine concentrated 
dispersion with systemic forms of integration. These networks integrate the dispersed 
supply and customer bases of a network flagship, i.e. its subsidiaries, affiliates and joint 
ventures, its suppliers and subcontractors, its distribution channels and value-added 
resellers, as well as its R&D alliances and a variety of cooperative agreements, such as 
standards consortia.’  
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Ernst, 2002, p.508 
 
Fragmented Production 
‘The term, “fragmentation”, refers to a splitting up of a previously integrated production 
process into two or more components, or “fragments”…made possible by utilizing 
activities from the “service” sector.’ 
Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001, p.18 
 
Commodity Chains 
‘A network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity’ 
Hopkins and Wallerstein, 2000 [1986], p.159 
 
Global Commodity Chains 
‘Global commodity chains have three main dimensions: (1) an input-output structure 
(i.e., a set of products and services linked together in a sequence of value-adding 
economic activities); (2) a territoriality (i.e., spatial dispersion or concentration of 
production and distribution networks, comprised of enterprises of different sizes and 
types); and (3) a governance structure (i.e., authority and power relationships that 
determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a 
chain)’ 
Gereffi, 1994, p.96 
 
In general, this research will use the GVC framework as the lingua franca of this 
literature, since it is more widely used in policy circles and academia, although we will 
take an eclectic approach, drawing from all the frameworks mentioned above. It is not our 
aim to reproduce here an in-depth genealogy of these concepts, so the reader is referred to 
Bair (2005; 2009), Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) and Henderson et al (2002) for detailed 
discussions. What follows is a short critical evaluation, focusing on the concepts of 
governance and of upgrading in the GVC and GPN literatures.  
3.3.2 From Dependency Theory to Global Commodity Chains 
The first attempt to conceptualize the phenomenon of transnational, export-oriented, 
production networks was within dependency theory. Fröbel et al (1981) in The New 
International Division of Labour explored the emerging tendency for the establishment of 
foreign-owned manufacturing facilities in developing countries, to service exports markets. 
For the authors, this represented another form of dependency, where labour worked for low 
compensation in export enclaves with few linkages to the domestic economy, fully 
67 
 
dependent on external technology, and without any security, as firms were footloose. In 
this context, sustained development of the host country would not be feasible.  
Hopkins and Wallerstein (2000 [1986]), who were the first to talk in terms of 
production ‘chains’ in a global context, also took this pessimistic view. Their commodity 
chain concept aimed to show that capitalism was not a national but an international 
phenomenon. Throughout the history of capitalism, products have required inputs that 
linked together seemingly different production systems in a global market exchange. The 
division of labor between countries in the context of GVCs continued to prop up this 
unitary ‘world system’, with oligopolistic core firms, supported by strong states, being able 
to appropriate more surplus compared to firms in developing countries.  
However, the successful development of some East Asian economies showed that it 
was possible for the periphery to develop, thereby putting a dent on the dependency thesis. 
More importantly, the state in those places emerged as an autonomous agent that could 
impose its own goals for industrialization on dominant class interests. In this sense, 
government action was not purely determined by the market logic as Wallerstein had 
suggested (see Skocpol, 1977; Evans et al, 1985).  
The concept of GCCs, developed later by Gereffi (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz [eds], 
1994), built on Wallerstein, but also marked a clear departure. Gereffi (1995), although a 
student of Wallerstein, was much more optimistic on the implications of such production 
chains for development. For example, the demand created by large retailers and other fab-
less brands in advanced markets was seen as instrumental in spurring the development of 
independent suppliers in the successful East Asian NICs (see also Hamilton and Gereffi, 
2009). At the same time, the role of the state was also seen in a more positive light 
compared to the dependency formulations, arguing that domestic industrial policies could 
improve supplier competitiveness, although these were not examined in detail (Bair, 2005).  
The main analytical innovation of GCCs was the introduction of a binary typology of 
chain governance, namely the distinction between buyer-driven and producer-driven 
chains (Gereffi, 1994). Producer-driven chains featured large industrial enterprises that 
controlled the production system through forward and backward linkages, typically found 
in capital-intensive industries such as automobiles. Buyer-driven chains were instead 
governed by large retailers, brand-name merchandisers and trading companies that 
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purchased finished products from producers in various exporting countries. By identifying 
these two distinct types, Gereffi was able to capture not only the typical FDI-led global 
integration that had been the focus of earlier studies, but also the increasing integration 
without equity investments, based largely on global sourcing networks. The studies on the 
triangular textile and footwear trade in East Asia were representative of these efforts 
(Gereffi, 1994; Chen, 1994; Bair and Gereffi, 2001).  
However, despite these advances, the typology remained largely descriptive in nature, 
and was unable to accommodate the increasingly diverse outsourcing arrangements that 
were coming to light. The GVC framework that was developed later identified a larger 
number of types of chain governance as well as key variables that determined their 
emergence. The GCC continues to be the focus of sociologists that are interested in the 
macro, world historical processes and the role of labor, compared to the inter-firm 
relationships that became the focus of GVCs (Bair, 2009).  
3.3.3 The Multinational Corporation and the Global Business Revolution 
Another strand of literature that is important for understanding production networks is 
that regarding the multinational corporation (MNC), although this intellectual lineage is 
not widely acknowledged in the GVC literatures.  
The question of why a firm would choose to become a multinational and invest abroad 
has been explored at great depths in business literature, with notable contributions by 
Penrose (1959 [1956]), Caves (1971), Hymer (1976), Rowthorn (1992), Dunning (1984), 
Dunning and Lundan (2008). The GVCs and GPN literatures clearly have been influenced 
by the more nuanced analysis of lead firm strategy in MNC/FDI works. However, the focus 
had usually been on low production and transaction costs as determinants for overseas 
investment, at least until Gereffi et al. (2005) and Coe and Yeung (2015) also explored 
supplier capabilities more seriously. Moreover, the empirical work by GVC and GPN 
scholars has focused on the upgrading of developing country suppliers, rather than lead 
firm strategy. In contrast, the Global Business Revolution framework, developed by Nolan 
(2001; Nolan et al, 2008), shares a focus with business literature on the global large lead 
firm.  
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Nolan’s framework examines more closely the evolution of the large firm from an 
integrated entity investing in its own subsidiaries to becoming a system integrator and 
coordinating its ‘external firm’. Nolan observes that lead firms have shed their non-core 
competences but have increased their global market dominance in the narrower scope of 
core business. These global lead firms (termed ‘core system integrators’) normally have 
some superior attributes compared to their suppliers or to lower-end competitors, such as 
better access to financial resources, higher R&D spending, better branding or the ability to 
attract better human capital. These firms also closely coordinate the activities of their first-
tier suppliers, with whom they develop strategic partnerships. Key business decisions of 
strategic suppliers, such as where to locate production or activities like R&D and product 
development are made in close cooperation with lead firms who monitor these processes. 
This ‘planning’ of business activities beyond what is legally the boundary of the firm is 
conveyed by the concept of the ‘external firm’. Moreover, this phenomenon is cascading 
down the value chain; the most important first-tier suppliers also specialize, outsource and 
closely coordinate with their own suppliers and so on.  
The Global Business Revolution framework describes aptly the logic that pushes global 
lead firms to pursue strategies of outsourcing and coordinate dispersed production 
activities. However, its emphasis is on the competitive position of large global lead firms 
and not on the perspective of their suppliers, especially in the lower tiers. Moreover, while 
it offers a rich understanding of governance when lead firms have much more bargaining 
power than their suppliers, it does not focus much on situations where greater inter-
dependence between suppliers and lead firms exists. In this sense, this framework does not 
provide a framework to study individual lower-tier suppliers in a developing country, 
which is better analysed through the GVC and GPN frameworks. However, the insights 
from the Global Business Revolution framework are highly relevant for this study, so we 
will be revisiting them throughout this work.   
3.3.4 Global Value Chains and Global Production Networks 
The GVC and GPN frameworks are the most fully developed so far, at least in terms 
of sketching out some causal principles. The two literatures may come from different 
theoretical perspectives, but empirically case study work in the two traditions has tended 
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to be quite similar (Bair, 2005), so they are considered here together. Before we go on to 
describe the theories of governance and upgrading in these literatures, it is worth spending 
some time to problematize the definitions of GVCs and GPNs first, as their fuzzy 
boundaries are indeed a source of confusion.  
First, which product is the starting point of the analysis and how much forward or 
backward should one go? For example, some case studies in the electronics sector take 
telecommunication devices as the final products, but when they analyze inputs into the 
production, they do not really go backwards all the way to the raw materials that make up 
the hardware, which would be quite cumbersome. Other studies focus instead on some key 
functions of the firms involved (design, assembly, key component manufacturing) or on 
individual components (semiconductors, LCD screens, software) that might actually 
feature in more than one chain. The opposite starting point is usually encountered in 
agricultural commodities, starting from the raw material and going forward to downstream 
processing, marketing and use, when one could go backwards into agricultural machinery, 
fertilizer and water pumps. In this sense, the boundaries of the GVC/GPN are simply a 
matter of perspective, rather than a sharply delineated object of inquiry that exists 
independently of the viewpoint of the researcher.  
Second, what is the role of extra-firm actors? The GVC theory has strived to abstract 
from complexity to uncover causal relationships in governance and upgrading. To do this, 
it has largely focused on the inter-firm arena, with other key institutions like the state being 
peripheral to the analysis and rarely conceptualizes as having their own (potentially 
conflicting) goals. The GPN framework has acknowledged that firms are anchored in a 
certain geographical space and institutional matrix, which creates historical specificities in 
the way GPNs become embedded in local production structures. However, this approach 
has led to a rather complex and descriptive framework, especially when it comes to the role 
of the extra-firm actors, such as the state, trade unions and international institutions.  
There are no hard and fast answers to the questions above, but we simply point out that 
any analysis of transnational production networks should explain clearly what boundaries 
have been adopted. In this dissertation, it is argued that a focus on the product and its 
immediate components is the most fruitful approach to study the electronics value chain, 
going further backwards only if there are significant elements of governance between 
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lower-tier suppliers. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that few studies, not excluding this 
one, can tackle such detail, especially given the sensitivity of information involved. In 
terms of the extra-firm actors, while we acknowledge the multitude of actors involved, we 
are only concerned with the role of the state as it is expressed in industrial policy objectives. 
The narrow focus enables a more in-depth analysis and an exploration of the different 
configurations possible.  
Governance 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the binary governance structures of GCCs were not able 
to capture a large spectrum of transactions that stood in between the buyer-led and 
producer-led types. Gereffi et al (2005) dealt with this problem by incorporating insights 
from transaction cost economics and theories of the firm to make governance a more 
analytically useful concept.  
Three key elements appeared to influence governance: the complexity of information 
and knowledge transfer that is needed for a particular transaction to take place, the extent 
to which these elements can be codified and the capabilities of actual and potential 
suppliers to meet these requirements. These characteristics determine governance into 
market-based, modular, relational, captive and hierarchies (see Table 3.1 for definitions). 
Governance modes can change over time, leading to dynamic organizational changes in 
the GVCs concerned.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Governance Modes 
Table 3.1 redacted, pending permission  
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The above modes are highly dependent on supply side characteristics. However, the 
organization of the chain can also depend on institutional variables, as highlighted by the 
varieties of capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or on final market characteristics 
as the original GCC typology strived to show. Coe and Yeung (2015) try to integrate some 
of these issues in the GPN framework. They argue that governance modes are 
organizational outcomes of how firms deal with the following factors: optimizing their own 
cost-capability ratios, sustaining market development, working with financial discipline 
and dealing with risk. Part of their summary table is reproduced here (Table 3.2) but some 
of the terminology has been changed to match the terms used in the GVC literature to 
facilitate comparison.  
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Firm-specific strategies and organizational outcomes in global 
production networks 
Table 3.2 redacted, pending permission  
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There are some new elements here. The optimization of cost-capability ratios is a more 
complex way to understand capabilities, as the incentive to outsource does not only depend 
on suppliers, but also on how high the capabilities of the lead firm are compared to its 
production cost. In any case, this is the variable the GVC framework has largely dealt with. 
The market imperative refers mainly to whether a firm is operating in a saturated market 
or in one that is growing. Both will increase incentives to externalize production, but a firm 
operating in a saturated market will focus more on cost cutting by engaging with low cost 
suppliers, rather than on building strategic partnerships. Finally, the issue of risk is more 
problematic, as it encompasses many diverse issues, from potential leakages of intellectual 
property when outsourcing to rapid technological shifts. This makes it unlikely that all 
types of risk would have the same impact on the incentive to outsource, as the authors seem 
to suggest.  
The issue of financial discipline is a welcome addition. This has not been explored 
enough in the GVC literature, except perhaps by Milberg and Winkler (2013) and Nolan 
(2001). Firms that are more financialized will make more efforts to cut costs by outsourcing 
non-core competences. This also has implications on future growth, as higher stock market 
capitalisations could improve the ability of firms to conduct M&As and increase in scale 
(Nolan, 2001). At the other extreme are state-owned firms that may have different goals, 
such as employment expansion or strategic technology acquisition, rather than shareholder 
value maximization. The issue of financial discipline ties into the wider discussion of 
varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and could also shed light on the observed 
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governance variations in production networks not only according to sectors, but also 
according to the national origin of the lead firm or the type of ownership.   
However, the above typologies of governance are not without problems. First, they 
refer to transactions between only two firms and it is not clear if a certain kind of 
coordination at the ‘top’ impacts the ‘bottom’ or not. In other words, does it matter for a 
low-end plastic material supplier if Foxconn is a strategic partner to Apple or a captive 
supplier? It is possible, for example, that supplying to a strategic partner could offer more 
long-term potential as these are less easily replaced by lead firms compared to captive 
suppliers. However, this is not something that is explored in the literature. This is important 
because if we perceive the value chain or the network as the totality of these inter-firm 
relationships, a theory of governance should have something to say about the set of these 
relationships, rather than only about the binary relationships at the top.  
Second, it has been mentioned that modes of governance are not static and can change 
over time, but the mechanisms are not explored systematically within the frameworks. 
Many of the dynamic changes considered take place due to developments external to the 
networks or chains. For example, supplier capability can be shaped by industrial policy as 
explained in Chapter 2, while codification in the form of global standards is a process that 
frequently involves the state and multi-stakeholder bodies that can use standards to erect 
barriers or promote specific technologies (see for example Kennedy, 2006 on the case of 
wi-max in China). Other changes could be endogenous; for example, as suppliers engage 
in GVCs they increase their capabilities or lead firms increase codification over time to 
promote outsourcing (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011). In any case, it is clear that exploring 
dynamic changes will require connecting GVCs to other theoretical bodies, and in this 
research these will be industrial policy and the development of technological capabilities. 
 Upgrading and Development  
The GVC and GPN frameworks have tried to find ways to describe the new ways of 
organizing production globally and uncover the drivers of their governance patterns. If 
anything, it is clear that the boundaries of the firm keep changing and international trade 
has become increasingly complex. In this setting, far removed from the perfectly 
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competitive models of economic theory and the theory of comparative advantage, how is 
development to be achieved?  
Development in the GVC framework is perceived as an aggregation of firm level 
upgrading outcomes across a pre-defined space, such as the sector, the region or the 
national economy (Bair, 2005; Coe and Yeung, 2015). In this framework, upgrading can 
take four different forms. A firm could remain within the same chain ‘link’ but introduce 
a more efficient production system (process upgrading), it could introduce a new product 
(product upgrading), it could add more high value-added functions (functional upgrading) 
or it could change chains altogether (inter-chain upgrading) (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002).  
The reason that upgrading leads to development is that suppliers can capture more 
profits. Adding more functions could turn a firm from a supplier to a strategic partner and 
eventually to a lead firm, a situation that could land a firm into a position of more structural 
power, and hence the ability to reap more profit in the future. However, given the tough 
competition between lead firms, this strategy is risky and might not always pay the 
imagined rewards. For this reason, some researchers suggest to focus entirely on 
profitability as a measure of upgrading, rather than the firm’s position on the value chain 
(Coe and Yeung, 2015; Ponte and Ewert, 2009; Tokatli, 2013). However, in this way we 
would not be able to differentiate between strategies of increasing profit through innovation 
and productivity growth, and strategies that rely on skirting regulations or repressing labor. 
A way around these issues would be to follow Morisson, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2008) 
and define upgrading ‘as innovation producing an increase in the value added’ (p.45), 
shifting the focus back onto firm capabilities for upgrading.  
However, there are two problems with the concept of upgrading as development in the 
GVC framework.  
First, upgrading captures a change relative to the original situation of the firm but not 
relative to the firm’s competition and the other chain links. What this means is that there is 
no way of understanding if there is an improvement in the bargaining position of the firm 
following the upgrading vis-à-vis the buyer. If supplier firms constantly upgrade in order 
to keep up with technological developments but remain at the lower end of the value chain, 
then, even though technological capabilities will be improving somewhat, the relative 
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distribution of value added will be stable. This highlights the need to study firms in context, 
rather than as stand-alone case studies.  
Second, upgrading does not take into account empirical evidence on lead firms that 
came to that position not by gradually upgrading from being suppliers, but by starting their 
own brands from the start. For example, Hyundai Motors accumulated capabilities by a 
combination of reverse engineering capital goods, sending engineers abroad for training 
and technology licensing (Westphal et al, 1981). As explained later in Chapter 4, many of 
Guangdong’s leading firms in electronics and telecommunications developed on the basis 
of a mixed strategy, acting both as a supplier to foreign brands, and also as a lead firm for 
the domestic market.  
Assuming that upgrading in GVCs is desirable, the next point of inquiry would be what 
causes it. In general, there seems to be an assumption in the GVC literature that integration 
into GVCs is a prerequisite for upgrading, as it encourages learning-by-doing and firms 
gain knowledge from dealing with sophisticated buyers and markets. However, despite this 
superficial link, there have been little efforts to incorporate more seriously the economics 
of technological change. Moreover, not many works have looked at the social and 
environmental aspects of upgrading. The few examples that exist show that insertion in 
GVCs does not actually guarantee upgrading, especially since suppliers are often 
discouraged from functionally upgrading and competing with lead firms on certain 
business segments15 (Schmitz and Knorringa 2000, Giuliani, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 
2005). This is in sharp contrast to the more critical tradition of looking at FDI, where both 
benefits and costs have been repeatedly reviewed (for a summary see UNCTAD, 1999).  
In arguing that integration into GVCs is the main conduit for knowledge transfer and 
market development for firms in developing countries, and by not problematizing this 
process further, the GVC line of research has failed to come up with a credible theory of 
development beyond the firm-level.  
                                                 
15 Of course discouragement does not mean that it is impossible. Several developing country 
firms developed brands successfully, often buying the firms that had supplied them with OEM 
(original equipment manufacturing) business before, in order to gain market access and technology. 
For example, the South Korean electronics manufacturer LG acquired the U.S. based TV maker 
Zenith in 1999.  
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For example, Gereffi (1995) used the earlier framework of GCCs to discuss 
industrialization strategies pursued in East Asia and Latin America from 1950 to 1990. 
Gereffi argued that the export orientation of many East Asian suppliers was feasible 
because of the sharp rise at the time of buyer-driven GCCs in light consumer goods, such 
as electronics and textiles. In contrast, heavy industries continued to be characterized by 
producer-driven chains that had a more inward orientation. However, what his argument 
missed is that the demand generated by the lead firms needed to be matched by supply 
from firms that had already developed significant capabilities, and this depended on the 
implementation of industrial policies.  
A similar problem exists in the GPN literature. Coe and Yeung (2015) describe three 
different modes of ‘plugging into’ networks for regions: (i) regions integrate by creating 
local indigenous firms that rely on innovation and could become lead firms; (ii) regions act 
as export platforms for MNCs; and (iii) regions integrate by being hosts to (indigenous or 
foreign) specialized suppliers and strategic partners 16 . This typology is an effort to 
differentiate regional modes of integration based on the average function of firms within 
the GPNs that develop in each region. There is a clear hierarchy of development outcomes 
according to the technological capabilities of firms, but how firms develop these is not 
discussed.  
In contrast to those who are advocating integration into GVCs as the only (or at least 
the main) path to economic development, my view is that we should understand economic 
development as a process of accumulation of capabilities, whether these are enhanced by 
integration or not. 
3.4 Global Value Chains and Industrial Policy 
Given the diverse approaches to the study of transnational production networks, it is 
not surprising that opinions in this literature on the role of industrial policy in fostering 
                                                 
16 The terms Coe and Yeung (2015) choose to refer to the three modes are indigenous, structural 
and functional. It is worth noting that the three types of integration described above are also similar 
to other characterisations development trajectories in East Asia. For example Keller and Samuels 
(2003) talked about technologlobalists, technonationalists and technohybrids and Amsden (2001) 
who discussed the independents and the integrationists.  
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economic development vary widely. These views do not depend only on what the perceived 
impact of GVCs is on the implementation of industrial policy but also on whether the 
author is convinced that industrial policies bring about industrial development, regardless 
of how production is organized.  
This Section discusses three distinct views on the issue. Section 3.4.1 discusses the 
view that selective industrial policy is not feasible under fragmented production. Section 
3.4.2 evaluates the view that industrial policy is desired but its impact on creating global 
lead firms in developing countries might be limited. Section 4.3 discusses the view 
supported by recent GVC scholarship that industrial policy is necessary to increase supplier 
capability but it should not be interventionist in trade and investment.   
3.4.1 Industrial Policy is a No-Go 
Traditionally market-oriented institutions have seen the expansion of GVCs as further 
justifying a hands-off approach to the economy. For example, a joint publication by the 
OECD, the WTO and the World Bank (2014) insisted that the role of governments in 
regards to GVCs is only to provide a facilitating environment, focusing only on horizontal 
measures such as infrastructure and education.  
This view is largely based on two observations that have weak foundations. The first is 
that even if selective instruments were successful in the past (which in any case mainstream 
authors do not agree with, as discussed in Chapter 2), such instruments are not relevant any 
more due to the fact that GVCs are organized according to tasks, not sectors. The second 
is that tariffs cannot be used since trade is essential for value chains and tariffs will disrupt 
them.  
Selectivity  
The trade in tasks literature (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) argues that 
countries do not trade in products or components, but in tasks (for example, R&D, design, 
production of components, assembly, sales), which are horizontally similar across sectors. 
Countries then specialize in tasks rather than products or components, prompting some to 
declare sectoral industrial policy incompatible with GVCs (De Backer and Miroudot, 
2014).  
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This view seems rather extreme. First of all, it implies that all products have the same 
processing steps and that no particular asset specificity is needed (in skills or capital 
equipment) for different sectors. This is clearly not true. Assembly for semiconductors is 
not the same as assembly for toys even if in abstract terms they mean something similar. 
This becomes even harder to fathom as we move into more capital- and skill-intensive tasks 
that feature even higher asset specificity. For example both South Korea and Taiwan have 
specialized in semiconductors (among other products), but South Korea leads on memory 
chips while Taiwan on ASICs17. The production of memory chips relies on large economies 
of scale (mass production) and is characterized by vertical integration, where firms both 
design and produce chips (e.g. Samsung and Intel). In contrast, ASICs require flexible 
production methods, while design and production do not necessarily take place within the 
same firm. Firms producing ASICs (e.g. TSMC) need to adapt their products to their 
clients’ designs and produce at a smaller scale for each design compared to memory chips 
(Hobday, 1991). Both governance in GVCs (Gereffi et al, 2005) and systems of innovation 
(Malerba and Nelson, 2011) differ greatly by sector. This means that even if firms 
undertook the same tasks in different sectors, they would still face distinct opportunities 
and constraints to upgrading, arising from these unique sectoral characteristics. 
However, there are at least two ways in which industrial policy should adapt to GVCs. 
First, it has become evident that increased production and exports in what would have been 
considered a high-tech sector in the past (for example electronics or automotive) does not 
necessarily mean the undertaking of high-tech activities anymore, if firms are engaged only 
in labor-intensive, low-tech assembly. One should not just look at the sector then, but also 
at the functions performed within that sector. Second, the rise of GVCs puts focus on the 
entire spectrum of activities that is required to bring a product to market, beyond 
manufacturing. For example, for suppliers to become competitive in the production of 
electronic components it is necessary that they have access to reliable, fast and cheap 
logistic services. Industrial policies for the electronics industry then should take into 
                                                 
17  Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are custom designed for specific 
applications.  
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account not only the capabilities of electronics suppliers, but also the logistics 
infrastructure they have access to.   
In conclusion, the rationale for industrial policy in targeting specific sectors has not 
changed, but what GVCs imply is that within sectors of interest, targeting could be done at 
the component or task level at the entire value chain and not just manufacturing.  
The Use of Tariffs 
The ineffectiveness of tariffs in the context of GVCs is perhaps the most widely cited 
impact of GVCs on industrial policy. The main rationale is that within GVCs products 
cross borders several times to get processed further and therefore tariffs would make this 
process highly uneconomical, thereby hurting efforts to industrialize (De Backer and 
Miroudot, 2014, Hummels et al, 2001). For example, if a country has tariffs on a certain 
component for mobile phones, then a global mobile phone manufacturer/assembler like 
Samsung or Foxconn, will not locate there at all, and in this case the developing country 
will not have the chance to integrate into GVCs at all.  
However, this argument needs some unpacking. First, the import-intensity of 
production is not new. For example, during the implementation of ISI policies in Latin 
America, it was observed that imports rose sharply as imported capital equipment was 
needed to localize production and assembly, thereby actually worsening the balance of 
payments (Prebisch, 1964). Second, tariffs are not normally implemented as an across-the-
board measure, but as a highly differentiated policy tool. 
There should be a distinction between imports for the domestic market and imports for 
exports. The latter have been encouraged by implementing measures that reduce or 
eliminate tariffs on imported components for exports, such as the duty-drawback system 
on imported inputs used for exports, tariff exemptions for certain components or free trade 
zones. These can co-exist with tariffs for goods, for which import substitution could take 
place. The challenge is to ensure that domestic producers that have developed on the basis 
of import substitution invest in building capabilities, so that they eventually become 
globally competitive when the tariffs are removed.  
Furthermore, there could be differentiation according to the stage of production. In 
many cases, even in export-oriented countries such as China and Malaysia, there are higher 
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tariffs on final goods that target the domestic market and lower or no tariffs on intermediate 
goods. This encourages local processing of final goods with cheap imports of intermediate 
goods. Tariffs can be extended gradually to intermediate goods if localization of those is 
desired, although this should take into account the size of the domestic market for such 
goods. In any case, the structure of tariffs can change over time to match the industrial 
structure of the economy (Akyüz, 2009).  
Of course, this discussion does not imply that tariffs will always be successful. In 
Chapter 2 we saw that successful use of tariffs requires that industrial policies should 
discipline rent recipients into investing in capabilities building, e.g. with conditions on 
exports as it happened in Korea (Chang, 1994; Amsden, 1989). Moreover it is possible for 
export-oriented production to be encouraged side by side with producers for the domestic 
market, using highly differentiated tariff structures to match an evolving strategic vision 
for industrial development, as it happened in Taiwan and Korea (Wade, 1990).  
3.4.2 Industrial policy has new limits due to the rise of GVCs 
The second line of critique against industrial policy in a GVC context is that grooming 
national champions is less likely to be effective nowadays, given the tight race at the top 
of the chain. However, as this section shows, without industrial policy the chances for 
upgrading to the top are even dimmer than before.  
Some authors in the GVC literature argue that the main problem with industrial policy 
is that national champions have traditionally been vertically integrated firms, a business 
form that cannot be competitive given the trend of vertical disintegration (Gereffi and 
Sturgeon, 2013). However, a firm could be promoted to reach Minimum Effective Scale 
(MES) in a specific stage of the chain, so the ‘extreme’ vertical integration is not a 
necessary feature of firms supported by industrial policies. Moreover, industrial policy 
does not imply insularity from the global economy. Establishing joint ventures with foreign 
firms, licensing technologies and engaging in international M&As have all been strategies 
employed by national champions at least in South Korea and China, in order to access 
foreign knowledge networks.  
The most convincing argument on the contemporary problems of promoting national 
champions is that of Nolan (2001), who has shown that there is an ongoing unprecedented 
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struggle for market dominance between the top global lead firms in almost all sectors18. 
These firms keep on growing by conducting M&As, which are feasible, given their superior 
access to financial resources and high market capitalizations. They then invest in enormous 
R&D expenditures to sustain their technological dominance, branding power and state-of-
the-art IT infrastructure, erecting formidable barriers to entry.  
In this context of highly oligopolized and ever-concentrating market structures, a 
developing country firm starting its catch-up now would be even more disadvantaged than 
before. It would have far fewer resources to spend on R&D, branding and M&As (even 
with industrial policy measures) and it would not be able to compete on price since cheaper 
production sites are also available to lead firms through outsourcing. Of course, the 
development of few but powerful brands from South Korea and Taiwan in electronics, 
automobiles and ships (LG, Samsung, HTC, Hyundai) shows that it might be difficult but 
not impossible. Below in Table 3.4 we show the slow growth of global firms from 
developing countries. In 2015 these accounted for a quarter of all global companies and 
revenue, the majority of growth since 1995 is due to the development of Chinese firms.  
Table 3.4 Fortune 500 companies from developing countries 
Country No of F500 Share of firms in 2015  
Total global revenues (%) 1995 2005 2015 
Developing Countries 10 30 123 25.00 
Brazil 4 3 7 1.31 
China 2 15 97 20.43 
India 1 4 7 0.96 
Indonesia   1 0.15 
Mexico 1 2 2 0.47 
Malaysia  1 1 0.23 
Russia  3 5 1.15 
Thailand  1 1 0.21 
Turkey 1 1 1 0.09 
Venezuela 1    
Note: China does not include Hong Kong firms 
Source: Fortune.com/global500  
                                                 
18 According to data from the US Census Bureau analyzed by the Economist, between 1997 
and 2012 the weighted-average share of the top four firms’ revenues in the US has risen from 26% 
to 32% of the total. Almost a tenth of the industrial activity took place in industries in which the 
top four firms control two thirds or more of sales (The Economist, March 24 2016).  
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We agree that becoming a global leader today is indeed much harder than it was before 
the ‘Global Business Revolution’. However, there are three further considerations one 
should take into account.  
First, technological leadership often changes not in ‘head-to-head’ battles over 
established business, but when there is a new technological ‘window of opportunity’ (Lee, 
and Malerba, 2016). For example, Nokia toppled Motorola when the GSM standard was 
implemented and then Samsung and Apple toppled Nokia with the emergence of the smart 
phone. This requires the existence of firms that have already built considerable expertise 
and are ready to recognize opportunities in new technologies and reap them. Industrial 
policy can help with developing such capabilities in the first place.  
Second, in some ways becoming a lead firm has also become easier, since firms can 
access large networks of suppliers, bypassing the cumbersome task of building advanced 
manufacturing capabilities in-house (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). For example, Xiaomi, a 
Chinese mobile phone company outsources product assembly to Foxconn and Inventec, 
among others, to produce its phones, the same suppliers used by Apple.  
Third, becoming a global lead firm is one measure of success of many. Taiwan has 
secured a high standard of industrial performance not by having lead firms, but by being 
home to the top first-tier suppliers in the electronics industry.  
Fourth, the problem of high entry barriers to lead firm status should actually be further 
cause for concern and would serve to justify (rather than nullify) the rationale for industrial 
policy, despite the lower likelihood of developing country firms reaching lead firm status. 
China, a country that has used industrial policies aggressively, managed to create large 
(mostly state-owned) firms, making up a quarter of Fortune 500 companies in 2015. Their 
innovative capacity is another story (see Nolan, 2014), but at least they have amassed the 
required resources, should they want to invest with a view to competing globally.  
Let’s take this argument further. We saw in Chapter 2 that the structural differences 
between developed and developing countries had been cited as a key reason for 
implementing industrial policy (ECLAC, 1950). While at that time the framework was 
conceived largely in terms of industry versus commodity production, later works have 
differentiated between industrial sectors in terms of productivity growth. In a nutshell, core 
84 
 
countries specialize in industrial sectors that have more potential for productivity growth 
than developing countries do.  
The GVC can be thought of as a microcosm of how these structural differences are 
encouraged and sustained at the global level (Schwartz, 2007). Lead firms face 
oligopolistic market structures, while competition increases as one goes down the value 
chain and profits similarly decrease. This is not only an outcome of technological or market 
characteristics, but it is a structure sustained actively by lead firms. Strategies of grooming 
alternative suppliers, squeezing suppliers by offloading to them the risk of maintaining 
inventories, and restricting their access to key technologies are some of the ways in which 
lead firms can sustain the gap with suppliers. In other words, there is an endogenous 
incentive for lead firms to keep externalizing selected aspects of their production and then 
keep costs down by squeezing suppliers, thereby increasing their own profits even in the 
face of sharp product market competition (Milberg and Winkler, 2013).  
Since lead firms predominantly reside in advanced countries and lower-tier suppliers 
in developing countries, on aggregate something like a core-periphery relationship can be 
created through GVC operations. On the one hand, the expansion of GVCs makes it ever 
harder for suppliers to reach lead firm status, and, on the other hand, supportive industrial 
policy is even more necessary for them to improve their bargaining power, even if they do 
not aspire to become lead firms. Almost all industrial policy measures can be of help, but 
particularly helpful are those that increase the scale of suppliers (e.g. promoting national 
champions) and those that increase technological capabilities beyond those of competitors, 
such as the promotion of specialized clusters (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006), public-
private partnerships in developing high-tech products (Weiss, 1998), university-industry 
collaborations, worker training and R&D subsidies and grants.  
3.4.3 Yes to industrial policy, but  no to selectivity 
During its first decade at least, GVC scholarship did not engage much with industrial 
policy, focusing instead on insertion into GVCs as the main tool for knowledge transfer 
and consequently for development. However, given the success of the GVC framework 
with policymaking (Neilson, 2014), more questions started emerging about the role of the 
state in this context.  
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The vision of industrial policy that was articulated by the GVC literature, as represented 
by Gereffi and Sturgeon (2013), Coe and Yeung (2015) and UNCTAD (2013b) is one that 
envisions a role for industrial policy in developing local supplier capabilities but in a way 
that aligns with the interests of lead firms and buyers so that integration is encouraged. 
This view is based on both a reluctance to acknowledge that trade policy could play role 
(as in 3.4.1) and also on the understanding that national champions could be too vertically 
integrated and insulated from global knowledge flows (Section 3.4.2). Below we 
summarize some of the basic recommendations:    
 Attention to horizontal non-selective measures such as infrastructure, human capital 
and R&D support, to both indigenous and foreign firms. 
 Support for compliance to ISO and other production standards.  
 Creation of clusters and promotion of inter-firm linkages. 
 Intellectual property protection policies. 
 Liberalized trade and investment environment.  
 Environmental and social standards.  
While these works highlight an important part of the contemporary development 
experience, they do not go far enough in problematizing the creation of firm capabilities, 
especially beyond the supplier-buyer relationship. A key criticism of the neoclassical 
literature was that it assumed that firms can be competitive from the get-go or that they can 
themselves fully bear the cost of learning and experimentation. In line with our discussion 
in Chapter 2, we argue that this is an unrealistic assumption.  Successful building-up of 
technological capabilities often needs bold action. More importantly, it is crucial to 
consider the role of industrial policy in areas where a conflict exists between the needs of 
lead firms and national economic development. For example, while the emergence of 
technologically advanced lead firms is an objective of economic development, lead firms 
may want to stifle their growth to prevent future competition. (UNCTAD, 1999; 
Christopherson and Clark, 2007; Evans, 1995).  
This work is a departure from other works that consider GVCs and industrial policy in 
three ways. First, selective industrial policy measures are not considered incompatible with 
development in the face of GVC expansion but necessary. Second, the constraints to 
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development from global integration are considered in greater depth, especially as they 
relate to indigenous firm development. Third, a more integrated framework is presented 
that attempts to connect the three literatures of concern here, (industrial policy, GVCs and 
development of technological capabilities), not only nominally, but also analytically. We 
present this in Section 3.5 below.  
3.5 An Integrated Framework 
Since three different theoretical strands are considered, we specify three ‘pairs’ of 
relationships that make up the building blocks. First is the relationship between industrial 
policy and the building of technological capabilities. This has been explored at length in 
Section 2.6. Second, there is the relationship between industrial policy and GVCs, which 
was explored in depth in Section 3.3. We discuss these two briefly (3.5.1 and 3.5.2). Third, 
there is the connection between technological capabilities and upgrading in GVCs, 
presented below, in Section 3.5.3. In section 3.5.4, we bring all these elements together and 
give some broad examples of the diversity of industrial trajectories possible.  
 
3.5.1 Pair One: Industrial policy and Technological Capabilities  
For a detailed view on industrial policy and technological capabilities the reader is 
referred to Chapter 2, Section 6, but to re-cap briefly:   
 
Evolutionary economics has argued that firm technological capabilities, spanning from 
basic assembly to launching cutting-edge product and process innovations, are 
accumulated gradually and require significant effort by the firms (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Dosi et al [eds], 1988; Lazonick, 1993; Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009; Nübler, 
2014). Industrial policy should complement the endogenous incentives firms have for 
investing in innovation by shaping the environment faced by them, through changing 
relative prices, reducing uncertainty by providing markets, and encouraging cooperation 
between firms. These factors significantly influence the choice of a firm regarding what to 
produce and whether and exactly in which areas to invest in technological capability 
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accumulation (for a detailed exposition of the types of capabilities see Lall, 1992 and Pack 
and Westphal, 1986).  
3.5.2 Pair Two: Industrial Policy and GVCs 
My analysis so far agrees with several previous works on strategic industrial policy 
(Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Chang, 1994; Lall, 2004). Industrial policy affects domestic 
firm engagement with GVCs in two ways. The first is direct, encompassing policies to 
attract FDI or any other policies that promote domestic firms’ integration into GVCs. The 
second way is indirect and it involves changing any of the determinants of governance 
modes and are in the purview of industrial policy, such as standard-making, financial 
discipline, financial risk, and more importantly the capabilities of suppliers.  
 
3.5.3 Pair Three: Technological Capabilities and GVCs 
The notion of technological capability development and its relationship with industrial 
upgrading is something that is frequently mentioned in the GVC literature (Hobday, 2001; 
Ernst, 2002; UNCTAD, 2013). Moreover, concepts that are important to the innovation 
literature, such as the complexity and the codifiability of knowledge, have already been 
used to classify GVC governance modes (Gereffi et al, 2005).  
Despite these superficial links, the efforts to analytically combine these two literatures 
further have been sparse. This could be due to the difference in the objects of investigation. 
The GVC literature looks at transnational inter-firm relationships, with the state usually 
treated as exogenous. In contrast, evolutionary economics has produced concepts like the 
innovation system that explicitly take into account the role of the state and other institutions 
(e.g. universities) for firm innovation capacity development. Another reason for the sparse 
integration between the two literature is that the main object of the study of innovation 
economics has been frontier innovation in industrialized countries, for which insertion into 
GVCs would not be a significant determinant (Enrst and Kim, 2002). 
The two literatures can be fruitfully combined, if one views transnational inter-firm 
relationships as a central source of technological learning for firms directly engaged in 
transnational production networks, additional to the sources found in the domestic 
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economy, which is traditionally the focus of the innovation literature. Conversely, for the 
GVC scholars, focusing on technological capabilities can provide a better understanding 
of upgrading, beyond the buyer-supplier relationship.  
We prefer to critically combine two already existing frameworks that complement each 
other. The first is that developed by Ernst and Kim (2002), who constructed a matrix 
describing the possibilities for knowledge transfer to local firms when they participate in 
GPNs, drawing on modular networks found in the electronics industry (Table 3.5). The 
process of knowledge transfer is complete when it has been internalized by the local 
supplier. The more common mechanism that can takes place even outside of GVCs is 
where the supplier acquires knowledge embodied in capital equipment bought on the 
market. However, within GVCs, provided that increasing supplier capacity is in the interest 
of the lead firm, other arrangements could also take place, such as the lead firm training 
supplier employees or sending its own engineers to the supplier to help with production.   
Table 3.5 Knowledge transfer matrix in GPNs 
Table 3.5 redacted, pending permission  
 
 
 
The second framework is that developed by Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2011), who 
deepen the connection with the GVC literature, by pointing out that different GVC 
governance modes can encourage different kinds of learning mechanisms (Table 3.6).  
 
Table 3.6 Governance and learning 
Table 3.6 redacted, pending permission  
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Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2011) argue that a mature, complete and effective innovation 
system in the suppliers’ country could help with increasing the suppliers’ technological 
capabilities as well as their capacity to deal with complexity and codification. This in turn 
encourages chains that rely on increased supplier competence, complexity and codification 
and offer better opportunities for further learning than chains, which rely simply on low 
costs. This is similar to the argument this research is making, but our emphasis is on the 
impact of industrial policy over time on a wide range of technological capabilities, from 
production to innovation.   
3.5.4 An Integrated Framework 
The causal relationships discussed in 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 are put into Figure 3.3 to 
provide a visual guide to what has been argued so far. The main goal is upgrading, 
understood as innovating to upgrade, in any of the four identified ways discussed 
previously. Upgrading requires the build up of technological capabilities and the success 
of such a build up in turn will also depend on how extensive and intense the firm effort is 
(Ernst and Kim, 2002; Lazonick, 1992). To mirror the flow of the chapter, Arrows 1.1 and 
1.2 reflect the influence of industrial policy on firm effort. Some of it is direct through 
shaping prices, market structure and uncertainty, while some of the impact is indirect, 
through the impact on the domestic innovation system, with policies such as setting up 
research agencies, investing in infrastructure, encouraging linkages and so on. There is also 
a feedback loop from firm capability accumulation to industrial policy, to show that policy 
should adapt to a changing level of skills (Arrow 1.3). Then Arrow 2 reflects the direct 
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relationship between industrial policy and GVCs. Arrows No 3.1 and 3.2 reflect the 
bidirectional relationship between knowledge transfer and GVCs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Determinants of upgrading  
 
The need to adapt policy in terms of the development stage of the country and the stage 
of maturity of a sector has been pointed out before19 (Chang, 1994; Livesey, 2012). Infant 
industry policies (including subsidizing FDI) would be needed in the beginning to establish 
new sectors that are mature in the world stage. Then, as economy-wide technological 
capabilities evolve and suppliers can undertake more complex functions, the main goal of 
                                                 
19 The notion that policy needs to adapt to the stage of maturity of a sector is related to the 
industry life-cycle literature. Key works include Abernathy and Utterback (1978), Gort and Klepper 
(1982), Klepper (1990) and Utterback and Suarez (1993).   
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industrial policy would shift to maintaining competitiveness in the already existing 
segments and to promoting upgrading to higher value added segments. 
Moreover, the institutional variation across countries, or even regions means that the 
design and implementation of policy, the responses of agents to it and the nature of 
interaction between agents can differ and that such differences can be sustained over time 
(Zysman, 1994; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Chaminade and Edquist, 2010). For example, it 
may be the case that a country selectively and strategically attracts foreign firms, like 
Singapore did, or puts more emphasis on building indigenous technology, like Korea and 
to a lesser extent Taiwan did, thereby shaping the direction of future policy choices in terms 
of climbing up the value chain (Amsden, 2001; Yeung, 2007; Thurbon and Weiss, 2006; 
Keller and Samuels, 2003). Others point out that, when policy aims to increase 
competitiveness, the necessary policy instruments should depend on the sector, too. Some 
sectors that usually feature small firm sizes, such as textiles, biotechnology, specialized 
equipment suppliers or software development, might require clustering in order to increase 
collective efficiency, while others, such as automobiles, chemicals, and other heavy 
industries, require achieving economies of scale in a single firm (Robertson and Langlois, 
1995).  
We now push the analysis a little bit further to add a three-stage perspective to this, 
building on the cumulative and evolutionary character of firm, sector and economy-wide 
technological capabilities (Table 3.7).  
The three stages are: (i) when the industry concerned is emerging and the economy has 
low technological capabilities; (ii) when the industry is growing and the economy has 
intermediate technological capabilities; and (iii) when the industry is catching-up and the 
economy has advanced technological capabilities. This implicitly assumes that firms and 
economy are developing in tandem. This assumption is for simplicity, as it might not be 
the case, when one industry is developing much faster than others. The industry here is 
defined in terms of the broad category of the final product, for example textiles and 
garments or electronics, while recognizing that only a few stages of production or specific 
components will make up the sector in each economy. In modular chains there are often 
components that have their own complex chains, such as hard disks or semiconductors. In 
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that case it might be possible to focus on a sub-industry, especially if the same component 
could find its way into different types of final products.  
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Table 3.7 Stages of industrial policy, GVCs and industrial upgrading 
Industrial Policy Instruments Impact of integration into GVCs 
General policies Specific for 
Indigenous Firms 
Knowledge Transfer Constraints 
Industry Emerging, Low Technological Capabilities in Economy 
Active attraction 
of FDI  
Selective 
instruments to 
promote specific 
industries (e.g. 
tariffs and 
subsidies) 
Infrastructure 
development  
Investments in 
education, esp. 
vocational 
Creation of SOEs or 
subsidize entry of 
POEs 
Establishment of 
local institutes to 
help with 
technology transfer 
and adaptation 
Policies to 
encourage JVs and 
firm linkages in 
general 
Lead firm actively 
transfers knowledge to 
subsidiary 
JV partners and 
promoted domestic 
suppliers become 
captive suppliers to 
MNCs that have 
invested in the 
economy and enjoy 
spillovers 
Spillovers to local 
economy from 
turnover of skilled 
workers 
Limited subsidiary 
autonomy implies 
limited demand for 
local 
subcontracting  
 
 
Industry Becoming Competitive, Intermediate Technological Capabilities in Economy 
Clustering 
policies  
Subsidies to 
encourage R&D  
Establishment of 
applied research 
institutes 
Encouraging 
government – 
industry – 
academia linkages 
Infant industry 
policies to 
encourage 
economies of scale 
and learning in 
domestic firms  
Subsidization of 
standards 
compliance  
 
Lead firm transfers 
more or higher value- 
added 
products/functions to 
subsidiaries  
Greater autonomy for 
subsidiaries  
Subcontracting 
demands from lead 
firms for lower-end 
tasks 
 
Low-end foreign 
subsidiaries might 
feel competitive 
pinch from 
domestic firms and 
leave 
Lead firms 
encourage price 
competition among 
subcontractors to 
keep costs down 
 
Industry Catching-Up, Advanced Technological Capabilities in Economy 
Selective 
protection of 
strategic 
firms/sectors 
High-tech-
specific subsidies  
Incentives for 
talent to return 
from studies/work 
abroad  
Selective subsidies 
and protection to 
leading firms, with 
conditionalities on 
competitiveness 
Enhanced 
competition for 
previously protected 
firms with sufficient 
capabilities (e.g. by 
More chances of 
relational and modular 
supply links, which 
improve technology 
transfer further 
 
Lobbying from 
lead firms to limit 
development of 
potential 
competitors (e.g. 
citing security 
concerns of their 
products or unfair 
trading practices) 
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Notes: POE: Private-owned enterprise (indigenous), from Amsden (2009) 
Source: Author’s classification  
One will notice that in Table 3.7 we have divided policies into general -pertaining to 
all firms in the domestic economy whether foreign or indigenous- and into policies 
specifically to encourage indigenous firms. This is to highlight the fact that discussion of 
integration into GVCs often does not make it clear whether the firm that is doing the 
upgrading is foreign or not, a distinction that has implications both on the ability of the 
firm in question to upgrade and on the impact of upgrading on local development 
(UNCTAD, 1999). It is also tied to discussions of path dependencies, with reliance on FDI 
being a major determinant of future industrial trajectories (Amsden, 2001, 2009). It is after 
all difficult to expect a country to develop indigenous innovation capabilities without first 
spending years encouraging and promoting local learning, a strategy that would usually 
conflict with lead firm interests.  
In reality, the possibilities for different paths arising out of the interaction of industrial 
policy, integration into GVCs and firm strategy are endless, given the evolutionary 
character of development. However, we hope that some of the empirical regularities that 
are highlighted by the stage approach will prove a useful guide for future thinking on 
industrial policy.  
The first stage is about the emergence in a developing country of an industry that is 
already mature in advanced industrialized countries. Assuming a low level of 
industrialization, which was the case in many emerging export platforms in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, such as South Korea and Taiwan, the most basic production and innovation 
capabilities had to be created and nurtured. Two strategies have been followed to encourage 
the development of an emerging industry: (i) relying on attracting FDI, and; (ii) promoting 
indigenous capital. These strategies can be pursued simultaneously in different industries, 
as it happened in South Korea and Taiwan (see Wade, 1990).   
Investments in 
high-end skills 
Promotion of 
basic research  
Venture capital 
promotion 
 
liberalizing or 
putting in place anti-
trust strategies)  
Encouragement of 
international M&As 
and technology 
licensing 
Unlikely that MNE 
subsidiaries will 
reach this stage 
because advanced 
tasks are 
undertaken in 
headquarters 
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Attracting FDI aims to leverage on the demand for offshoring and subcontracting to 
build domestic capabilities. Common policy tools include tax incentives, specialized 
infrastructure in the form of export processing zones or other industrial zones, duty-free 
imports for certain inputs, relaxed rules on labor protection, and so on. The aim is to reduce 
transaction and production costs so as to make offshoring in the economy more attractive 
for MNCs. Some examples of this include the efforts of China with special economic zones 
(Zeng, 2010) or Malaysia with free trade zones (Johansson and Nilsson, 1997). In this FDI-
led stage, there are knowledge transfers taking place between the headquarters and the 
subsidiaries established in the developing economies, with the former having an interest in 
developing the capabilities of its subsidiaries. The benefits of FDI then could spill over into 
the local economy (UNCTAD, 1999). In the simplest case, this spillover would be only the 
knowledge acquired by workers and managers and some minimal local sourcing. However, 
even this case does not necessarily imply a hands-off attitude from the state. For example, 
in Penang in Malaysia the local state was active in attracting selected firms for FDI and 
tried to encourage their linkages with local suppliers by connecting firms with each other 
and set up a private-public vocational skills center to improve local human capital  
(Hutchinson, 2008).  
Actively promoting indigenous firms to enter an emerging industry in a country at a 
low level development requires tackling several market failures that may prevent firms 
from doing so. Capital might be scarce in the country or financial markets might be unable 
to provide finance for long-term investments. Basic skills might also be lacking, including 
at the managerial level, to handle basic investment and production activities and so on. The 
state could help by offering fiscal incentives, by establishing its own firms, or by setting 
up state-owned financial intermediaries to provide long-term and/or specialized finance, to 
encourage entry into the industry. Indigenous firms can also link-up to value chains as 
subcontractors to local MNC subsidiaries or foreign buyers and benefit from knowledge 
transfers within GVCs. It could be argued that this is the strategy followed in China, and 
Korea and Taiwan before it, where domestic firms mushroomed next to foreign-invested 
firms and were able to provide simple components or perform basic assembly.  
Upgrading to the next stage requires different type of interventions than those for 
simple industrial emergence. For upgrading to happen, firms (either local or foreign 
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subsidiaries) have to progress from performing basic tasks to acquiring more advanced 
innovation capabilities, although these will still be considered intermediate by global 
standards, such as adaptation of technology, training of skilled workers and forging of 
linkages with other agents in the innovation system (Lall, 1992).  
 
 
Again, industrial policy can be instrumental in encouraging the shift from industrial 
emergence to upgrading. Given that these innovation capabilities require investments in 
capital (including R&D) equipment, skilled staff, marketing and so on, tax incentives and 
other ways to subsidize particular types of investments could be crucial. This can be 
directed at both indigenous firms and at foreign firms, to induce them to make larger 
investments in their subsidiaries. Promoting scale economies in indigenous firms through 
building national champions is also a strategy followed in countries like Korea (Amsden, 
1989) and China (Nolan, 2014). Initiatives to promote clustering and coordination could 
also fall under this category, as they also encourage economies of scale in R&D and 
marketing on top of cross-fertilization of ideas and increased labor mobility (Robertson 
and Langlois, 1995; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996). Investments in human capital become 
increasingly important at this stage, as do investments in building supporting institutions, 
such as the establishment of research agencies and technical institutes and investments in 
telecommunication and IT infrastructure.  
Even without industrial policy measures, it is possible that some upgrading would take 
place anyway, because of the inter-firm knowledge transfer within GVCs, as has been 
discussed previously. In Malaysia, for example, electronics MNC subsidiaries nurtured 
local subcontractors, while some lead firms, such as Intel, increased the functions 
performed by their own subsidiaries considerably over time (Rasiah, 1999).  
However, as mentioned before, there are also limitations to upgrading at this stage. 
First, some foreign investors that look for lower costs might not appreciate the higher factor 
costs that come with a growing industry and simply relocate. Second, lead firms may try 
to increase competition among suppliers in order to reduce costs and diversify their supply 
sources, thereby reducing profits for suppliers (Milberg and Winkler, 2013). Third, some 
of the measures that had been traditionally used to promote the emergence and upgrading 
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of an industry are not available due to a restriction in the policy space of developing 
countries nowadays (Gallagher, 2008).  
The last stage is that of a mature industry that is about to catch-up with industry leaders. 
Here industrial policy should stimulate advanced innovation capabilities, which has often 
been the focus of innovation economics. Relevant measures include selective protection, 
promotion of industry-government-academia research consortia and provision of risk 
capital. 
At this stage, the limits to and the opportunities from integration into GVCs change 
considerably compared to the previous two stages. It is difficult to even find one example 
of a country that has managed to reach a mature stage based mainly on foreign-led 
enterprises. Even in Singapore, SOEs are active in key sectors, such as shipbuilding and 
semiconductors. For indigenous firms, barriers to entry into the most sophisticated parts of 
the value chain can prove impossible to overcome (Nolan et al, 2008) and efforts to reach 
lead firm status are often frustrated (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). Industrial policy would 
need to deal with these issues, by focusing on the specific problems faced by firms with 
potentials to become lead firm. The recent controversial moves by China to impose 
restrictions on foreign firms in the IT sector and the support it provides to its lead 
electronics firms by battling security concerns raised by the US and the EU, are an example 
of such a strategy.  
3.6 Conclusions 
This Chapter has shown that it is possible to analytically combine the theories of 
industrial policy, the evolutionary perspective of technology capabilities accumulation, and 
the GVCs literature.  
The GVC literature has highlighted the importance of governance in production and 
trade that takes place outside the limits of intra-firm coordination. By inserting themselves 
in such networks, developing country suppliers have the opportunity to be exposed to 
higher technology and production standards, engage with more sophisticated markets and 
become more motivated to invest in capability accumulation. The positive impact of 
integration, notwithstanding fears of social and environmental downgrading, has led to 
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policy advice that prioritizes the needs of lead firms over the creation of indigenous global 
firms.  
However, as the previous Chapter has shown, bold action to build up technological 
capabilities is necessary for successful upgrading, even if it conflicts with the objectives of 
lead firms. First, a period of protected learning, balanced with incentives to encourage 
investment in capabilities, is still of great importance. Second, lead firms have incentives 
to sustain their leadership and these can diminish opportunities to upgrade further, 
especially as developing country firms move up the GVCs. This means that at the 
intermediate and final stages of industrial development, developing countries need to use 
more, not less industrial policy.  
Finally, the framework developed in this Chapter has highlighted that there are not hard 
and fast rules. From encouraging certain modes of knowledge transfer and responding to 
developmental constraints arising from integration to adapting to a changing industrial 
structure, it becomes evident that industrial policy needs to be responsive to many different 
factors that shape technological capability accumulation. The creation of a strong vision 
supported by institutional mechanisms that bring stakeholders together can help provide 
the cooperation, flexibility and knowledge needed to implement successful industrial 
strategies.  
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4 Borrowing the Ladder to Climb Up: The Experience of 
Guangdong in the Electronics Industry   
4.1 Introduction 
The theoretical framework conceptualized in Chapter 2 posited that successful 
integration into and upgrading within Global Value Chains (GVCs) are contingent on 
industrial policies that accelerate technological capability accumulation. The evolutionary 
character of the process of capability accumulation also implied that interventions should 
change over time, from encouraging integration and the accumulation of basic capabilities 
to increasing scale and eventually to catching-up with the frontier. While integration into 
GVCs offers opportunities for technological learning for firms, industrial policy can offer 
additional channels via investments in the local innovation system together with incentives 
for firms to invest in capability accumulation. Industrial policy interventions can therefore 
be compatible with a strategy of integration and upgrading within GVCs, contrary to 
common perception.   
This Chapter explores the validity of this study’s theoretical framework by examining 
the experience of Guangdong province of China in promoting integration, upgrading and 
catch-up in the electronics sector. Guangdong has successfully integrated into electronics 
GVCs and more recently there is evidence that upgrading has taken place. By critically and 
extensively reviewing the experience of Guangdong province in the past four decades, this 
study provides empirical evidence that contemporary industrial policies can harness 
integration of domestic producers into GVCs to advance industrial upgrading.  
Guangdong’s development is a story of an impressive transformation20. On the eve of 
reforms, Guangdong had a relatively underdeveloped industrial base, compared to Beijing, 
Shanghai and parts of the Northeast region, such as Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang 
                                                 
20 Comprehensive works on the post-reform development of Guangdong province include 
Vogel (1989), Cheng [ed] (2003), Yeung and Chu [eds.] (1998), Cartier (2001) and Di Tommaso, 
Rubini and Barbieri (2013). A collection of the most important policy documents in the post-reform 
period is provided in the volumes of Guangdong Archives (2008). 
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provinces. In 1978, the province accounted for only 4.6% of Chinese Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). By 2015 Guangdong accounted for 10.8% of Chinese GDP and had the 7th 
highest GDP per capita in the country (China Bureau of Statistics or CBS, various years, 
a).  
Guangdong’s economic success owes in large part to the fact that it hosted the earliest 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China, attracting foreign investment and following a 
growth path intimately linked to integration into GVCs. Guangdong was chosen to pioneer 
market-oriented reforms because of two main reasons. First, Guangdong’s relative lack of 
industrial assets meant that if reforms failed, China’s industrial powerhouses would not be 
in danger. Second, the province borders Hong Kong, which was expected to prove vital as 
a source of foreign investments and linkages to foreign markets (Vogel, 1989).  
The electronics industry has been an important driver of Guangdong’s growth. The 
province, and specifically the Pearl River Delta (PRD)21 within its borders, is one of the 
main industrial bases for electronics manufacturing and assembly in China. The industry 
has also become very important for the provincial economy, accounting for almost 22% of 
provincial industrial value added (Guangdong Bureau of Statistics or GBSa, 2015). The 
province has successfully integrated into the electronics GVCs. Every large first-tier 
supplier in electronics has facilities Guangdong and numerous clusters of foreign-owned 
and domestic SMEs have formed undertaking assembly, predominantly in 
telecommunications equipment and computer peripherals. The emergence of a few 
domestic firms with brand-power from Shenzhen, the largest electronics production base 
in the province, and some recent investments by foreign firms in sophisticated components 
and R&D, indicate that upgrading has taken place successfully.  
Scholarship on the Guangdong electronics industry has focused largely on the 
formation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)-led clusters in the province. This Chapter 
widens the lens by also taking the development of domestic firms into account, making this 
                                                 
21  The PRD is an economic region within Guangdong encompassing some of the most 
prosperous cities there such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Jiangmen, Dongguan, 
Zhongshan, Huizhou and Zhaoqing.  
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research better able to account for the diversity in the industry in terms of ownership, size 
and position in the value chain.  
Section 2 discusses the existing research on Guangdong and the ways in which this 
study adds a fresh perspective.  
Section 3 begins the analysis by offering a review of the evidence regarding the extent 
of upgrading in the electronics industry in Guangdong. The industry is diverse featuring: 
(i) large, innovative domestic firms with brand-power; (ii) smaller, often foreign-invested, 
unsophisticated assembly and processing firms; and  (iii) large foreign operations that are 
more advanced in terms of product portfolio and processing techniques.  
Before proceeding to a review of the industry’s development, Section 4 discusses 
policy-making by the central and provincial governments in relation to the electronics 
industry and offers a brief discussion on the particularities of studying provincial policies 
in China in the context of ongoing reforms.  
Finally, Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 discuss the successive policy regimes in the Guangdong 
electronics industry that reflect respectively: (i) the Maoist era (1949-1978); (ii) the first 
attempt to integrate into GVCs (1979-1992); (iii) efforts to increase scale of firms and the 
industry as a whole (1993-2005); and (iv) recent attempts to encourage innovation (2006-
now). The Sections discuss the main thrusts of industrial policies and policies that have 
encouraged integration and upgrading within GVCs, and offer insights on how these have 
complemented each other (or not) in each phase.  
This Chapter will show that industrial policy interventions have been critical in creating 
the capabilities necessary to achieve upgrading in Guangdong’s electronics industry. The 
provincial government supported domestic firms (mostly state-owned in the beginning) by 
providing subsidies and by taking advantage of central-level protectionist policies. At the 
same time, large domestic firms were explicitly encouraged to be export-oriented, enabling 
them to integrate into GVCs early in the reform period. Many of these firms ended up 
building successful brands in recent years. Integrating at the low-end of the value chain by 
attracting FDI and encouraging processing and assembly provided an easy way for 
domestic firms to engage with GVCs. In turn, the emergence of these FDI-led 
manufacturing clusters has turned into an important asset for both foreign and domestic 
firms, who are now becoming strong in hardware innovation. However, despite the 
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successes, ongoing weaknesses in the innovation system point to further issues that need 
to be addressed by public policy in the future.  
4.2 Literature Review 
There is no complete account of the development of the electronics industry in the 
province of Guangdong. First, there are works that explore a province-wide mode of 
development, known as the ‘Pearl River Delta (PRD) model’, but these do not focus on the 
electronics industry and they emphasize the province’s low value-added FDI-led exports, 
which is an outdated perspective, given the industry’s recent upgrading and strong 
domestic firm presence. Second, there are works that touch on the role of city governments 
in Guangdong province in developing the electronics industry, but only in specific cities 
(e.g. in Shenzhen or Dongguan). Third, there are works that focus on the development of 
industry in China and discuss large domestic firms that are based in the province (e.g. 
telecommunication equipment conglomerates Huawei and ZTE). Finally, there are works 
on the Guangdong electronics industry from the GVC perspective, which focus on the 
operations of foreign firms, neglecting the role of domestic ones. This research is able to 
effectively synthesize these different perspectives by employing the framework laid out in 
Chapter 2. Before doing that this Section will examine the main strands of the literature.   
The first strand of literature focuses on the provincial political economic structures that 
have shaped patterns of industrial growth in Guangdong (Eng, 1997; Cheng [ed.], 2003; 
Yeung and Chu [eds.], 1998). According to this literature, Guangdong has pursued an 
export-oriented strategy. On the one hand, the central government used the Delta to 
implement its ‘Open Door Policy’, aiming to tap into foreign trade and investment flows 
to advance the country’s technological capabilities (Tzeng, 1991). Rapid export-oriented 
industrialization has also been sustained by migration flows from inland provinces, again 
controlled by the center. On the other hand, the industry evolved with a great deal of 
experimentation, made possible by the autonomy enjoyed by the provincial government 
vis-à-vis the center and that of sub-provincial governments vis-à-vis the province. 
Provincial leaders, such as Ren Zhongyi and Lin Ruo were instrumental in securing this 
autonomy for the province in the 1980s and in passing it down to sub-provincial 
governments (Vogel, 1989; Cheung, 1998). 
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However, these works do not make mention of any of the strategic industrial policy 
initiatives that have been important in the development of the electronics industry in 
Guangdong. As will be explained in this Chapter, attracting FDI and promoting exports by 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) was an important tool for integrating into GVCs, but 
complementary industrial policy initiatives launched by the central government and 
elaborated on by the provincial government, were also important in encouraging upgrading 
in the industry. Moreover, no works have examined the development of the electronics 
industry at the provincial level in Guangdong in the context of the ‘PRD model’ (or 
otherwise). As industrial policies, governance structures and innovation systems can differ 
across industries, zeroing in on one industry can better capture the evolutionary dynamics 
of industrial policy and its relationship with GVCs. Additionally, the interest in the ‘PRD 
model’ peaked in the late 1990s, and only a few works have examined the evolution of 
provincial-level institutional structures and their impact on industrial upgrading in the last 
fifteen years (Lim, 2016; Yang, 2014). Offering an updated account is particularly 
important because in 2008,of Guangdong in labor-intensive assembly, issued the ‘Outline 
for the Development of the PRD’ (hereafter referred to as ‘PRD Outline’), encouraging 
upgrading into higher value added activities. In response, the provincial governor at the 
time, Wang Yang, implemented the ‘double relocation’ policy, aiming to shift low value-
added activities and low-skilled labor towards inland areas. Considering this latest period, 
which has been neglected, is extremely important, given that many of the positive 
upgrading outcomes, such as the emergence of innovative domestic firms, have taken place 
during this time.  
A second strand of literature looks at the ‘PRD model’ as pursued by sub-provincial 
governments. Under the province, there are three levels of government, often collectively 
referred to as local governments: (1) the prefecture and prefecture-level cities; (2) counties 
or county-level cities; and (3) towns, townships or districts (Saich, 2004). As of 2014, 
Guangdong had 21 prefecture-level cities 22 , 35 counties, 3 autonomous counties, 61 
                                                 
22  These are Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Shaoguan, Dongguan, Heyuan, Meizhou, Chaozhou, 
Shantou, Jieyang, Shanwei, Huizhou, Zhuhai, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Yangjiang, Zhanjiang, 
Maoming, Yunfu, Zhaoqing, Foshan, Qingyuan.  
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municipal districts, 4 townships, 7 ethnic minority townships and 1128 towns. In 
Guangdong, towns, township and district governments are important when it comes to 
administrative and local infrastructure issues, but policy-making powers are concentrated 
primarily in prefecture-level cities and to a lesser extent in counties and county-level cities.  
The ability of prefecture-level city (hereafter referred to as city) governments to pursue 
their growth objectives means that industrial strategies have differed somewhat across the 
province.  Among the different cities commonly studied in terms of the electronics industry, 
Shenzhen emerges as the one that has pursued upgrading more vigorously, discouraging 
lower-end FDI projects since the early 1990s, offering incentives for innovation and 
upgrading, and paying greater attention to hard and soft infrastructure (Ng and Tuan, 2001; 
Wang and Meng, 2004; Chen, 2014; Segal, 2003). In contrast, Dongguan, despite the 
important role of the city government there in building infrastructure and pursuing 
industrial upgrading (Yeung, 2001), is seen as overall weak in terms of nurturing industry 
towards upgrading (Wang, Luo and Tong; Yang, 2007). Guangzhou is seen as somewhere 
in between, attracting better FDI than Dongguan, but not adequately supporting innovation 
as in the case of Shenzhen (Segal, 2003; Schiller, 2011).  
However, the focus on city governments in the existing literature omits certain 
dynamics that are important in a contemporary analysis of industrial development in the 
province. First, the provincial government has always been an important driver of policy-
making and implementation, adapting policies decided by the central government and 
passing them down to sub-provincial governments, as well as in providing funds and other 
kinds of support directly to firms. Second, the role of the provincial government has 
increased following the implementation of the PRD Outline, which requires coordination 
at the provincial level. Third, over time value chains have formed at the level of the 
province, making it difficult to discuss isolated city-level dynamics.  
A third line of work centers on the role of the central government in terms of supporting 
‘national champions’ in the electronics and telecommunications industries, with measures 
such as preferential government procurement, tariffs, subsidized loans, restriction of 
foreign competition and funding. These works conclude that industrial policy interventions 
by the Chinese government fostered large-scale indigenous conglomerates (Harwit, 2007; 
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Fan 2006a,b), but that these are not globally competitive (Ning, 2009; Ernst, 2014; 2016; 
Fuller, 2016).   
However, the China-wide lens of the studies mentioned above does not adequately 
capture the regional specificities in pursuing industrial policy or in integrating into GVCs. 
Understanding these at the provincial level can help shed light on why certain firms 
emerged in Guangdong and how these built their capabilities over time. Moreover, by 
focusing on large firms this literature does not account for the vast supply clusters that have 
emerged in the province, formed by thousands of small-sized factories and service firms 
and which are important for the industry’s overall competitiveness.  
The fourth line of work that is relevant for this research, focuses on the emergence and 
upgrading of provincial electronics clusters within GVCs. The emphasis of this literature 
has been on the foreign-invested firms in the province, their positions within GVCs and 
the process of their upgrading (or lack thereof). This literature explores the global dynamics 
that have led to the emergence of TNC-led supply clusters in the province, noting the 
relocation of manufacturing activities from Taiwan and Hong Kong to Shenzhen, 
Dongguan and other locations in the PRD (Yang, 2007; Chen, 2007) or the increasingly 
wide-ranging and sophisticated activities of large contract manufacturers (Lüthje, 2004). 
However, the role of industrial policy interventions in encouraging upgrading, especially 
in regards to domestic firms, has been underexplored in this literature, with some notable 
exceptions (e.g. Yang, 2014 on the Shenzhen Light Emitting Diodes industry).  
Understanding the development of the electronics sector in Guangdong requires 
drawing on all the above perspectives. On the one hand, it is impossible to leave out the 
role of the provincial government in pursuing industrial upgrading. The provincial 
government has set the broad developmental directions for the entire province, and has 
developed its own industrial upgrading initiatives, especially since 2008. On the other hand, 
a full account needs to take into account the role of GVCs and the avenues they have 
provided for upgrading for firms in the province. By integrating and furthering the different 
perspectives found in the literature, it is possible to build an account of Guangdong’s 
industrial development in the electronics sector that coherently takes into account the 
impact of industrial policy and integration into GVCs and explores their dynamic evolution 
over time. 
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4.3 Growth, Integration and Upgrading in the Guangdong Electronics Industry 
Just how much has the Guangdong electronics industry upgraded over time? This 
section will examine the performance of the industry since integration into global trade and 
investment flows in 1978, drawing on data published by the national and provincial 
statistical agencies and ministries. The data presents several challenges, the most important 
of which is the change in the size of firms (in terms of minimum annual revenues) that are 
part of the annual industrial surveys over time, which was raised from RMB 5 million 
during 1998-2010 to over RMB 20 million in 2011 and the fact that statistical variables are 
not consistently available over time, which makes compiling time-series challenging. 
However, despite their limitations, the comprehensiveness of Chinese industrial statistics 
presents a rich source of data that can be mined for the purposes of this research.  
4.3.1 Output and Value Added 
The growth of output and value added in the electronics industry has been very rapid. 
Table 4.1 lists the absolute numbers in the two variables and their share in the province’s 
total industry.  
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Table 4.1 Key statistics in the Guangdong electronics industry, 1995-2014 
  Industrial 
Output (RMB 
billions) 
Share in 
Provincial Total 
Industrial 
Output 
Industrial 
Value Added 
(RMB 
billions) 
Share in 
Provincial 
Total Value 
Added 
Value 
Added 
/Output 
1985 3.7 8.0% 0.67 4.7% 18.4% 
1986 3.6 7.0% 0.57 3.6% 15.6% 
1987 5.7 8.7% 0.86 4.3% 15.0% 
1988 9.1 10.3% 1.44 5.2% 15.7% 
1989 9.9 9.7% 1.85 5.4% 18.7% 
1990 13.8 11.5% 2.68 6.8% 19.5% 
1991 21.6 11.0% 3.57 6.8% 16.5% 
1992 30.4 11.0% 5.09 7.3% 16.8% 
1993 41.2 11.1%       
1994 61.2 13.9%       
1995 84.8 13.4% 17.9 11.6% 21.1% 
1996 99.5 13.6% 21.1 11.1% 21.3% 
1997 128.1 15.6% 28.4 13.6% 22.2% 
1998 159.9 16.4% 34.7 14.2% 21.7% 
1999 195.0 18.5% 43.6 15.6% 22.3% 
2000 241.8 19.4% 58.1 17.0% 24.0% 
2001 311.0 22.2% 65.5 17.5% 21.1% 
2002 416.4 25.4% 88.1 20.2% 21.2% 
2003 593.2 27.6% 134.1 23.5% 22.6% 
2004 746.6 27.9% 148.3 20.9% 19.9% 
2005 983.1 27.4% 209.5 22.3% 21.3% 
2006 1,189.1 26.6% 252.0 21.4% 21.2% 
2007 1,337.7 24.2% 252.1 17.9% 18.8% 
2008 1,537.4 23.5% 322.8 18.3% 21.0% 
2009 1,572.2 23.0% 342.9 18.8% 21.8% 
2010 1,922.8 22.4% 430.6 18.7% 22.4% 
2011 2,146.0 22.6% 420.1 19.4% 19.6% 
2012 2,286.5 23.9% 483.9 21.3% 21.2% 
2013 2,583.6 23.6% 574.3 21.6% 22.2% 
2014 2,825.5 23.6% 612.5 21.7% 21.7% 
Notes: 1980-1990 in constant 1980 prices; 1991-1994 in constant 1990 prices and 1995-2014 
in current prices.  Data for 2012-2014 is based on industrial sales revenue, which very closely 
approximates output value. Empty cell denotes data unavailability.  
Source: Author’s calculations on data from GBS (various years, a), GBS (various years, b) and 
CBS (various years, b). 
 
The industry was still relatively small in the mid-1980’s, accounting for only 8% of 
industrial output value and 4.7% of value added in the province, but growth accelerated in 
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the late 1990’s. In 2004 the industry accounted for almost 28% of the province’s industrial 
output, declining since then and stabilizing at around 22% to 23% in recent years. However, 
the share of value added in total output, an indicator of upgrading, has not changed much 
since 1995. Table 4.2 shows the compound annual growth rates for the two variables, over 
five year intervals.   
 
Table 4.2 Compound annual growth rates in output and value added, Guangdong 
 Output Value Added 
1985-1990 30% 32% 
1991-1994 42% 
 
1995-2000 23% 27% 
2001-2005 33% 34% 
2006-2010 13% 14% 
2011-2014 10% 13% 
Source: Author’s calculations on data from GBS (various years, a) and GBS (various years, b). 
 
 
Growth was fastest during 1991-1994 and 2001-2005. These are both related to 
liberalization episodes: after 1992, following Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour to Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai, market-oriented reforms increased in scope and scale 
(Zhao, 1993) and in 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
4.3.2 Geographic Distribution  
Guangdong accounts for a large share of the electronics industry in China, second only 
to the Yangtze River Delta (YRD). The province accounted for only 3.6% of the industry’s 
total revenue23 in 1978, but it quickly increased its share, accounting for 33% of total 
revenue by 2001, dropping slightly ever since. The YRD accounted for 34% of industrial 
revenue in electronics in 2014 (Figure 4.1). 
 
                                                 
23 Business revenue as reported by industrial firms is the only consistent variable reported in 
the Electronics Information Industry Yearbooks (MIIT, various years, a) that allows for a 
comparison of the industry’s size across time and regions. It refers to the revenue from the sales of 
products (or commodities) and from rendering of industrial services by industrial enterprises.  
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Figure 4.1 Share of key economic zones in China’s total electronics revenue, 1978-
2014, % 
 
Notes: Yangtze River Delta here includes Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces and Bohai 
Economic Rim includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning and Shandong provinces. 
Source: Author’s calculations on data from Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT) (various years, a). 
 
Within the province, the sector’s development in the early 1980s concentrated in the 
old industrial centers of Guangzhou, Foshan and Shantou and the newly established 
Shenzhen SEZ. The latter remains the major base for electronics manufacturing in 
Guangdong today, accounting for 49% of total electronics output and 58% of the value 
added in 2014 (Table 4.3). At the same time, the share of other locations in Guangdong, 
such as Dongguan and Huizhou, which also drew in FDI, has increased rapidly.  
 
Table 4.3 Share of cities in the Guangdong electronics industry 
 Shenzhen Guangzhou Dongguan Foshan  Huizhou Others 
Output Value as a Share of Total 
1985 37.6% 24.4% 0% 14.2% 0% 23.8% 
1995 49.3% 5.6% 5% 3.7% 13.7% 22.6% 
2005 58.3% 7.2% 12% 2.4% 7.9% 12.2% 
2014 48.5% 7.6% 17.3% 3.4% 10.9% 12.3% 
Value Added as a Share of Total 
2014 57.8% 6.3% 12% 3.5% 9.5% 10.9% 
Source: Author’s calculations on data from GBS (various years, a).  
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4.3.3 Performance by Types of Ownership 
The industrial sector data that this chapter looks at is split into the following ownership 
categories:  
 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This category was split into SOEs and State-Holding 
Enterprises (SOSHEs) after 1998. The latter category includes both the ‘pure’ SOEs and 
those corporatized companies in which the state has a large share.  
 Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs). This includes wholly foreign owned subsidiaries, joint 
ventures and enterprises from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HKMT).  
 Collective Enterprises 
 Shareholding Cooperative Enterprises. This includes stock companies in which the shares 
are owned by employees. These used to be part of the collective economy until 1998.  
 Shareholding Enterprises. This includes mostly private firms since those with majority 
state ownership are under SOSHEs.  
 Private Enterprises, which is a category that has been added in the data since 2006. This 
can also include private shareholding enterprises.  
The categories listed above are not based on the firms’ registration status and are not 
mutually exclusive, leading to double counting (see Holz and Lin, 2001; Holz, 2013). 
Moreover, a large number of FIEs are actually domestic Chinese investments, but they 
have registered as foreign (usually coming via Hong Kong) mainly to take advantage of 
preferential tax rates for foreign investment in China. The true volume of this phenomenon 
is difficult to establish, especially in Guangdong where access to Hong Kong has been 
much more convenient (Yeung, 2002). 
During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, many foreign investments in the province were in 
the form of Joint Ventures (JVs) with SOEs. These, together with the SOEs, were part of 
the planning system and, as such, were managed by the provincial-level authorities. As 
wholly foreign-owned (WFOEs) and private domestic investments started increasing 
towards the end of the 1980s, the share of state controlled production in the province’s total 
decreased steadily (Table 4.4).  
 
Table 4.4 Share of SOE sector in output, Guangdong 
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RMB billions, Constant Prices 
 
Total Sector State Sector Share of State  
Sector in Total 
1985 3.7 2.5 68.3% 
1986 3.6 2.9 78.5% 
1987 5.7 5.2 90.6% 
1988 9.1 7.6 83.6% 
1989 9.9 7.8 78.3% 
1990 14.8 10.7 72.6% 
1991 21.6 18.7 86.4% 
1992 30.4 23.9 78.6% 
1993 41.2 29.6 71.9% 
1994 61.2 38.7 63.3% 
1995 96.3 53.9 55.9% 
Source: Author’s calculation on data from Guangdong Electronics Industry Annals (GEIA) 
(2002) and GBS (various years, a).  
 
 
Data after 1995 shows a different picture, as JVs between foreign investors and SOEs 
started to be reported under FIEs. In 1995, 91.3% of the industrial output was produced by 
FIEs, either wholly owned or in some form of JV, while pure SOEs accounted for only 10% 
of the total (Figure 4.2). Since then, the share of FIEs in total output has been steadily 
declining, accounting for below 60% in 2014. The share of SOSHEs in production has also 
experienced a decline (from 33% of total output in 1999 to less than 10% in 2014), 
indicating a continued process of restructuring in the state-owned sector. Meanwhile, the 
share of the private sector has been increasing rapidly. This indicates a decreasing reliance 
on foreign capital and the dynamic emergence of a domestic private sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Electronics output value by ownership categories, Guangdong, 1995-
2014, % 
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Note: The shares exceed 100% because of double counting across categories. The share is also 
below 100% for some years because the private economy was not fully captured prior to 1999.    
Source: Author’s calculation on data from GBS (various years, a). 
4.3.4 Performance By Types of Products 
The province has specialized in low- to mid-tech products, compared to other provinces 
in China, such as in audio-visual equipment, consumer electronics and peripherals. 
Nevertheless, the share of the province’s production in China’s integrated circuits (ICs) – 
a sophisticated component - increased markedly between 1995 and 2013 (Table 4.5).  
Most of the province’s value added in electronics is concentrated in the 
telecommunications equipment segment (Figure 4.3). This is most likely related to the rise 
of large telecommunications equipment manufacturers such as Huawei and ZTE, and the 
mobile phone production cluster that has developed in and around Shenzhen.  Value added 
produced by the segment represented 20.5% of total value added in the industry in 1996, 
increasing to 45.3% by 2014.  
 
 
Table 4.5 Share of Guangdong’s production in China’s total (% of number of 
units) 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Microcomputers 26.3 17.6 20.6 14.6 6.0 
Laptops 3.4 0 13.8 5.9 3.5 
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Printers 16.9 14.5 47.8 73.1 54.2 
Laser Disc Players 54.5 24.3 72.5 92.1 95.2 
Colour TVs 25.9 33.5 49.4 38.0 49.8 
Digital Cameras   57.9 40.5 55.2 
Mobile Phones 0.1 18.0 13.8 48.7 50.6 
Phones 70.6 69.8 88.8 88.8 86.6 
PBX (switches) 16.8* 51.3^ 34.3 51.2 58.5 
Colour Picture Tubes 27* 21.3^ 28.5 26.2 100.0 
Screens 13.4* 8.1^ 8.9 33.5 12.0 
Discrete Semiconductor devices 15.9 10.7 30.1 36.7 27.0 
Integrated Circuits 1.6 19.6 21.2 24.7 21.0 
Notes: * denotes data for year 1994 and ^ data for year 1999.  
Source: Author’s calculations on data from MIIT (various years, a), Zhou [ed] (2011) and 
GYCC (1995, 2000). 
 
Figure 4.3 Share of electronics segments in Guangdong electronics value added, 
1996-2014, % 
 
Notes: The category ‘electronics components’ refers to passive devices, such as resistors, 
capacitors and inductors. The category ‘electronic devices’ refers to active devices, such as 
transistors, vacuum tubes and integrated circuits.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from GBS (various years, b).  
 
While there are wide annual fluctuations, the share of value added in output for the 
telecommunications equipment segment increased from under 25% to over 30% for most 
years since 2000, indicating upgrading (Figure 4.4).  By contrast, the computer 
manufacturing segment shows a marked decline from 23.5% in 1996 to 15% in 2014, 
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suggesting ‘downgrading’. These indicate that the process of upgrading has not been 
uniform across the industry. Moreover, during 1998-2003 spikes in the share of value 
added in output in Guangdong’s electronics industry, as domestic telecommunications 
equipment manufacturers benefitted from import-substitution policies by the central 
government.  
Figure 4.4 Value added in output by electronics segments, Guangdong, 1996-
2014, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on data from GBS (various years, b). 
4.3.5 Trade 
China ran a trade deficit in electronics during the first decade of reforms (Zeng, 1990) 
and the SEZs also run a deficit during their first few years (Wong, 1987). However, 
consistent data on exports at the provincial level is available only after 1995 on electric and 
electronic goods combined and by that time the sectoral trade balance was positive (Figure 
4.5). Gross exports have skyrocketed since, increasing from USD 12 billion in 1995 to 
USD 242 billion in 2014. Figure 4.5 shows the trade balance and the net export index, 
which is the trade balance divided by the total value of trade. During the second half of the 
1990s the province was running a diminishing surplus in the industry, which turned into a 
deficit around the time China entered the WTO. Since 2005, there has been a large surplus 
in the sector, which, given the largely liberalized trading regime in the sector (China is 
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signatory to the International Technology Agreement in WTO ), points to increased 
competitiveness.  
 
Figure 4.5 Trade balance and Net Export Index in Guangdong electronics, 1995-
2014 
Left: USD billion, current prices. Right: Net Export Index 
 
Notes: The net export index divides the trade balance by the total amount of trade. It gives an 
indication of the trade surplus that is independent of the level of trade. If there are no exports it 
takes the value of -1 and if there are no imports the value of 1.  
Source: Author’s calculation on data from Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (various years, a). 
 
The export-intensity of firms, measured by the share of exports in total sales, has 
increased over time as well, further highlighting the increasing competitiveness of the 
industry (Figure 4.6). As expected, FIEs display higher levels of integration into global 
trade, while private firms are more oriented towards the domestic market.  Between 1995 
and 2014, FIEs also accounted for at least 60%-70% of total exports in the industry (GBS, 
various years, b) 
Figure 4.6 Share of exports in sales by ownership category, Guangdong electronics 
industry 
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Notes: Private firms were recorded as a separate category since 2006. The value of exports is 
not derived from customs data, but from a variable called “Exports Delivery Value” in the industrial 
accounts. It records the value of the products that an industrial enterprise has delivered to export 
units or directly exported, as well as the value of the products from processing and compensation 
trade. 
Source: Author’s calculation on data from GBS (various years, b). 
 
4.3.6 Productivity  
Value added and output per employee has increased by four times during the period 
1996 to 2014. However, it should be noted that the data is nominal, rather than real, so it 
most likely overestimates the real rate of growth. The data also reflects the rapid increase 
in wages that has taken place since the mid-2000s, far outstripping the increase in 
productivity (Figure 4.7). The large increases in labor productivity indicate that upgrading 
is in place, either due to increased skill levels or due to the increased capital intensity of 
production.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Growth in wages, output and value added per employee, Guangdong 
electronics industry, 1996=100 
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Notes: Wages include reported wages and benefits paid. The separate categories of wages and 
benefits are not reported in all years, so wages may be underreported.  
Source: Authors calculations on data from GBS (various years, b).  
 
Figure 4.8 Fixed assets per employee, Guangdong electronics industry, 1996-2014 
RMB, current prices 
 
Source: Authors calculations on data from GBS (various years, b). 
 
Fixed assets per employee have been increasing, almost doubling in terms of value 
between 1996 and 2014 (Figure 4.8). Figures are not adjusted for inflation, so the increase 
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may be overestimated. There is a peak in 2010, but it is not clear what caused this, implying 
that it may be an error or adjustment in the statistics. In the first half of the 2000s, there 
was a gradual fall in fixed assets per employee, rising again after 2010. This is consistent 
with a post-WTO expansion of low capital-intensity production and then a restructuring 
towards more capital-intensive activities, following rising factor costs and changes in 
policies in 2008.  
4.3.7 Innovation  
More than any of the previous measures, Guangdong’s increased innovation capacity 
in the industry points to upgrading. The total R&D spending from the industry’s large and 
medium firms has increased fast, almost doubling every five years. In 2014 the industry 
spent RMB 58.6 billion (USD 9.5 billion) in R&D, accounting for almost half the spending 
in the total industry in China (Table 4.6).  
 
Table 4.6 Innovation indicators in large and medium enterprises, electronics, 
Guangdong 
 
R&D1  
(Million 
RMB)  
R&D as 
share of 
revenue  
Share in 
total 
provincial 
R&D 
Patent 
applications 
(PCT2) 
Share in 
China's total 
R&D in 
electronics 
2000   4,180  43.90%  1,304 29.79% 
2005 11,478 1.37% 63.63%  7,780 41.48% 
2006 14,981 1.38% 60.63% 14,271 43.00% 
2007 22,677 1.85% 67.42% 19,665 56.11% 
2008 21,518 1.54% 52.36% 19,760 41.36% 
2009 27,349 1.74% 49.51% 28,289 45.50% 
2010 35,561 1.86% 50.54% 27,623 51.82% 
2011 44,019 2.05% 48.94% 36,978 46.73% 
2012 51,098 2.24% 47.41% 38,568 47.99% 
2013 58,610 2.75% 47.36% 41,540 46.79% 
Notes: 1. All R&D refers to intramural R&D expenditures.   2. PCT: Patent Cooperation 
Treaty.  
Source: Author’s calculations on data from GBS (various years, c), GDST (2000), CSB 
(various years b) and GBS (2013).  
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The industry has also become more R&D-intensive, almost doubling the share of R&D 
in output between 2005 and 2013, while patent applications have increased by a factor of 
32 between 2000 and 2013 (Table 4.6).  
In electronics, the overwhelming majority of R&D takes place within large firms. 
According to the Guangdong 2013 census (GBSd, 2013), 85.5% of R&D in the industry 
took place in large firms (453 firms) and a further 10.8% took place in middle-sized firms 
(1,513 firms). Large firms are those that employ over 1000 persons and have an annual 
turnover of over RMB 400 million (approx. USD 60 million), medium firms those that 
employ between 300 and 1000 people and have an annual turnover of RMB 200 to 400 
million (approx. USD 30 to 60 million) and small firm those that employ between 20 and 
300 people and have an annual turnover of RMB 3 to 20 million (approx. USD 4.5 to 30 
million). The funds for R&D in the industry came mostly from the enterprises’ own 
resources, with only 3% of funds coming from government between 2009 and 2012. The 
dominance of enterprises in R&D explains the largely commercial nature of R&D activities. 
In 2012, almost no funds went to basic research, about 7% of expenditures went to applied 
research (an original investigation aimed at a specific practical aim or objective), and 93% 
went to experimental R&D (which is not original investigation but draws on existing 
knowledge gained from research or practical experience) (GBSc, 2013).  
FIEs accounted for 47.7% of firms in the 2013 census, but for only 28.4% of total R&D 
expenditures. Combining this fact with the distribution of R&D according to firm size 
noted above, we could assume that the majority of R&D takes place in large domestic 
firms24.  
4.3.8 Lead Firms & First Tier Suppliers  
A final indicator of upgrading is whether the sector features first-tier suppliers and lead 
firms. Here Guangdong performs particularly well, as it is a host both to some of the largest 
                                                 
24 A survey of electronics firms in Dongguan and Guangzhou showed that in the absence of 
such large local players, the innovation capabilities of domestic firms are on average lower than 
those of foreign ones (Schiller, 2011). However, the survey did not include Shenzhen, which is the 
‘hub’ for innovative domestic firms in Guangdong and the data is from 2008, predating the large-
scale efforts of the province to shift its development model.  
120 
 
lead firms and first-tier suppliers in the world and even boasts a few lead firms based in 
the province.  
First-tier suppliers started locating their subsidiaries in Guangdong in the 1990’s. It is 
not possible to estimate exactly their contribution to output, but some figures can be 
gleaned from the annual Guangdong top 50 industrial firm list, which was unfortunately 
discontinued since 2010. In 2010 Foxconn accounted for 15.3% of total provincial output 
in electronics (17.2% in 2007), while Flex contributed for an additional 2.3% and 4.1% of 
between 2002 and 2010. Subsidiaries of Jabil and Wistron have also made the list but their 
contributions have been small (below 1%). So whereas before 2000 no subsidiary of large 
first-tiers suppliers was large enough to make the top 50 list, by 2010 at least 19% of the 
industry’s output came from such first tier suppliers.  
The large-scale operations of first-tier suppliers and product mix, often combining 
automated and labor-intensive production methods, led Lüthje (2004) to proclaim their 
presence as a sign of upgrading, especially compared to the more low-end processing 
operations performed by informal assembly firms. However, their capacity for further 
upgrading and innovation should also be taken into account. Indeed, some R&D is also 
taking place in such firms, especially in Foxconn, followed by Flex and Jabil25. Foxconn 
undertakes significant R&D activities in Shenzhen and Flex in Zhuhai has set up a 
Production Innovation Centre. Nevertheless, such firms do not have high investments 
overall in R&D. Foxconn spent about 1.17% of its total revenue in R&D in 2015 globally 
and Flex respectively 1.4%, whereas Cisco spent 12.6% and Apple 3.4% (company annual 
reports).  
The most interesting development in the Guangdong electronics industry has been the 
rise of domestic brands, particularly in telecommunications equipment (ZTE and Huawei) 
and in consumer electronics (TCL, Konka, Oppo, DJI). These brands are becoming 
increasingly well known even beyond China. Firms like Huawei and ZTE are still relying 
on importing some key components26 (Li, 2012), but they are undertaking great efforts to 
                                                 
25 Interview with engineers at first tier suppliers, F07, Foshan, 29 November 2015. 
26 For example central processing units, GPS modules, CPU, GPS, the AMOLED screen and 
memory chips.  
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vertically integrate. Huawei especially has invested in designing its own chipsets, used in 
Huawei phones since 2012. It has also developed patented technology in 4G-LTE and is a 
major force behind the development of 5G technology27. TCL on the other hand has 
attempted to expand via international acquisitions; it purchased French TV manufacturer 
Thomson’s Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) business in 2004 and established a joint venture with 
Alcatel, although both of these struggled financially initially28. Nevertheless, the company 
recovered and is now the fastest growing television brand in the United States29. The large 
indigenous brands also perform a great amount of R&D, although it is unknown what share 
of this may be carried out outside Guangdong. Huawei, ZTE and TCL had high ratios of 
R&D in sales, reaching 15%, 10% and 6% respectively in 2015, which compared favorably 
with foreign lead firms such as Cisco (12.6%) and Apple (3.4%) in relevant segments of 
the industry (company annual reports).  
4.4 Policy-making in the Guangdong Electronics Industry 
4.4.1 Studying industrial policy in the Chinese context 
To outsiders, China is often seen as a unitary, monolithic one-party state, where top-
to-bottom directions dictate its politics and economics. Scholars of Chinese political 
economy have a somewhat different view, commenting that it is characterized by 
‘fragmented’ or ‘regionally decentralised’ authoritarianism (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 
1988; Xu, 2011) as policy needs to accommodate the interests of different power centers 
across the Party, the bureaucracy, the state-owned sector and the different levels of 
government.  
The principal agency for advancing industrial competitiveness in the electronics 
industry has been the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and its 
predecessors. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is also important in 
advancing Science and Technology (S&T) capabilities in industrial firms, with 
responsibilities that are increasingly overlapping with MIIT. In the past, other agencies 
                                                 
27 Lucas, Louise and Fildes, Nic ‘Huawei aims to help set 5G standards’, Financial Times, 29 
November 2017.  
28 Lau, Justine ‘TCL to close most European operations’, Financial Times, October 31 2006. 
29 TCL Explosive Growth Continues in North America, PR Newswire, 25 July 2017. 
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such as the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) (now part of MIIT), the 
Ministry of Railways, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the military, used to be 
significant buyers of electronics products and produced an estimated 10% of the total 
output (Zeng, 1990), making them important stakeholders in policy-making.  
The need for consensus has been met in several ways. First, ‘Small Leading Groups’ 
with participating officials from different agencies have been used to forge consensus at 
the central, provincial and sub-provincial levels for important agendas. Second, the process 
of policy-making has been regularized, especially in the past 15 years, ensuring that 
different agencies have the option to comment on policy drafts relevant to them. Third, 
institutional reform has helped to put different agencies under one roof. For example, in 
the end of the 1990s the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications was merged with the 
Ministry of Electronics and in 2008 the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
was created by absorbing other industrial ministries. The changes in leadership at the 
central and provincial are shown in Table 4.7.  
The relationship of provincial governments to the center, and of the provincial 
government to the sub-provincial ones, adds further complexity to policy-making. The 
broad (and vague) development directions are forged at the top and their detailed 
implementation is up to the provincial and sub-provincial governments to determine. 
Guangdong, like other provinces, has implemented in one way or another all of the big 
initiatives launched by the central government, including the more interventionist ones, 
such as the ‘national champion’ initiative of the mid-1990s. At the same time, there is also 
significant room for maneuver in the adaptation of policies at lower levels, especially in 
initiatives that are not deemed as important by them. In some cases, provinces can simply 
chose to delay implementation or choose not to implement them at all, if they perceive 
them to go against their interests30.  
 
 Table 4.7 Leadership in the electronics industry at central and provincial level 
Relevant 
Institution 
Name of 
Minister 
Period Relevant 
Institution 
Name of 
Director 
Period 
                                                 
30 Interview with government-affiliated consultant, BJ01, Beijing 1 April 2015. 
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Ministry of 
Electronics 
 
Zhang 
Ting 
 
Jiang 
Zemin 
 
Li Tieying 
 
05 1982 – 
06/1983 
 
06/1983-
06/1985 
 
06/1985- 
051948 
Guangdong 
Electronics 
Industry Joint 
Company 
Xu 
Zhiliang 
 
05/1983- 
10/1983 
Guangdong 
Electronics 
Industry General 
Company 
Xu 
Zhiliang 
 
10/1983-  
05/1986 
Ministry of 
Machinery and 
Electronics 
Industries 
Zou Jiahua 
 
He 
Guanyuan 
04/1988 – 
1989 
 
1989 -
04/1993  
Guangdong 
Bureau of 
Electronics 
Industry  
 
Xu 
Zhiliang 
 
05/1986 -
01/1995 
Ministry of 
Electronics 
 
Hu Qili 
 
03 1993 - 
03 1998 
Guangdong 
Department of 
Electronics and 
Machinery 
Industry  
Xi Zhiwei 
 
Luo 
Jiansheng 
 
01/1995- 
03/1998 
 
03/1998 – 
02/2000 
Ministry of 
Information 
Industry 
Wu 
Jichuan 
 
Wang 
Xudong 
03/1998- 
03/ 2003 
 
03/2003-
03/2008 
Guangdong 
Department of 
Information 
Industry * 
 
Xu 
Zhibiao 
 
Wen 
Guohui 
02/2000-
09/2007 
 
09/2007-
09/2009 
Ministry of 
Industry and 
Information 
Technology 
 
Miao Wei 
 
12/2010 
until 
today 
Guangdong 
Economic and 
Information 
Commission  
 
Yang 
Jianchu 
 
Lai 
Tiansheng 
 
Tu Gaokun 
09/2009- 
03/2013 
 
03/2013-
02/2017 
 
01/2017 
until now 
Notes: *Part of the responsibilities of the defunct Guangdong Department of Electronics and 
Machinery Industry went to the Guangdong Economic and Trade Commission (GETC). The GEIC 
combined the GETC and the Guangdong Department of Information Industry.  
 
The central-provincial dimension is certainly important in Guangdong, given that it 
was the place that first forged an autonomous space for provinces, during the 1980s. The 
province has always displayed a strong local identity that has its roots in historical and 
cultural traits, accentuated by the role of Guangdong as a protagonist in the reform process 
(Vogel, 1969, 1989). Provincial leadership encouraged this autonomy by convincing the 
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Party to build the SEZs in Guangdong31 and by boldly encouraging experimentation in 
localities, under the leadership of Ren Zhongyi32 (Party Secretary, 1980-1985) and later 
under Lin Ruo (Party Secretary, 1985-1991) and Ye Xuanping (Governor, 1985-1991). 
Particularly important in securing autonomy have been the fiscal relationships between the 
centre and Guangdong, which progressively allowed the province to retain a larger share 
of its fiscal revenue for provincial-level investment (Cheung, 1998).  
The inheritance of a liberal attitude towards trade, investment and institutional reforms, 
has been important in the way the province has adapted central level policy in the 
electronics industry. In interviews, the Guangdong government was often described as 
adapting policies in a way that emphasizes cooperation with foreign firms and encourages 
overseas investments. It has also kept its pioneering spirit, by being one of the first 
provinces to apply new policies in the electronics sector (e.g. setting up government funds 
that offer financial support to firms not only with grants but also by taking equity in 
supported projects since 2012)33. However, provincial autonomy also has its limits and this 
was signaled by the implementation of the PRD Outline in 2008, published by the State 
Council, which pushed strongly for more attention to higher value-added activities in the 
province. 
Finally, policy-making in the electronics industry has been deeply affected by the long 
reform process of the Chinese economy, from a Marxist-Leninist centrally planned 
                                                 
31 This has been attributed to Xi Zhongxun, First Party Secretary during 1978-1980 and father 
current Chinese President and Party Secretary Xi Jinping. According to Cheung (1998) Xi even 
suggested at one point that the province should form a federal union with China, but his proposal 
was shot down.   
32 Ren Zhongyi was particularly bold in encouraging experimentation, commenting in 1980 
that “if something is not explicitly prohibited..then move ahead [and] if something is allowed, then 
use it to the hilt” (Vogel, 1989:81). He also did not waiver even when corruption scandals involving 
smuggling of consumer goods in Shenzhen drew in much criticism. In a meeting in Guangzhou in 
1982, Ren promised to shoulder responsibility for any mistakes in the implementation of reforms, 
gaining the admiration of cadres (Choi, Chi-yuk, ‘One man’s triumph over foes of reform: 
Guangdong leader who blazed new trail’ SCMP, 21 November 2008) 
33 Interview BJ01, footnote 11. Also interview with government-affiliated research centre, 
GZ07, 25 March 2015. 
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economy, to what is now called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’34. This has meant 
that the institutional context has been in a constant flux, both in terms of the agencies 
involved in policy design and implementation and in terms of the boundaries between 
regulatory and entrepreneurial functions of those agencies. The issue of reforms in the 
Guangdong electronics industry is taken up further in Sections 4.5 and 4.6.   
4.4.2 The policy-making process and the governance structure 
The multi-stakeholder, multi-scalar governance in the industry has led to the emergence 
of a complex process of policy-making. The general developmental direction is set by the 
socio-economic five-year plans (FYPs), which are now under the purview of the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The FYPs are made with input from 
many different actors (including ministries and provinces), who provide suggestions and 
feedback during the formulation phase, ensuring that a consensus is formed. The NDRC is 
also responsible for drafting macro policy initiatives that can include the electronics 
industry, such as the Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI) Plan that was announced during 
the 12th FYP period (2011-2015). Regarding initiatives for specific industries, the primary 
agency at the national level remains the MIIT. The latter can independently draft its own 
plans, as long as they are broadly within the aims of the FYPs, but for issues of particular 
national importance, it might be necessary to get the approval of NDRC35.  
Plans drafted by the NDRC and the ministries should, in principle, be interpreted, 
adapted and adopted by lower level governments and their units, replicating to an extent 
the coordination structure of the centre. The large policy initiatives are drafted by the 
Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (GDRC), which is in charge of overall 
planning, the management of investments in large projects, and interagency cooperation. 
Industry-specific policies are drafted by the Guangdong Economic and Information 
Commission (GEIC), in charge of improving the development of all enterprises, and the 
Guangdong Department of Science and Technology (GDST), in charge of promoting 
science, technology and innovation. There are some overlaps between the activities of 
                                                 
34 Notable works on the Chinese economic reforms include: Naughton (1995), White (1993), 
Fewsmith (1994), Nolan (1995), Shirk (1993), Vogel (2011), Wang (1998) and Steinfeld (1998).  
35 Interview BJ01, footnote 30. 
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GDST and GEIC, although firms do not seem to consider this a problem36. The Guangdong 
Department of Education is also of some importance, as it is responsible for funding 
research projects at universities with long time horizons (over 10 years) 37 . In some 
circumstances where broad coordination is needed, there are also provincial ‘Small 
Leading Groups’, which bring important provincial-level leaders together to oversee the 
implementation of important initiatives.  
Provincial plan drafts follow the spirit of central-level documents while also looking at 
the key industries and tasks that are more relevant for the province and introduce specific 
policy measures for them. Drafting in some cases might be done by specialized agencies 
affiliated to the government, such as CCID (China Centre for Information Industry 
Development) consulting38. Government-affiliated think tanks, such as the Guangdong 
Academy of Social Sciences or the Guangdong Development Research Centre, also 
provide important inputs to drafting39.  
The draft is then sent to other relevant agencies for comments, as well as to experts, 
who are consulted increasingly frequently since the mid-2000s. Experts are called upon 
according to their seniority. More senior experts will be invited to give comment to 
provincial-level policies, while less senior ones will go to city-level meetings and so on40. 
Business opinion is mainly solicited through inviting provincial-level industry associations 
(such as the Guangdong Electronics Association) to provide comments and through expert 
consulting groups. Input will be absorbed and usually sent out for a second round of 
comments before the final draft is approved41. The implementation and monitoring of the 
plan is then divided according to the mandate of the different agencies.  
Figure 4.9 shows the multitude of vertical (red lines) and horizontal (blue lines) 
relationships that shape the content and implementation of policy.  
                                                 
36 Interview with business association, F04, Foshan 11 March 2015. 
37 Interview with expert academic, GZ08, Guangzhou 13 April 2015.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Interview GZ07, footnote 33. Also, Written communication with government-affiliated think 
tank, GZ09, Guangzhou 12 April 2015. 
40 Interview GZ08, footnote 37.  
41 Interview GZ07, footnote 33. 
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Figure 4.9 Governance structure in the Guangdong electronics industry 
 
Source: Authors elaboration. 
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4.5 1949-1978: An Emerging Industry, Mark I 
During the pre-reform era, China’s industrial development mostly took place behind 
closed borders, with the exception of Soviet help and the occasional imports of technology 
and capital equipment42. The importance of electronics (mainly computers and ICs) for 
improving the capacity of the military meant that R&D and production were intimately tied 
to the defense industries (see Zhou [ed.], 2011). Guangdong was not at the frontline of 
industrial development, but owing to the Maoist principles of self-reliance and 
decentralization, the province developed some basic production and technology 
development skills in the industry.  
The Chinese electronics industry, led by the Fourth Ministry of Machinery Industries, 
started developing in the 1950s (Ning, 2009, Chapter 3). The first Chinese computer was 
made in 1958 at the Institute of Military Engineering at the University of Harbin, based on 
technology transferred from the Soviet Union (Pecht and Liu, 2006). China developed 
transistors in the late 1950s and was able to manufacture ICs since the late 1960s (Maier, 
1980; He, 1990). Given the few resources that China possessed at the time, the majority of 
R&D and production in the industry took place in advanced institutes and in military bases. 
By 1978, 24% of business revenue in the industry was created in Shanghai, 16% in nearby 
Jiangsu, 11% in Beijing, 6% in Liaoning, and only 3.6% in Guangdong (Zhou [ed.], 2011).  
The level of China’s technological development advanced considerably after 1949, but 
remained low by Western or even Soviet standards. This may not be surprising given 
China’s stage of development at the time, the turbulent periods of the Great Leap Forward 
and the Cultural Revolution, and the preoccupation with moving industries to remote places 
to protect against a possible nuclear war. Additionally, the transferred Soviet technology 
was already lagging behind the global technological frontier and the Sino-Soviet split in 
1960 led to the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet experts.  By the time of reforms, some estimates 
put the technology gap with the United States (US) in computers and semiconductors at 15 
                                                 
42 Accounts of China’s economic development in the Maoist period can be found in Riskin 
(1987), Meisner (1999), MacFarquhar and Fairbank [eds.] (1987, 1991). An overview of 
Guangdong’s development during the same period – with a focus on Guangzhou - can be found in 
Vogel (1969).   
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years (Maier, 1980). The acquisition of technology from Western sources became feasible, 
following the normalization of diplomatic relations with the US in 1972 and a cautiously 
open attitude after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. However, technology exports 
to China remained hindered by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM) regulations and the US Export Administration Act (ibid.).   
In Guangdong, before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the only 
electronics-related firms were some privately-owned repair shops for radios and other 
electrical goods, which were gradually nationalized in the 1950s. The expansion of a 
broadcasting station, which had been built earlier by the Kuomintang, created some local 
demand for small components and repairs for wireless communications. The first large 
SOEs were established in the urban centres of the time, namely Guangzhou, Foshan and 
Shantou, and produced small batches of radio components and assembled simple goods 
such as radios, loudspeakers, magnetic telephones and transformers. In a reform effort in 
1962, the more technologically backwards firms were turned into collectives and the rest 
were brought under the management of the provincial department of machinery industries 
(GDEIA, 2000; Yu [ed.], 1988). 
Research in electronics was conducted at the Sun Yat-sen University that had been 
established in Guangzhou in 1924 and in new research institutes that were established to 
help develop the industry, such as the South China University of Technology, the 
Guangzhou Wireless Research Institute and the Guangzhou Electric Apparatus Research 
Institute. These undertook research in transistors, semiconductor technology and to a lesser 
extent computing (Yu [ed.], 1988). By the mid-1960s, SOEs in Guangdong could produce 
TVs, electronic measurement instruments and communication equipment for the military. 
Even some modest successes by China’s standards were achieved. The Guangzhou 
Zhujiang Radio Equipment Factory produced a transistor radio (model SB3-1 under the 
brand name ‘Zhujiang’) that received the first prize in the country’s first radio quality 
appraisal (GDEIA, 2000).  
During the Cultural Revolution the number of enterprises in the industry was reduced 
from 38 in 1968 to 25 in 1969 and a large amount of resources was invested in moving a 
large factory from Guangzhou to the northern mountainous regions of Guangdong and 
establishing two more factories there. The goal was to develop the local peasant economy 
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and shield the industry from potential foreign attacks on China from the coast, but the cost 
was enormous and the factories were deprived of access to the urban industrial and research 
system (GDEIA, 2000). In the early 1970’s, the situation begun to normalize and by 1977 
there were 159 firms, employing 3,220,000 people and producing about 3 million RMB 
(USD 1.6 million) annually (Table 4.8).  
 
Table 4.8 Key statistics for the Guangdong electronics industry, 1965-1978 
Year 
No of 
Firms 
No of 
Employees 
Output Value  
(Million RMB) 
Productivity 
(RMB/employee) 
1965 31 4,169 12.9 4,580 
1966 34 5,265 28.8 8,020 
1967 36 6,635 28.8 5,540 
1968 38 7,084 24.6 4,890 
1969 25 9,026 38.9 6,630 
1970 146 15,245 80.3 5,700 
1971 201 21,779 116.3 5,580 
1972 178 22,971 125.9 5,790 
1973 147 22,095 120.2 5,646 
1974 140 24,150 150.8 6,360 
1975 143 26,102 254.0 10,240 
1976 145 30,841 321.6 11,085 
1977 159 32,209 365.0 11,706 
1978 165 36,872 390.6 11,228 
Source: GDEIA, 2000. 
 
Between 1969 and 1976, the province joined two China-wide campaigns to develop the 
industry, the ‘Go in For Electronics in Big Way’ (daban dianzi) and the ‘Great Battle for 
Colour Television’ (caise dianshi dahuizhan). These entailed a large effort to build 
capacity in cathode ray tubes (CRT), camera tubes and semiconductor components. Some 
twenty units were involved, including factories and research institutes, coordinated by the 
Guangdong Broadcasting TV Small Leading Group and headed by the provincial leader at 
the time, Lin Liming. Among the technological achievements of this period mentioned in 
the official history of the sector are a 16-inch black and white TV, a mainframe computer 
and an ultrasound wave detection equipment (GDEIA, 2000; Yu [ed.], 1988). However, 
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the effort to develop the industry in almost every locality was matched by falling 
productivity (Table 4.8).  
On the eve of reforms, Guangdong’s experience with the planned economy had 
produced some indigenous capacity in the electronics industry. The industry accounted for 
only 2% of Guangdong’s industrial output value, was of low quality and technologically 
weak, but the units involved had at least developed basic capabilities in production, 
assembly and even research. These allowed Guangdong to integrate into GVCs after 
reforms, not only by attracting foreign capital, but also by turning its domestic enterprises 
into suppliers to foreign firms.  
4.6 1978-1992: An Emerging Industry, Mark II 
During the first fifteen years of reforms, the Guangdong government and many of the 
province’s city governments had a pioneering role in implementing experimental 
institutional reforms and in opening-up to world trade and investment (Vogel, 1989). This 
encouraged a ‘re-birth’ of the electronics industry, which expanded rapidly on the basis of 
foreign investment. At the same time, several of the large domestic firms that operate in 
the province today can trace their origins to the SOEs that were established during this 
period. On the one hand, the favorable policy environment and the purpose-built 
infrastructure attracted foreign investment, and on the other hand, government efforts 
encouraged SOEs to reform, improve their capabilities and produce for foreign markets. 
These two strategies created the basic structure of the industry: a nucleus of domestic firms, 
some with SOE origins, which developed with state support and by integrating into GVCs, 
and clusters of FDI-led small-scale labor-intensive suppliers, mainly of Hong Kong and 
later of Taiwanese origin.  
4.6.1 China’s Renewed Modernization Effort 
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, China’s new Paramount Leader, lost no time in announcing 
the Four Modernizations programme, aiming to bring the country back on track after the 
turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution (Vogel, 2011). Deng placed the formerly 
neglected S&T sector at the center of the modernization effort. Technological development 
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was supported by a wide restructuring of the S&T system to better service industry and by 
encouraging access to foreign technology (Saich, 1986).  
Under this general direction, the electronics industry became a priority area. The 
Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI) was established in 1982 and was briefly headed by 
Li Tieying. However, it was Jiang Zemin43, Minister from 1983 to 1985, who first laid 
down a strategic vision for the electronics industry in China. Jiang put emphasis on 
centralizing resources in the industry, focusing on key advanced technological projects that 
would enable the country to close the technological gap. Catch-up would be further enabled 
by encouraging foreign trade and investment, especially in provinces that implemented the 
Open Door Policy, and by pursuing reforms that separated regulatory from business 
management functions in the state-owned sector (Jiang, 1984a).  
China progressed from transistors to ICs, but was struggling to develop Very Large 
Scale Integration (VLSI), putting the technological gap with the US at 5-10 years by the 
mid-1980s (Central Intelligence Agency or CIA, 12 March 1985). In computer hardware 
and software, the picture was not much better either (Jiang, 1983). However, at the time 
China faced many other severe problems, including an antiquated infrastructure, frequent 
energy shortages and macroeconomic disturbances, which featured as the main areas of 
concern in the 6FYP (1981-1985) and 7FYP (1986-1990). This meant that resources for 
spending on electronics were limited44. At the same time, forging a coherent development 
plan in the industry was a challenge, given the multiple actors involved (see Section 4.4.1). 
Nevertheless, the development of domestic capabilities in the industry was supported with 
a variety of measures. These included (drawing on Jiang, 1985a): 
                                                 
43 Jiang Zemin would later become the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China 
from 1989 to 2002.   
44 Jiang (1984b: 145): “We need to effectively solve the problem of placing the electronics 
industry on a strategic footing and formulate corresponding policies and measures [..]. I believe 
that when considering economic development, we should accord the same importance to the 
electronics industry as we do to energy and transportation”. Li Megwei (1990:45), Former Director 
of the Ministry of Electronics’ Quality Company noted: “Our country has difficulties, it cannot 
invest like advanced countries do [but].. a lot of people think the investment during the 6FYP and 
7FYP in the entire electronics industry was small, not even that of one Baosteel” (author’s 
translation).  
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 The establishment of special funds for key state projects granted to firms and other 
institutions with public bidding,  
 Preferential policies to support the development of key products. Enterprises producing 
these would be entitled to low-interest loans, tax reductions and exemptions, and special 
depreciation considerations.  
 The leading enterprises and institutions that undertook key state projects were given more 
decision-making power over foreign exchange, finances and pricing. 
 The establishment of an incentive fund for units that make outstanding contributions to 
developing and applying electronic technology.  
 Imports of foreign electronic products that can already be produced domestically were 
limited or restricted with tariffs. For example, in early 1985 China reduced prices on 
domestically produced microcomputers, cut tariffs on components and doubled tariffs on 
imported machines. The government also centralized import licensing for over 15 key 
commodities and re-imposed foreign exchange controls (CIA, February 1986).   
 Soft loans or other support were given for the diffusion and use of electronic products and 
services.  
Industrial policies implemented in Japan (Fifth Generation Computer Programe), the 
US (Star Wars) and the European Union (Eureka plan) were inspirations for the measures 
above (He, 1990). The experience of South Korea and Taiwan were also frequently cited 
as an example to follow for policy in China (Li, 1990), including in Guangdong (Xu, 1992). 
As explained later in this section, Guangdong firms not only benefitted from the above 
measures, through import protection and funding, but were also encouraged to have an 
outwards orientation, which enabled them to access additional channels for learning.  
4.6.2 Electronics Becomes a Pillar Industry in Guangdong  
The electronics industry in Guangdong expanded rapidly on the basis of foreign 
investment during the first few years of reform. By 1986, at least 80 FIEs (most of them 
JVs) and more than 700 other businesses that engaged in processing and assembly trade 
had been established, with foreign capital utilization of USD 60 million  (Luo, 1988). The 
industry’s rapid development, together with its potential to contribute to technological 
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advances, led the provincial government to proclaim electronics a ‘pillar’ industry in 
Guangdong in 1983, gaining the support of both Ren Zhongyi and Lin Ruo, the provincial 
leaders during the 1980s (GDEIA, 2000). However, instead of only attracting FDI, the 
initiatives launched during this time aimed to leverage integration into the global economy 
to encourage domestic firms, which were mainly SOEs at the time, to enhance their 
capabilities and upgrade.  
The declaration of the industry as ‘pillar’ was followed by the ‘Policy to Accelerate the 
Preferential Discounts to the Electronics Industry’ and other specific plans drawn up during 
the 6FYP and 7FYP45. The policy packages were meant to emulate those adopted by Asia’s 
‘Four Little Dragons’, by supporting firms through subsidies and a protected domestic 
market, while at the same time encouraging an outwards orientation. This strategy also 
became known as building an ‘Electronics Industry with Guangdong characteristics’ (Luo, 
1988; Xu, 1992). The policy support included the following measures, summarized by 
Kuang (1988): 
 Income from new products was tax-free  
 Firms were allowed to use 1% of sales of new products (that have been approved by the 
provincial government) to upgrade their technology 
 Interest-free or subsidized loans were given to important enterprises  
 Subsidies were given to certain units 
 Priority for support was given to enterprises with advanced technology, low cost and high 
quality. 
During the first half of the 1980s the main products that were supported were the ‘three 
machines’, namely TVs, tape recorders and radios. However, the increasing attention to 
technological catch-up by the MEI, led to a shift in emphasis for the province as well, 
                                                 
45 According to the annals of the industry there were several plans published between 1981 and 
1987, such as the ‘Plan concerning the development of large scale ICs’, ‘Draft long term plan for 
the development of the provincial electronics industry’, ‘7FYP Plan for the Guangdong Electronics 
Industry’, ‘Plan for the development of the Guangdong Province Computer Industry’, ‘Designated 
Enterprises and 6FYP Plan for the Guangdong Province Wireless Electronic Enterprises Backbone 
Enterprises’ (GDEIA, 2000, author’s translation). Unfortunately the author has not been able to 
access these documents.  
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prioritizing, large scale ICs and investment goods in the latter half of the 1980s (Yu [ed.], 
1988). Between 1987 and 1992, at least 18 companies (from the provincially managed ones) 
received preferential policies in the areas of ICs, electronic computers, software and 
program-controlled switches (GDEIA, 2000).  
Efforts were also made to revamp the technological capabilities of firms. During the 
6FYP (1986-1990), USD 240 million was used for this purpose, mainly through importing 
equipment, with the provincial government covering 52% of expenditures, while the rest 
was covered by sub-provincial governments and enterprise own funds (GDEIA, 2000). 
Importing foreign technology46 could save steps in industrial development, saving time and 
money on developing indigenous technology. However, the end goal of policy was to 
eventually absorb the technology and achieve self-reliance in the future (Jiang, 1984b). 
Additionally, efforts were made by the provincial government to educate the technical 
and managerial staff of SOEs. Education was generally provided at Electronics Technology 
Secondary Schools and four Technical Schools, while courses were also organized for 
workers after work, within firms and sometimes with instruction from large specialist 
schools. For example, the Guangzhou Baiyun Wireless Factory organized after-work 
classes with Jinan University and the South China Engineering School for engineering, 
management and wireless electronic technology for its technical staff and cadres. For line 
staff, on-the-job training was normally provided (Yu, [ed.] 1988).  
The electronics industry also benefitted from China-wide S&T programs launched in 
the 1980s, namely: (a) the State High-Tech R&D Program (863 Program), launched in 
1986 to promote high-tech industries, including electronics; (b) the Spark Program, 
launched in 1986 to promote the use of S&T to modernize the rural economy; (c) the Torch 
Program for high-tech industrialization, launched in 1988 to develop High and New 
Technology Enterprises (HNTEs) that could commercialize technologies. Beyond 
                                                 
46 Another way to acquire technology was to leverage the domestic market to force foreign 
vendors to share technology. This strategy was used extensively in the telecommunications sector, 
managed by the MPT, who undertook large infrastructural projects, but was also used in the 
electronics sector. Jiang (1985b) commented: “[we] need to use our domestic market as a 
bargaining chip for importing more advanced technology in accordance with the principles of 
equality and mutual benefit and of opening portions of our market to the outside world in return for 
foreign technology”. However, it is not clear to what extent this applied in Guangdong.  
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providing funding for high-tech electronics, these programmes encouraged the 
construction of specialized industrial parks. The Shenzhen High-Tech Industrial Park was 
established under the 863 programme in 1985 and in the 1990’s tens of High-Tech 
Development Zones (HTDZs) were set up in Guangdong under the Torch programme47 
(Arvanitis and Jastrabsky, 2006). The parks and zones, which were larger than parks in size 
and included parts of urban areas, encouraged clustering and were important avenues for 
firm-level interaction and learning (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011; Di Tomasso, Rubini and 
Barbieri, 2013).  
Despite the support to the industry described above, the electronics industry in 
Guangdong continued to be constrained by the lack of quality universities, especially 
beyond the provincial capital, Guangzhou. This made the supply of local talent difficult48 
and shaped an innovation system in the province that is still heavily reliant on firm-level 
training and research efforts (Kroll and Tagscherer, 2009).  
4.6.3 Restructuring and Institutional Reforms 
With MEI leaders being staunch supporters of reforms49, the ministry encouraged 
bureaus to grant more management autonomy to SOEs. However, reforms proceeded in 
varying degrees. Some firms felt uncomfortable trying out their new responsibilities, while 
many bureaus continued to exercise power despite their pronouncements (Jiang, 1985c).   
When it came to reforms, the Ministry put the focus not on Guangdong but on other 
provinces, where production units were larger and more advanced, not only in electronics, 
but also in other industries, too. Companies that had a good track record in terms of 
technological capabilities could be trusted to follow newer production standards and 
                                                 
47 The development of High-Tech zones were also supported by the Decision to Rely on 
Technology to Promote Economic Development in 1991 and the Preliminary Regulation to Support 
the Development of High Tech Enterprises in 1993.  
48 Shen Yili, a Director at the Guangdong Science and Technology Commission claimed that 
FDI could help with this. He is quoted as saying: “[Guangdong does not] have the educational 
facilities that exist in Shanghai, so we will have to concentrate on technical training and exchange 
programmes with foreign investors (Crothall, Geoff ‘Guangdong aiming to be centre for hi-tech’. 
SCMP, 11 June 1990). 
49 See also Ning (2009), especially Chapter 4.  
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perform better under marketization (Jiang, 1984a). However, given that Guangdong was a 
pioneer in economic reforms, it hosted some of the enterprises that participated in the first 
autonomy and management experiments. In 1980 the Foshan Wireless Electronics First 
Factory was one of the first eight factories in the province to receive experimentally 
expanded management rights. The Shenzhen Electronics Group was also one of the first 
four horizontally integrated groups in electronics in the country (GDEIA, 2000). 
Another aspect of reforms had to do with rationalizing the industry, expanding the scale 
of production by merging facilities and improving coordination of imports among 
production units50. Partly due to lack of experience and partly due to lack of foresight, 
production lines for final products were often imported without production lines for their 
components, or were imported incomplete. For example, a firm in Guangzhou imported in 
the beginning of the 1980s a production line for black and white TVs, but did not import 
testing equipment and know-how, so the products were unreliable, working only 2,000 to 
3,000 hours without malfunctioning. This was increased to 8,000 hours after the necessary 
equipment was imported (Yu [ed.], 1988). 
For Guangdong, another problem was that some of its old industrial assets had been 
moved to the mountainous areas during the Cultural Revolution. After reforms, these 
factories were transferred to Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Zhuhai and formed large SOEs, 
such as the Shenzhen Huaqiang Group, the Guangdong Semiconductor Factory, the 
Guangdong Huayue Factory, the Guangdong Yuebao Joint Company and others (GDEIA, 
2000). The relocation created the ‘seeds’ of a domestic industry in Shenzhen, together with 
firms that were established by other provinces and Ministries. In the beginning of reforms 
there was only one electronics factory in Shenzhen, the Shenzhen Wireless Factory in 
Baoan. By 1981 there were eleven companies, six of which were SOEs including the ones 
                                                 
50 The problem of duplication and lack of coordination in imports was acute. For example, 
during the 6FYP 113 assembly lines for colour TVs were imported in China but only 10 companies 
could produce 300,000 to 400,000 units a year, only a tenth of what a factory by Samsung or LG 
(then Gold Star) could manage at the time. Moreover, the lines imported were from so many 
different companies that it was difficult to reach scale in component production. For such reasons, 
TV production remained expensive by global standards (by about 70% to 80%) (Lu, 1990). 
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mentioned above. The rest were set up as joint ventures between ministerial agencies and 
the local government (Wei, 2010).  
Finally, institutional experimentation implied changes in ownership and management 
patterns. Many of the firms established during this period were SOEs, under state or 
collective ownership, but were run effectively as private sector enterprises. For example, 
TCL, a large TV maker, was established by the Huizhou city government under the 
leadership of a government employee, Li Dongsheng, with the government - reportedly at 
least - having little interference in day-to-day affairs51. The private sector started to be 
‘tolerated’ in the end of the 1980s, especially in Shenzhen (Segal, 2003).  
4.6.4 Guangdong Integrates into GVCs 
Guangdong hosted three of the first SEZs in 1980: Shenzhen, Shantou, and Zhuhai (the 
fourth was Xiamen in Fujian province). Even though FDI was allowed in other parts of 
China as well, the SEZs, which were inspired by the experience of Singapore, Korea and 
Taiwan (Sit, 1985), were the first to offer generous fiscal incentives for foreign investors 
(OECD, 2003). Incentives included “a 15% corporate tax rate, 1-3 years tax holidays in 
general but 5 years for investment over US$5 million, repatriation of corporate profit, 
personal income after tax, and repatriation of investment capital after completion of 
contract” Chu (1998: 491). There were also duty free imports on raw materials and 
intermediate goods, while sales to inland areas were restricted. Moreover, wholly foreign-
owned enterprises (WFOEs) were welcome in Shenzhen and other SEZs much earlier than 
in the rest of the country, especially those established by overseas Chinese. High-tech 
enterprises could also get an extension of their tax holiday (Wu, 1998).  
The early SEZ experience was highly contentious within the Party leadership, with the 
more conservative factions likening them to treaty ports, a humiliating spot in China’s 
history. The profiteering, real estate boom, incidences of corruption and smuggling were 
considered scandalous for many, and SEZs were eventually surrounded by physical borders 
in 1984 to limit the illegal flow of goods to the rest of the country (Vogel, 1989). The 
                                                 
51 ‘Huizhou – new breed of state enterprises leads economic race’, SCMP, 11 April 1996. 
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supervision from cadres from Beijing was therefore intense, and difficulties mounted with 
the growing macroeconomic imbalances of the mid-1980s.  
However, the experiment was eventually deemed a success and similar policies were 
rapidly extended elsewhere. First, fourteen coastal cities were granted the ‘open city’ status, 
which was similar to an SEZ, in 1984. Then in 1985, the entire Pearl River Delta was 
granted the status of Open Economic Region, together with the Yangtze River Delta, which 
centred on Shanghai, and other coastal areas. The new regions, although not as free to 
experiment with economic policies as the SEZs, also offered incentive packages for FDI. 
A lot of resources were spent on infrastructure provision, as Shenzhen and Zhuhai were 
essentially built from scratch. During the first few years, the SEZs spent close to RMB 7.6 
billion (USD 3.7 billion) in developing adequate infrastructure (Wong, 1987). Moreover, 
particularly in Guangdong, infrastructure had suffered from neglect by the provincial 
government during the previous decades. Vogel (1989) noted that the lack of energy 
infrastructure meant that factories frequently ran just three days a week. The provincial 
6FYP and 7FYP were heavily focused on developing energy, transport, 
telecommunications and raw materials (Ye, 1986).  
The amount of infrastructure spending, the high ratio of goods sold locally (exports 
were a key goal for SEZs to earn foreign currency) and the deteriorating macroeconomic 
environment led to a curtailment of capital construction in the province towards the second 
half of the 1980s (Ye, 1986). To bridge the financing gap, the Shenzhen government 
experimented with a system of using state-owned land as collateral to raise funds for 
infrastructural development, a variation of which was later adopted by other local 
governments. Despite these efforts, problems of insufficient transportation and 
telecommunications infrastructure, and erratic electricity and water supplies persisted 
during the 1980s (Wong, 1987). Additionally, both domestic and foreign firms were 
encouraged to be more export-oriented, so as to increase their foreign exchange earnings.  
The infrastructure and incentives handed out by the SEZs and later by the entire Pearl 
River Delta were important in achieving integration into GVCs. The success of these 
measures can be seen from the amount of foreign investment that came in. Wu (1998, 
pp.36-37) provides some data from Shenzhen between 1979 and 1990. During that period, 
Hong Kong firms invested cumulatively USD 1.9 billion in Shenzhen, more than 10 times 
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the amount of Japanese or US firms, and 8.7% of their investments (USD 165 million) 
were in electronics. Japanese firms invested USD 77 million in electronics and this made 
up 52 % of total Japanese investments. US firms invested USD 15 million or 13% of their 
total investments in computers and electronic systems. Hong Kong, Japan and the US 
accounted for 92% of investments in the electronics industry in Shenzhen. Many of these 
investments took place either in JVs or as more informal ventures engaged in compensation 
trade, 
Establishing Joint Ventures 
A key way for integration into GVCs in the electronics industry has been the creation 
of JVs with foreign investors accompanied by a stipulation for high technology transfer. In 
other regions of China these were particularly aimed at the domestic market. For example, 
in one of the earliest ventures, HP set up a JV in Beijing with the newly created China 
Electronics Import and Export Corporation under MEI to produce for the domestic market 
in 198452. However, as foreign exchange started to become scarce in the end of the 1980s, 
following macroeconomic deterioration in China, most import-substituting projects faced 
problems, unless they were of very high priority53.  
Most of the early JVs were established in Guangdong, given its more favorable policies. 
The first JV in electronics was established in Shenzhen, between the Hong Kong Hua 
Electronics Company and the Guangdong Overseas Agricultural Management Office, and 
is now a large conglomerate named Konka (Wei, 2010). In 1990, almost 80% of the 
products produced by JVs were exported and in some product categories the percentage 
was even higher (91% of color TVs and 100% of telephones) (China Electronics Industry 
Yearbook Compilation Committee or CEIYCC, 1991).  
Some of the JV projects were deemed strategic and entered the so-called “important” 
project lists in provincial annual and five-year plans and were prioritized in terms of 
                                                 
52  Taylor, Paul ‘World Trade News: US and China in electronics joint venture’, 
Financial Times, 24 April 1984.  
53 Dodwell, David ‘Survey of Shanghai: Deals delay in currency confusion’, Financial Times, 
29 October 1985. 
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government support. One of these was the Shenzhen Electronics Group (SEG)-Hitachi 
Colour Display Device project, a JV between SEG, the (Shaanxi-based) Caihong group 
and Hitachi, established in 1989 for a total of RMB 156 million (USD 41 million). This 
project was also integrated vertically with a JV that produced glass bulbs in Shenzhen, set 
up also in 1989 by SEG, the China Electronic Industry Corporation (a central-level SOE) 
and a state-affiliated Hong Kong company (Hong Kong Kang Mao Ltd) (Liu, 1995).  
There were high expectations that these JVs would lead to rapid technology transfer, 
but the reality was that many of these firms used low technology production methods and 
relied on labor-intensive techniques for exports54. Nevertheless, some of them were quite 
successful in the electronics sector. The top two industrial exporters in China in the early 
1990’s in the electronics industry were the Huaqiang - Sanyo JV and Konka, a JV with a 
Hong-Kong firm, both based in Shenzhen (CEIYCC, 1992). Many of the large domestic 
firms that emerged later had extensive experience in JV projects, indicating that the JV 
route was a major source of learning (see Annex).  
Sanlaiyibu 
Beyond the large SOEs and JVs, the electronics industry in China also features 
thousands of small firms (originally collectively-owned, now also private) engaged in 
export-oriented processing and assembly, referred to as sanlaiyibu55. These businesses do 
not have the legal status and privileges of FIEs and in some cases do not engage in foreign 
exchange payments at all. They are often ‘signed as cooperative contracts with town or 
village level foreign economic and trade offices (waijingban) in the form of business 
entities and are registered in the name of the Chinese partners’ (Yang, 2012: 142). The 
                                                 
54  Vogel (1989, p.143) wrote humorously of all JVs in the province: “Considering the 
unrealistic hopes that Beijing had for attracting the latest technology at virtually no cost, the 
political pressures on Shenzhen not to make concessions to foreigners, and Chinese officials’ low 
level of technical and international experience, it is perhaps surprising that any of these ventures 
worked at all” 
55 The term means ‘three supplies and one compensation’.  It denotes the existence of three 
different types of assembly and processing trade: processing trade with supplied materials, 
processing trade with imported materials and processing trade with supplied equipment.  
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Chinese party only charges processing fees or earns a fee from exports, if it has imported 
part of the materials.  
The informal nature of sanlaiyibu attracted investors that could operate in this 
environment and engaged in labor-intensive activities. Hong Kong investors in particular 
were the largest takers, as they were more understanding of the Guangdong context and 
had significant familial connections with the province (Vogel, 1989). Guangdong was in 
very close proximity and offered considerable savings in production costs. A company 
could afford for the same investment value 10 times the land space and 5 times the workers 
compared to Hong Kong 56 . A survey of members of the Hong Kong manufacturers 
association shows that 46.6% of Hong Kong operations (across industries) in Guangdong 
in 2008 were still engaged in this type of processing trade, some 30 years after reforms 
started (Chinese Manufacturing Association, 2013).  
Jiang Zemin, the head of MEI, argued that sanlaiyibu was part of a ‘reverse 
development model’ for domestic firms engaged in it. Assembly would be followed by 
indigenous development of technical services, then by assimilation of the technology 
embodied in equipment and finally by innovation and own production (Jiang, 1985b). 
While on the whole such hopes have not been met, processing trade was indeed a useful 
learning experience for some firms.    
First, processing trade provided learning opportunities in terms of markets. One SOE 
branch manager (Ge, 1988) described it as the “WHCW” model: the world gives orders to 
Hong Kong, which then sends them to China and then China exports to the world. At the 
time, this allowed Chinese firms to gain capabilities in exports without needing to build 
market knowledge. Second, for some firms (mostly SOEs at the time) it was an opportunity 
to gain production experience before developing their own products, which were mostly 
aimed at the domestic market. For example, Aihua Electronics, an SOE based in Shenzhen, 
engaged in processing trade on the side, while developing its own brand for the domestic 
market in consumer electronics. It later also set up a JV with a Japanese company to 
produce higher performance products. The company kept the processing business, even if 
it was small as a share of its overall business, as it could employ surplus labor and provide 
                                                 
56 Grothall, Geoff ‘HK electronics firms ‘not abandoning China’’, SCMP, December 5 1989. 
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training to workers and managers on top of the market and trade knowledge it gained (Wei, 
2010). Finally, sanlaiyibu provided extra cash to squeezed SOEs. It is no surprise then that 
participation was extensive. In Guangdong, by the end of the 1980’s, almost 90% of the 
provincially managed SOEs had engaged in such business (GDEIA, 2000). 
Conclusion 
Guangdong followed an outward oriented path towards developing the electronics 
industry. The better-known path of this story is the establishment of the SEZs, the fiscal 
incentives towards FDI and the encouragement of low-end, labor-intensive processing 
trade. However, government leaders also paid emphasis on harnessing openness for 
learning in the domestic sector, made up mostly of SOEs at the time. Domestic firms were 
not only the beneficiaries of import-substitution policies and support schemes enacted by 
the central and provincial governments, but were also integrated into global trade and 
investment flows. They were chosen as partners for large JV projects and were encouraged 
to export directly to buyers or in processing trade arrangements.  
 
4.7 1993-2005: Pushing for Scale 
Already from the early 1990s, Guangdong started facing the challenge of the Yangtze 
River Delta (YRD), the economic region centered on Shanghai57, as the latter grabbed the 
attention of the central government. On the whole, the policies adopted during this phase 
by the central government allowed firms (and the industry as a whole) to increase in scale. 
Scale at both the firm- and the industry- level is necessary to improve technological 
capabilities, by allowing firms to apply sophisticated process technologies and source 
components locally. The ‘champion’ initiatives allowed selected firms to become larger, 
engage in the production of more sophisticated products, absorb technology and in some 
cases even export under their own brands. At the same time, the TNC-led clusters expanded 
considerably, creating a diverse base of suppliers and a specialized labour supply and 
intensifying linkages with electronics GVCs.  
                                                 
57 Crothall, Geoff ‘Pudong status starts internal economic war’. SCMP, 28 May 1990. 
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4.7.1 The Reform Battlefield  
The 1990s witnessed an intensification of liberalization and marketization reforms in 
China that radically changed, among other things, the structure, ownership and 
management of SOEs (Steinfeld, 1998; Nolan and Wang, 1999). Under the slogan of ‘grab 
the big, let go of the small’, many small and underperforming SOEs were closed down or 
privatized, while the larger ones were grouped together and corporatized. The reformed 
SOEs became the centerpiece of China’s industrial policy, promoting catch-up through the 
support of SOEs in pillar industries. A number of industrial policy interventions promoted 
selected firms - the ‘champions’ - such as restriction of domestic competition, regulation 
of market structure, easy lending and subsidies (Nolan, 2001, 2014; Sutherland, 2003).  
The electronics industry also implemented the champion initiative. In 1993 MEI 
became an independent unit again, under the direction of the rehabilitated reformist Hu 
Qili. Hu was a strong supporter of reforms, but at the same time he felt that the domestic 
industry had to be firmly supported by the government. He was quoted as saying “China 
will never be able to turn around if we always live on foreign left-over[s] and follow the 
tails of foreigners. [..] An industry that relies totally on foreign imports is a dead one, state 
enterprises must focus on research and development in building up our national (electronics) 
industry” (SCMP, 2 July 1994). Hu and his successor, Wu Jichuan, encouraged the growth 
of the domestic industry with a number of measures.  
First, ‘champion’ firms were chosen in the electronics industry. In the semiconductor 
segment, the 909 project was promoted. This was centered on Shanghai Huahong NEC, a 
JV between Shanghai Huahong Microelectronics Co and the Japanese giant NEC, and the 
most advanced IC fabrication facility in China at the time. The project was led by Hu Qili 
and he became its chairman upon retirement (Mays, 2013). In the consumer electronics 
segment, six large companies were chosen as champions: Panda Electronic Group (Jiangsu 
province), Rainbow Group (Shaanxi province), Changhong Electronic Corporation 
(Sichuan province), Legend Group (Beijing and Hong Kong), China Hualu Corporation 
(Liaoning province)58 (see also Sutherland, 2003). Panda, Changhong and Caihong were 
                                                 
58 ‘Big Enterprises to Take Lead in Electronic Industry’, Xinhua News Agency, 24 January 1995.  
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established SOEs, particularly in the TV manufacturing segment. Legend was a non-
governmental high-tech enterprise specialized in computers (later renamed Lenovo) and 
China Hualu had been recently established to promote the VCR segment that China was 
promoting at the time59 (Linden, 2003). None of these companies came from Guangdong, 
but as discussed in the next section, the province chose its own champions to promote.  
Second, the rapid build up of information infrastructure created a large domestic 
demand for electronics firms. The Gold Card (jin ka), Gold Passage (jin guan) and Gold 
Tax (jin shui) projects were promoted by MEI since 1993 as a way to promote 
modernization in banking, customs and taxation respectively through the application of 
information technologies60. These projects generated demand for relevant equipment and 
software across China. The emphasis on informatization as a way to promote 
industrialization also continued into the new century. In Guangdong, the 10FYP (2001-
2005) included a special plan on the informatization of the economy, promoting the 
manufacturing of relevant equipment, establishment of infrastructure and attention to 
software development and services61.  
Third, the convergence of digital telecommunications, information and electronics 
technologies, gave a strong impetus to the industry’s development, as firms involved in 
telecoms could use their expertise to develop consumer electronics products and vice versa. 
In 1994, MEI established China Unicom, the first telecommunications corporation to 
challenge the monopoly of China Telecom62, which was run by the powerful MPT. The 
struggle between the two ministries over the mobile business was dealt by merging the two 
ministries (along with the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television) to form the Ministry of 
Information Industries (MII), during an institutional reform aiming to eliminate branch 
                                                 
59 ‘Key VCR Plant Switches on’, China Daily, 29 December 1993. 
60 ‘Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua on role of information technology’, BBC Monitoring Service: 
Asia-Pacific, 24 April 1997.  
61  Opinion Regarding the Promotion of the Informatization of the Economy and Society, yue 
fa [2001] No. 2 document. 
62 The company was established with the resources of several ministries, including the ministry 
of railways, the ministry of energy and the ministry of electric power (Pei, Jianfeng ‘Unicom opens 
door for competition in telecom’, China Daily, 20 July 1994).  
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ministries in 1998. MII was headed by the previous MPT minister, Wu Jichuan63. The 
reform of the telecommunication sector would continue for some time, culminating in the 
big three: China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom64. The large telecoms were 
encouraged to compete with each other, but have been protected from foreign competition. 
Wu Jichuan strongly resisted pressures by Zhu Rongji to open up the sector to foreign 
investment during China’s negotiations to enter the WTO65. Eventually, a 49% stake in 
JVs in the telecoms sector was agreed, which could be increased to 50% after two years66.  
China’s investments in a mobile telecommunications network implied a massive 
demand for network equipment and mobile phone handsets that was used by MII to support 
the development of an indigenous industry. For example, it was announced in 1998 that 
telecommunication companies should purchase locally made mobile phone telephony 
equipment. This was acknowledged as “good news” by then Huawei director Fu Jun67. 
Additionally, other measures were announced, such as investments of USD 400 million on 
                                                 
63 Kazer, William ‘China taps telecoms boss for super agency’, Reuters News, 18 March 1998. 
64 China Mobile was split from China Telecom in 2000 ‘Posts and telecommunications China 
sets up two giant groups in telecom sector’, Xinhua Agency, 21 April 2000. In the beginning of 
reforms operators could either offer fixed line services or mobile services. The last round of 
restructuring in 2008 created three operators that could offer both. These were China Mobile, which 
was merged with China Tietong Telecommunications Corporation (the fixed line service of the 
Ministry of Railways), China Telecom, which acquired part of Unicom’s mobile business, and 
Unicom, which was merged with China Netcom – a company established by Jiang Zemin’s son, 
Jiang Mianhang and focused on fiber optic networks (Yeung, Frederick ‘Telecoms regulators take 
aim at cut-throat rivalry’, SCMP, 11 November 2008; Kynge, James ‘News Corp enters China’, 
Financial Times, 20 February 2001).  
65 The leadership tried to reduce the power of MII by establishing the State Informatization 
Leading Group in 2001, headed by Zhu Rongji himself and responsible for overall development 
planning in the sector (Batson, Andrew ‘Officials jump ship as China’s telecom ministry fades’, 
Dow Jones International News 14 May 2002). Then the State Council Informatisation Office 
(SCIO) was also established in 2001, which was first headed by Zeng Peiyan. The SCIO would be 
responsible for executing the national policies of the Leading Group. However, the appointment of 
Wang Xudong, MII minister, as head of the SCIO the status of MII was once again increased 
(McGregor, Richard and Dickle, Mure. ‘New chief for China’s telecom regulator’ Financial Times, 
7 July 2003).  
66 Pottinger, Matt ‘Internet, telecoms score big in China WTO deal’, Reuters, 15 November, 
1999. 
67 Kynge, James ‘World Trade: Beijing gives ‘buy local’ order’, Financial Times, 5 November 
1998. 
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support for auxiliary projects, the control of imports of complete sets of mobile phones and 
restrictions on FDI in this segment68. Mobile phone licenses were given to only nine 
Chinese companies in order to restrict competition, including three Guangdong-based 
firms, namely TCL, Konka and ZTE69.  
The above policies highlight the pitfalls of discussing industrial policy in China without 
taking into account the multi-scalar governance. In this case, the central government 
offered protection and support to several firms that had emerged in Guangdong, giving 
them the necessary space to learn and a lever to encourage technology transfer from foreign 
vendors (Harwit, 2007; Hsueh, 2011; Fan, 2006). At the same time, policy in Guangdong 
gave a distinct outward orientation to the electronic industry in the province and 
encouraged vibrant supply clusters that also supported the competitiveness of such firms.  
4.7.2 Guangdong names its champions  
In the mid-1990s the Guangdong Department of Electronics and Machinery Industry 
(GDEMI), adopted the strategy of ‘strategic shifts’ (zhanlue zhuanyi), which continued 
pushing for the same two objectives that had become prominent since the mid-1980s. The 
first shift referred to the move from an inward to an outward orientation, with a view to 
improving the foreign exchange balance. The second shift referred to changing the mix of 
products from consumer electronics to components (Liu, 1995). The shifts would take 
place by encouraging key firms to undertake projects in promoted products.  
In the electronics industry70 the GDEMI chose 10 enterprise groups and 16 ‘backbone 
enterprises’ to support (Table 4.9), most of them top brands already and state-owned (or 
JVs with state-owned firms), with the exception of privately owned Huawei (see Annex). 
The promoted companies were meant to become large enterprise groups in the industry, so 
as to take advantage of scale economies and acquire resources to invest in R&D (GYCC, 
1997; Xu, 1992).  
                                                 
68 ‘China Strives to Localize Manufacture of Mobile Telecommunications Products, Xinhua 
News, 25 October 1999.  
69 ‘China allows nine firms to produce mobile phones’ Reuters News, 30 October, 1999 
70 For Guangdong the pillars were car manufacturing, petrochemicals, machinery, ICT, light 
industry, textiles, building materials and construction, pharmaceuticals, metallurgical industry and 
forestry (Guangdong 9FYP).  
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The available statistics show that, when the ‘champions’ were chosen, they already 
accounted for the overwhelming percentage of the provincially managed (state-owned 
firms, including JVs) electronics industry, accounting for 72% of sales and almost 80% of 
output71. They also collectively had a large presence in the entire provincial electronics 
industry (including the non-state sector), accounting for 41% of total sales and 49% of total 
output in the industry in 1997. Most firms were quite large in size, with the exception of 
some small ‘backbone’ enterprises.  
 
 
  
                                                 
71 These calculations exclude Huawei as it is a private firm. 
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Table 4.9 Provincial champions, revenue and output, 1997 
 Sales Revenue 
(1990 prices) 
Output Value 
(1990 Prices) 
Groups Million RMB Million 
RMB 
Shenzhen Huaqiang Group 6,006.19 6,571.59 
Konka Group  5,525.00 6,800.70 
TCL Group 5,417.59 8,405.17 
Shenzhen Electronics Group 2,679.19 3,507.90 
Foshan Electronics Group1  2,333.13 3,138.70 
Guangdong Colour Picture Tubes2  2,119.67 3,226.50 
SED electronics group3 666.31 954.55 
DESAY Group 4,571.62 6,038.44 
Fenghua Advanced Technology 807.72 1,939.26 
Guangzhou Electronics Group 1,684.80 1,964.48 
 Backbone Enterprises   
Shenzhen Primatronix (Nanho Brand) 455.72 480.12 
Guangzhou Radio Group 189.27 134.73 
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd 3,906.25 4,757.00 
China Great Wall Computer Shenzhen Co. Ltd 3,992.26 13,469.66 
Shenzhen Kaifa Technology Co. Ltd 1,720.00 1,795.30 
Shenzhen Yuebao Electronics Technology Co. 
Ltd.  2,048.42 3,282.81 
Chaozhou Three Circle Group 1,791.77 1,802.64 
Shinwa Industries (China) Ltd  124.90 257.97 
Zhongshan Kawa Electronic Group 20.92 385.54 
Dongguan Shengyi Futongban4  240.71 562.75 
Guangdong GoWorld Co. Ltd 566.29 409.71 
Guangdong Jiali Group5  187.94 294.18 
Tianma Group 205.58 57.02 
Shenzhen Jinghua Electronics Co. Ltd  506.44 422.24 
Shenzhen Xianke Enterprise Group  992.61 1,317.95 
AF Technology Co. Ltd  28.90 34.00 
Total 48,789.20 72,010.91 
as Share of Total Electronics Industry 41% 49.3% 
as Share of Total Provincially Managed firms 72% 80% 
Notes: 1now part of Foshan Gongying Investment Holdings 2now part of Dongguan 
Development Holdings  3now China Electronics International Information Service Co. Ltd  4now 
Shengyi Technology Co. Ltd  5 now Sanshui Liping. 
Source: Data on sales and output from CEIYCC (1998). Percentages are author’s calculations 
based on data from GBS (various yeats, a) and GDEIA (2000). 
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Since the provincial government could not directly spend large sums owing to budget 
constraints, support was disbursed by way of preferential policies and loans, with priority 
given to projects that boosted the industry’s technological development (Guangdong 
Yearbook Compilation Committee or GYCC, 1997). The following policy measures were 
implemented: 
 Champion firms received preferential financing from China Development Bank for 
capital construction and technology renovation projects.   
 Some firms like Fenghua Advanced Technology and GoWorld were encouraged to 
list in the stock market, following the successful listing of Konka in 1992, the first 
firm to do so in the industry in Guangdong (Wei, 2010).  
 Firms received subsidies for R&D. It is unclear how substantial these were, as in 
general firms were expected to cover most of their research costs, while government 
funding supported basic research (GDEIC, 2001).  
 Firms with over-capacity or at risk of bankruptcy were encouraged to restructure or 
engage in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) (GYCC, 1997). 
The champions were expected to invest on key projects of importance during this time, 
which were in general prioritized in terms of finance and land availability (Liu, 1995). 
These projects had varied success, but they created some assets that still remain in 
production. The Shenzhen Electronics Group (SEG), a state-owned horizontally-integrated 
conglomerate, was particularly active in this regard, taking part in multiple JVs aimed at 
vertically integrating the local electronics industry. One such project was its effort to form 
a JV with SGS-Thomson (now STmicroelectronics) to produce silicon wafers for ICs72. 
The project initially envisaged a wafer fab in Hong Kong and a packaging plant and chip 
design facility in Shenzhen. The first phase was to see the production of 10,000 6-inch 
wafers monthly by 1995 with a second phase adding another 15,000 wafer capacity and a 
facility for 0.5 to 0.35 micron technology73. However, SEG was unable to raise the USD 
                                                 
72 At the time China’s capabilities were 2 to 3 microns in 4 to 6 inch wafers (‘Chinese lay 
submicron fab plans’, Electronic World News, 7 October 1991). 
73 Gold, Martin and Rick Boyd-Merritt ‘SGS, SEG fab deal on hold’, Electronic Engineering 
Times, 21 December 1992. 
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300 million needed in funding for the wafer fab74. The packaging facility nevertheless went 
ahead and started producing fully in June 1998. The inability of SEG to fund the investment 
shows the limits to the financial support available to firms by the provincial government, 
and explains the need to engage in exporting activities to gain extra income. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the provincial champion initiative started to target 
enterprises beyond the original 26 ones. In 1999 the electronics bureau chose 14 enterprises 
to have a guiding role (from the earlier champions) and as many as 50 leading enterprises 
that would also receive help to develop and grow (GYCC, 2000). The effort to widen 
support reflected two concerns. First, there was a growing preoccupation with developing 
large enterprises that could withstand entry into WTO. Tariffs, already quite low (10% in 
the sector compared to 17% overall for China) would eventually drop to 0% with accession 
to the ITA (Guangdong Information Industries Department, 2001). Second, the ongoing 
restructuring of state-owned firms was accelerating, and many SOEs that had been 
supported found themselves bankrupt or amid restructuring efforts, as in the case of the 
Foshan Electronics Group and Guangdong Colour Picture Tubes. This pushed the 
provincial government to look for new firms with high potential to promote.  
Entry into WTO encouraged more attention to smaller firms, to make sure they can 
survive foreign competition. The ‘Implementation Plan for the Structural Adjustment of 
the Guangdong Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry’ (GEIC, 
2001) aimed to address the technological weakness of the industry, by encouraging 
microelectronics and software, especially IC design, envisioning a leading role for large 
firms, while making Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) act as innovative, specialized, 
flexible suppliers. However, beyond listing encouraged products and technologies, the plan 
was not accompanied by policy levers, nor did it include the cooperation of other agencies.  
4.7.3 Champions Remain Integrated 
As mentioned in Section 4.7.2 above, one of the ‘strategic shifts’ during this time was 
the increase in export orientation. This did not exclude the ‘champions’ - even if some of 
                                                 
74 LaPedus, Mark ‘China Exports Chips – Low-tech Trickle is Just the Beginning, Electronic 
Buyers’ News, 8 November 1993. 
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them had a domestic market orientation - as these firms were not meant to develop insulated 
from global investment and trade flows.  
The access of champions to the domestic market, both due to their connections to local 
and provincial governments and their established domestic sales networks, was a draw for 
foreign partners, even after entry into WTO liberalized distribution and other services. 
Such domestic-market-oriented JVs included the SEG project on ICs with 
STmicroelectornics, the JVs between the DESAY group with Siemens, Philips and others, 
the JV of Guangzhou Radio Group with Ericsson and those of China Great Wall Group 
with IBM, Hitachi and Kingston (see Annex). The more successful firms were able to 
leverage these to achieve technology transfer. For example, TCL built JVs with its partners 
Sumitomo, Panasonic and Philips, exchanging its sales networks for technology transfer 
(Li, 2010).   
However, the champions also continued to engage in exports. Many of them had begun 
their lives as export-oriented JVs (e.g. Konka) and others set up export-oriented JVs with 
foreign partners, some of which ranked among the largest exporters in the country (e.g. 
Huaqiang-Sanyo). They also operated as Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
suppliers (e.g. TCL, Shenyi Technology and others). This trend continued in the 1990s.  
DESAY exported 30% of its DVD production to Europe75 and TCL, by the mid-1990s was 
already exporting to Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe 76 . Thus, the strategies of 
OEM/export oriented JVs and import-substituting JVs were not mutually exclusive, as 
often firms engaged in both (Wei, 2010).   
Moreover, during this time, the central government launched its initiative to push firms 
to invest abroad (zou chuqu). The Guangdong provincial government was an early adopter 
of this strategy, pushing firms to invest outside the bounds of the province, and later of the 
country, since the mid-1990s (Davies, 2013; GYCC, 1997) Internationalization took place 
by M&As and by establishing R&D and production bases abroad. TCL was a pioneer of 
this strategy; it purchased French TV manufacturer Thomson’s CRT business and 
                                                 
75 Yan, Dai ‘EU block of China’s DVD players causes dispute’, China Daily, 7 March 2002. 
76 Footnote 28. 
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established a JV with Alcatel in 2004, although both of these struggled financially 
initially77. 
4.7.4 Quick Results and Bottlenecks 
The champion initiative had some quick results. First, production in some of the 
promoted components increased quickly. In color picture tubes, production almost doubled 
from 3.9 million pieces in 1994 to 6.9 million pieces in 1999. In integrated circuits, the 
province accounted for only 1.6% of production in China in 1995, and by 2000 it accounted 
for almost 20%. In mobile phones, before 1997 there was virtually no production in the 
province, but by 2000 Guangdong accounted for 18% of all units, dropping slightly to 14% 
by 2005 (MIITa, various years).  
There was also an impact in terms of increasing the scale of selected companies. 
Beyond the year of the policy announcement (1997), there is no comprehensive data on all 
the firms’ financial results but their success can be gauged by whether they made the annual 
Top100 Electronic Firms (by sales revenue), a list published by MIIT (available on 
http://miit.ccidnet.com/) (Table 10). In 1992 only 9 of the chosen firms were in China’s 
top 100, but by 1999 14 firms were on the list, such as TCL, Konka and Shenzhen Kaifa. 
The success, in these terms, was not long lasting, with many firms from the original 
champion group gradually closing down or becoming restructured by the end of the 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10 Champion firms from Guangdong in China’s Top100 electronics list, 
rankings for selected years 
 
1992 1999 2002 20091 2015 
Shenzhen Huaqiang Group 10 14 17 16 45 
Konka Group 9 4 
 
18 27 
                                                 
77 ibid. 
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TCL Group 51 5 6 7 4 
Shenzhen Electronics Group 6 15 46 36 
 
Guangdong Colour Picture Tubes  
 
31 
   
SED Electronics Group 29 33 25 53 
 
DESAY Group  22 23 17 
 
Fenghua Advanced Technology  54 60 
  
Guangzhou Electronics Group  
 
57 55 
 
Huawei Technologies   10 7 1 1 
Great Wall Computers  13 
  
12 
 
Shenzhen Kaifa Technology 33 25 
   
Shinwa Industries (China) 35 
    
Guangdong GoWorld  95 85 87 95 
Shengyi Technology  74 89 
  
Tianma Group  
   
49 
Shenzhen Jinghua Electronics  41 80 
   
Shenzhen Xianke Enterprise Group  38 86   
Share of Champions in Top1002 in 
provincial sales3  
25.90% 27.50% 15.60% 16.30% - 
Share of non-Champion4 firms in 
Top100 in provincial sales  
11.10% 4.60% 9.60% 7.70% - 
Notes: 1 2009 is the last year for which Chinese yearbooks and list contain firm-level output 
and sales data  2 The top100 lists are by revenue from sales and refer only to local firms or JVs with 
local firms. This is in contrast to top50 lists produced by the provincial statistics bureau, which 
refer to industrial output or sales by any enterprise in the province and where factories like Foxconn 
routinely top the charts.  3Provincial sales in the electronics industry only 4Notable firms that were 
not original champions from Guangdong include Skyworth-RGB, ZTE, BYD Group, Midea Group 
and Galanz 
Source: Annual Top100 Electronic Lists (MIIT website) and data from the GBS (various years, 
a). 
 
Additionally, it seems that the province, instead of setting its sights on a limited amount 
of firms and nurturing them with a strategic vision, adopted a “strategic followership” 
(Wade, 1990) stance, supporting firms that had a good track record. This pattern of support 
fits anecdotal evidence78 and confirms previous work on industrial policy in Guangdong 
                                                 
78 An interviewee with long experience in the health electronics business pointed out that it was 
hard to get the attention of government when the enterprise was small, even though it was 
technologically sophisticated. When the firm grew larger, the government became more interested 
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(Thun, 2006; Segal, 2003). The provincial government supported firms that made the top 
50 industrial firms in Guangdong, the top 100 electronics list in China or won China-wide 
technological awards and brand name recognition. For example, the official roundup of the 
industry in 2003 (GYCC, 2004) includes references to firms that were not part of the 
original champions, such as BKK electronics (now owner of Oppo and Vivo brands). The 
mention of firms in official documents usually implies these firms received support.  
The efforts of the government during this time also coincide with the rapid growth in 
value added per employee in local firms in electronics (SOEs/SOCHEs & Share-holding 
corporations) (Figure 4.10).  The visible slow-down in value added per employee towards 
the end of this phase is also consistent with the lack of strong industrial policy initiatives 
in the 10FYP (2001-2005). The rapid productivity growth post-2005 also foreshadows the 
emphasis on upgrading in the third phase (2005-now), discussed in the next section.  
Figure 4.10 Value added per employee by ownership category, 1997-2014 
RMB, current prices 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on data from GBSb (various years).   
 
Finally, the emphasis of central and provincial policies on specific firms (rather than 
on creating a broader system of innovation), remained a constraining factor during this 
period.  
                                                 
in supporting it to grow even bigger (Interview with firm investor, SZ05, Shenzhen 11 November 
2015).  
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On the one hand, there were efforts to promote innovation. The provincial department 
in charge of industry promoted links between production, study and research (chanxueyan 
jiehe), by establishing engineering and technology development centers, encouraging the 
growth of High- and New- Technology Enterprises (HNTEs) and funding specific 
technology projects (Shanghai Microcomputers, 1997). The S&T system was under the 
purview of the Guangdong Department of Science and Technology (GDST), which was 
the agency responsible for policies on HNTEs, non-governmental technology enterprises 
(minying), high-tech zones and other types of S&T related clusters. Under the slogan of 
“Developing Guangdong Through Science and Technology” (kejiao xingyue), a series of 
support plans were released to further support HNTEs and non-governmental technology 
enterprises (GDST, 1998). These were complementary to champion initiatives, with some 
firms qualifying for both and taking advantage of the broad package of support available. 
Unlike the champion initiative, these measures were horizontal (mainly tax incentives 
applying to all qualifying firms) and place-based (e.g. specific zones).  
On the other hand, the large-scale reform of the S&T system, starting in 1998, was 
disruptive. The reforms led by the GDST, were aimed to make public research institutes 
more commercial in nature, so as to better serve the needs of industry. Funding was cut 
drastically for the S&T system and only research of public nature was kept, with institutes 
pushed to reduce staff, spin off companies and charge fees for research (GDST, 2001). 
While support was ample for large, especially state-owned firms, smaller innovative 
firms faced barriers to growth. Bank financing was mainly directed to the former, leaving 
the latter with few sources of capital available at a time of underdeveloped market-based 
financing (Segal, 2003).   
4.7.5 Global Integration Intensified 
Following Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour79, marketization and opening-up reforms 
were encouraged to expand in scope and depth (Qian, 2000). For Guangdong, this meant 
an increase in its integration into GVCs and some upgrading, through the diversification in 
                                                 
79 For the political significance of the Southern Tour see Zhao (1993).  
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sources of FDI and the increasing investments by more sophisticated suppliers. In this 
section, the policy regime towards FDI is further examined.  
Infrastructure Continues to Facilitate Integration 
The beginning of the 1990’s saw a sharp rise in infrastructure projects by the provincial 
and sub-provincial governments to match the speed of the growing economy and anticipate 
future needs. Planned targets for infrastructure in the province were routinely raised and 
projects that would have been undertaken towards the end of the decade were brought 
forward (Zhu, 1993). Large infrastructure projects planned in the beginning of the decade 
for Shenzhen and Guangzhou started taking shape in the mid-1990s, including the Yantian 
port and a super highway between Shenzhen and Guangzhou80. The rapid build-up of 
telecommunications, transport and energy infrastructure in the decade can be seen in Table 
4.11.  
Infrastructure serviced the economy at large and not specifically the electronics 
industry. However, its impact on the industry was substantial and it was a key factor in the 
decision of large foreign first-tier suppliers to locate facilities in the province, export costs 
were driven down substantially81. An official from the Dongguan city government pointed 
out that the rapid infrastructure construction also facilitated the functional integration of 
subsidiaries in different locations within the province82. An old joke went “when there is a 
traffic jam from Dogguan to Shenzhen, the prices of electronics go up!”. 
 
 
 
Table 4.11 Infrastructure indicators, Guangdong, selected years  
Items 1985 1992 1995 2000 2005 
Popularization rate of Main Lines of 
Local Telephones (line/100 persons) 
0.48 1.81 9 18 27 
Capacity of Local Telephone 
Exchanges (10000 lines) 
 305 1,007 1,939 4,617 
                                                 
80 Shenzhen unveils $74b project. SCMP, 28 November 1990. 
81 Interview with first tier supplier manager, SZ04, Shenzhen, 5 April 2015. 
82 Interview with official, DG02, Dongguan, 24 November 2015. 
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Capacity of Long-distance Telephone 
Exchanges (10000 lines) 
0.17 10 45 70 206 
Length of Long-distance Optical Cable 
Routes (km) 
   21,165 40,846 
Capacity of Mobile Telephone 
Exchanges (10,000 lines) 
  145 1,825 7,925 
Length of Highways (km) 51,288 55,883 84,563 102,606 115,337 
            Expressways (km)  42 358 1,186 3,140 
Length of Railways in Operation (km) 1,026 1,426 1,861 1,942 1,924 
No of Berths (unit) 1,219 2,030 2,285 3,191 2,926 
Berths at 10,000 Ton class 342 64 93 126 182 
No of pipelines 9 17 26 45 63 
Total length of pipelines  182 212 325 1,536 1,813 
Notes: 1 refers to 1990. CAGR data for this variable starts from 1995.  2 refers to 1986  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from GBSa (various years). 
 
FDI Policy & the Zone Fever 
The policy environment for FDI became more relaxed after Deng’s Southern Tour. In 
preparation for entry into WTO, FDI was increasingly encouraged not just into 
infrastructure and high-tech industries but also in services such as finance, insurance, trade, 
tourism and real estate (GPG, 1996). The establishment of wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises (WFOEs) became increasingly commonplace compared to JVs and entry into 
WTO added to the ease of investing, by removing formal requirements on FIEs, such as 
export quotas and technology transfer requirements (OECD, 2003).  
At the same time there were efforts to align FDI with local and national developmental 
objectives, particularly in Shenzhen. In the beginning of the 1990’s, FDI approval in 
Shenzhen started to become more selective, moving away from simple processing into 
encouraging higher value-added and less energy-intensive or polluting activities (Ng and 
Tuan, 2001; Wang and Meng, 2004).  
The publishing of the China-wide FDI catalogues also helped to meet these goals (Lu, 
2002). Catalogues consist of three lists stipulating encouraged, restricted and prohibited 
industrial sectors for foreign investment. Whatever is not included in the catalogues is 
simply permitted. There have been several iterations of the catalogue, published in 1997, 
2002, 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015. The 2002 one liberalized entry into some industries, 
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especially in services. Subsequently, there was little further liberalization but efforts have 
gone into stipulating higher process and product standards for investment. Encouraged 
projects were more likely to be approved and might have benefitted from lower income tax 
and value added tax (via rebates), duty free imports and easier finance (OECD, 2003). The 
catalogues were China-wide and did not change by province, but projects under certain 
total investment value could be approved by provincial and city governments.  
The fact that export-oriented projects were considered encouraged, and the potential 
for export-oriented FDI to improve local growth and export figures, made them particularly 
welcome in the province. Incentives for FDI continued to be provided by city governments, 
who competed with each other to attract investments, often through exemption from local 
taxes or reimbursement of central-level taxes (OECD, 2003). In the end, many local 
governments ended up subsidizing export-oriented projects, even if they did not meet the 
objectives for upgrading at the time83.  
The creation of development zones also facilitated FDI attraction. Beyond the SEZs 
and the similar but smaller Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs), 
the High-Tech Industrial Development Zones (HIDZs) and zones that encouraged 
processing trade, such as Free Trade Zones and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) (see Zeng, 
2010 for a review). Zones offered specific incentives to investors, tailored to the type of 
business they were promoting. Di Tomasso et al. (2013) list some of the incentives for 
different zones in Guangdong province. They ranged from exemption of Value Added Tax 
(VAT) for own-use equipment and parts for all or selected industries, license-free inputs 
for all or selected activities, immediate or post-shipment VAT refunds and exemptions 
from real estate taxes.  
Each zone or park promoted certain industries that fitted provincial or city development 
objectives. Since the electronics industry had become quite important for the provincial 
economy and it was considered a high-tech industry, many zones and parks in the province 
listed electronics as a desired industry to attract. However, there is little evidence that zone 
or park authorities consistently targeted firms in the electronics industry to locate activities 
in Guangdong during this phase.  
                                                 
83 Interview with business association, F03, Foshan, 29 January 2015. 
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Diversification & Higher Value-Added FDI 
During 1978-1992, FDI in the industry was dominated by small Hong Kong operations 
and some high-profile JVs, but in the 1990s a diversification of investments was observed. 
Many foreign lead firms opted to set up assembly plants in the province, often in JVs with 
local SOEs. Their share of local production in some items was large. For example, almost 
67% of mobile phones made in the province in 1999 came from Dongguan Nokia, a JV 
with a local firm (GYCC, 2000).  
Moreover, some of the largest foreign first-tier suppliers such as Foxconn, Flex and 
Jabil (also known as electronics manufacturing service or EMS firms) located their 
operations in the province. These were drawn by the good infrastructure, as mentioned 
before, the availability of skilled labor and tax incentives, which allowed large-scale, low-
cost but reliable operations. Such suppliers introduced relatively sophisticated product 
portfolios and process techniques compared to existing firms (Lüthje, 2004). However, 
their share of local procurement, beyond some plastic and metal components remained 
minimal, as facilities were vertically integrated, performing all stages of assembly, from 
board manufacturing and metal cabinets to plastic injection moulding and final assembly84. 
The scale of operations of first-tier suppliers in the province increased sharply after 
20008586.  
At the same time, Taiwanese investments started to increase. Investments from Taiwan 
had been limited in the beginning of reforms as they were blocked by the Taiwanese 
government, but then restrictions started to be lifted in the 1990’s, more investments flowed 
in. In Guangdong, Taiwanese investments concentrated in Dongguan, forming an export-
oriented cluster in computers and peripherals, Taiwan’s mainstay industry. Given that the 
Taiwanese suppliers were themselves second or third-tier suppliers, most of these 
operations were only for assembly. However, Taiwanese firms unlike those from Hong 
                                                 
84 Flextronics at Thomas Partners 2008 Technology Internet Conference, Voxant FD wire, 4 
February 2008. 
85 Flextronics to ramp up China production as demand soars’, Dow Jones International News, 
22 April 2004. 
86 ‘Hon Hai expands operations in Shenzhen’, Taiwan Economic News, 23 October 2002. 
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Kong, would later go through a process of upgrading that left room for more skill-intensive 
operations to be relocated to the province in the future (Ernst, 2013).  
4.7.6 Conclusion 
From the early 1990s until the mid-2000s, Guangdong favored a strategy of increasing 
exports and, at the same time, deepening the capacity of firms to produce more 
sophisticated products. The two strategies extended the policy direction taken since 1978, 
but the scale of efforts increased and became more focused. Additionally, central-level 
policies, particularly in telecommunications were instrumental in providing learning rents 
to the telecommunication segment. During this period, several large domestic firms 
expanded in scale and capabilities, producing more sophisticated components and 
launching their brands domestically and even exporting to emerging markets. Moreover, 
large-scale first tier suppliers and assembly factories of large lead firms started locating in 
the province and TNC-led clusters expanded considerably.  
Industrial policies appear complementary with GVC expansion in this phase. Foreign 
lead firms exchanged technology and expertise for local sales networks and a cheap export 
platform. Domestic firms were able to use subcontracting to improve their financial 
positions and their capacity to compete in the domestic market. Meanwhile, the vibrant 
small-scale supply clusters started to benefit local and foreign large firms by constituting a 
readily available and cheap source of low-end components.  
One of the reasons that Guangdong’s industrial policy was complementary with GVC 
upgrading has to do with China’s large domestic market. The size of the market meant that 
there was enough space for both foreign firms and domestic players to sell their wares and 
foreign firms were willing to enter into JVs to access it. Additionally, the threat of exposure 
to global competition after entry into WTO and the attention of the Guangdong government 
primarily to well-performing firms, may have acted as instruments of discipline for 
domestic firms that enjoyed rents. However, despite this ‘harmony’ of interests, there 
remained a large segment of the industry that remained out of the equation, the small-scale, 
domestic private sector.  
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4.8 2006-now: Emphasis on Innovation 
4.8.1 Attention to Indigenous Innovation 
At the start of the new century, China had become the ‘factory of the world’, deeply 
integrated into GVCs and even boasting some firms with advanced technological 
capabilities. However, the country was facing also facing environmental damages, a 
persistent technology gap in advanced components (CCID, 2013) and had yet to develop 
truly globally competitive firms (Nolan, 2014). Already since 2000, some policies had been 
announced to encourage structural adjustment, but it was after 2004 that industrial policies, 
aimed at the entire manufacturing sector, rather than a few selected firms, were announced. 
The establishment of the NDRC in 2003 as a supraministerial body, in charge of macro 
policy and broad development directions and the creation of MIIT, which absorbed 
industrial branch ministries, also enabled better coordination in central government 
(Heilmann and Shih, 2013).   
A series of plans were released since the mid-2000s, which tried to address critical 
shortcomings in China’s industrial capabilities. The so-called ‘indigenous innovation’ 
campaign was launched during the 11FYP (2006-2010), with the landmark “National 
Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology” (known 
as MLP). Subsequent FYPs also feature similar emphases on developing the indigenous 
industry, with the 12FYP encouraging the development of selected Strategic and Emerging 
Industries (SEIs) and the Made in China 2025 that was launched in 2015 to foster advanced 
manufacturing. These plans have not been without controversy, especially as Chinese firms 
are engaging in high-profile international M&As and governments at all levels have 
increased financial support for targeted activities87.  
The plans described above were adapted and implemented in Guangdong, as detailed 
in the next sections. It should be noted that some of the firms that had emerged as strong 
players in the previous phase became important for the implementation of central-level 
initiatives by the mid-2000s. For example, Huawei and ZTE started to play an important 
role in the development of domestic standards in mobile telecommunications network 
                                                 
87 See for example EU Chamber of Commerce (2017) on Made in China 2025.   
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technology, a goal strongly supported by MIIT 88 . The promotion of the home-grown 
standard for 3G by MIIT (TD-SDMA) gave a boost to local firms involved in the mobile 
phone value chain, as in addition to the technology itself, chipsets, handsets and other 
equipment compatible with the standard had to be developed (Chen et al, 2014; see also 
Sun et al, 2016). The companies involved in TD-SCDMA, such as Datang/CATT, China 
Mobile, Huawei and others (including foreign vendors) also collaborated on developing 
the more successful standard for 4G (TD-LTE), which was also adopted outside China. 
Huawei is now expected to be an important developer of 5G technologies 89 .  In 
semiconductors, the National Integrated Circuit Industry Fund, managed by MIIT, was 
launched in 2014 with a size of RMB 120 billion (USD 19.5 billion), to advance China’s 
semiconductor capabilities. The fund has been pumping money into China’s IC 
manufacturing and design houses 90 , including Huawei’s HiSilicon and ZTE 
Microelectronics91.  
A Change of Tune for Guangdong 
Guangdong, by the mid-2000s, faced similar problems in advancing the electronics 
industry as the rest of China. A report on the competitiveness of the industry in Guangdong, 
carried out by CCID, a MIIT-affiliated think-tank, offered a lukewarm conclusion (Xiong, 
2004). Guangdong had a more or less complete component supply chain, high levels of 
clustering, low labor costs and a few large innovative firms, but the industry as a whole 
was characterized by low value added in manufacturing and a high dependency on foreign 
imports (especially in core technologies and advanced components). It also lagged behind 
Beijing and Shanghai in human capital, endangering its capacity to upgrade in the future.   
The overall model of growth of the province came under increased criticism, 
culminating in a rare move by the central government to publish a regional development 
plan. The Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta 
(PRD) (NDRC, 2008), issued by the State Council, enshrined a new vision for the 
                                                 
88 Interview with policy expert, HK01, Hong Kong, 16 March 2015. 
89 See footnote 27.  
90 Zhu, Shenshen ‘More cash promised to China’s IC fund’, Shanghai Daily, 16 March 2016. 
91 ‘China IC design industry growing’, ETMAG.com, 21 March 2017. 
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development of Guangdong, away from the chaotic, liberal, experimental character of the 
early reforms and more firmly towards innovation, upgrading and regional coordination.  
The PRD Outline was particularly important in ushering more coordinated development at 
both the provincial level, encouraging the integration of cities in the Delta92, and also 
greater cooperation with Macau and Hong Kong, which are seen as possessing financial 
and human capital.  The connection with Hong Kong was more concretely articulated in 
the Framework Agreement on Hong Kong/Guangdong Co-operation, which outlined areas 
of work in infrastructure and cooperation in science, finance, logistics and other services.  
The ‘PRD model’ also came under pressure with rising wages and the phasing out of 
tax incentives for foreign investors after 2008 (see Section 4.8.3), while the financial crisis 
of 2008 demonstrated the fragility of an economy with large exposure to low-tech exports. 
This constellation of factors culminated in a noticeable change in Guangdong’s policy 
direction. On the one hand, attention shifted to increasing the innovative capacity of 
domestic firms, beyond the few large well-performing conglomerates, and on the other 
hand, there were efforts to upgrade the low-end FDI and export-oriented firms through 
relocation and automation. We look at each of these below.  
Industrial Policy with an Emphasis on Innovation 
The current policy phase (2006-now) has emphasized upgrading the industry and 
encouraging domestic production of core technologies and components. The initiatives are 
broader in nature, involving multiple agencies and expanding the measures of support 
available, making them accessible to a broader constituency of firms. The main 
development plans for the industry during the latest phase are listed below (Table 4.12).  
 
Table 4.12. Main development plans in electronics industry, Guangdong, 2006-
2015 
Date of 
pub. 
Title Main 
Agency 
                                                 
92 Economic integration with Hong Kong and Macau is part of a strategy for a Greater Pearl 
River Delta Area, and has been supported by other initiatives as well, such as the ‘Regional 
Cooperation Plan on Building a Quality Living Area’ launched in 2012. 
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2006 Guangdong 11th Five Year Plan for the Development of the 
Electronics Industry 
GEIC 
2006 Guangdong 11th Five Year Plan for the Development of the High-
Tech Industries 
GDST 
2005 Guangdong Party and Government Decision Elevating 
Indigenous Innovation Capability to Raise Industrial 
Competitiveness  
GDST 
2005 Guangdong Medium and Long Term Science and Technology 
Development Outline 
GDST 
2010 Guangdong Action Plan for the Development of the High-Tech 
Electronics and Information Industry 
GEIC 
2011 Guangdong 12th Five Year Plan for the Development of the High-
Tech Electronics and Information Industry 
GEIC 
2011 Guangdong 12th Five Year Plan for the Development of Strategic 
Emerging Industries 
GEIC (?) 
2011 Guangdong 12th Five Year Plan for the Development of the High-
Tech Industries 
GDST 
2011 Guangdong 12th Five Year Plan for S&T Development GDST 
2015 Guangdong Industrial Upgrading Battle Three Year Action Plan 
(2015-2017) 
GDEIC 
2015 Guangdong Intelligent Manufacturing Development Plan (2015-
2025) 
GDEIC 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
During the 11FYP (2006-2010), the ‘indigenous innovation’ initiative became 
Guangdong’s overarching policy goal, with the Guangdong Department of Science and 
Technology (GDST) being the main implementing agency. Given the importance of the 
electronics industry for the provincial economy, many of the S&T-related plans, focused 
on promoting industrial development in electronics, especially in high tech segments of 
home electronics, new generation broadband, wireless communication systems and core 
integrated circuit design. Promoted areas were supported by funding key projects and by 
undertaking measures to improve market financing for high-tech firms  (GDST, 2006).  
During the 12FYP (2011-2015), attention shifted to promoting the Strategic Emerging 
Industries (SEIs). The Guangdong SEI plan (launched by the Guangdong Economic and 
Information Commission - GEIC) announced a total investment of RMB 22 billion (USD 
3.2 billion) over five years. Support would be given to three top priority sectors, namely 
high-end electronics and IT, semiconductor lighting (LEDs) and electric cars, and 
secondarily to another five industries: biotechnology, high-end manufacturing equipment, 
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new energies, environmental protection equipment, and new materials. The funds were 
disbursed in a variety of ways, including grants, awards, loan guarantees, interest rate 
subsidies and equity investments. About 40% of those funds came from the Guangdong 
Department of Finance and the rest from the relevant implementation agencies like the 
GEIC, the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (GDRC) and GDST93.  
The latest initiative of importance has been the ‘Made in China 2025’, which has been 
implemented so far in Guangdong with the ‘Guangdong Upgrading Action Plan’ and the 
‘Guangdong Intelligent Manufacturing Plan 2025’, both launched by GEIC. The Action 
Plan is ambitious, aiming to push more than 50% of industrial firms to update their 
production equipment94. The Action Plan was backed by the establishment of an upgrading 
fund worth a total of RMB 51.6 billion (USD 7.8 billion), a much higher commitment than 
the SEI initiative of 2011-2015. This was disbursed in supporting advanced manufacturing, 
equipment upgrading, automation, upgrading in the semiconductor industry and raising the 
efficiency of industrial parks. The GEIC offered some funding through of Industrialisation 
and Informatisation Development Special Fund in 2015-2017. The total spending was 
approximately RMB 5.2 billion (USD 780 million) in 2016. The electronics industry still 
absorbed a high proportion of funding (according to author’s calculations, 30% of the 
robotics applications fund went to electronics-related projects).  
The transition from the SEI initiative to Made in China 2025 has not meant a change 
in the industries supported, with the electronics industry remaining a pillar one for the 
province (GPG, 2015). Moreover, the drive towards intelligent manufacturing and robotics 
that is envisioned in Made in China 2025 entails the application of Internet of Things 
technologies, cloud computing, big data and other smart technologies which rely on a 
number of electronics products such as integrated circuits, displays, terminals, sensors and 
others, thereby increasing their demand. The main areas of support currently include 
                                                 
93 Lu, Yi ‘Guangdong’s first round of 580 million RMB special fund to support strategic 
emerging industries’ [in Chinese] 1 December 2010, accessed at http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-
12/01/content_1757228.htm on 7 August 2017. 
94 GDEIC ‘Interview with GDEIC Director Lai Tiansheng: In 3 Years 900 billion RMB to 
Promote Technological Transformation in More than Half the Industrial Enterprises’ [in Chinese] 
29 October 2014, accessed at 
http://www.gdei.gov.cn/zwgk/mtbd/2014/201410/t20141029_113440.htm on 7 August 2017. 
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advanced screens, high-performance IC design and advanced semiconductor packaging, 
embedded systems, 4G TD-LTE & 5G network technology and compatible equipment, as 
well as areas to do with intelligent machines.  With each new plan, the promoted 
technologies have been updated towards frontier technologies.  
Policy Measures 
One way in which the provincial government promotes the electronics industry is by 
choosing important projects undertaken by firms to prioritize in terms of licenses, land 
availability and financing. During the period 2005-2010, 37% of planned investment in the 
projects of the 11FYP High-Tech Plan concerned projects in the electronics industry. 
Among those, the largest was a single project for a 6th generation TFT-LCD liquid crystal 
panel display production line, one of the core technologies promoted during that period. 
During the period 2011-2015, 48% of planned investment in the important projects of the 
12FYP High-Tech Plan and 20% of those in the Guangdong SEI plan were in the 
electronics industry, with some overlaps.   
Additionally, instead of choosing firms and giving support primarily to these, the trend 
since the mid-2000s is to provide funding through designated funds on a competitive basis 
(see Table 4.13). The funds disburse a mix of grants, awards, interest rate subsidies, and 
increasingly, equity investments. 
 
Table 4.13 Policy instruments during the 12th FYP (2011-2015) 
Special Funds 
Guangdong Strategic Emerging Industries Fund 
Guangdong Venture Capital Guiding Fund 
Technology renovation fund 
Industrial technology R&D special fund 
Provincial High-Tech Industry Development Zone Development Guiding Special Fund 
Guangdong Strategic Emerging Industries Venture Capital Risk Investment Fund 
Guangdong Technology Financial Group (for equity investments) 
Instruments 
R&D tax deduction  
Indigenous innovation tax discount 
15% tax rate reduction for HTEs 
Duty free imports for equipment for technology renovation programs 
Duty free imports of important technology equipment 
Reduced duty for imported equipment 
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Software and IC value added tax reduction 
Rapid depreciation for R&D equipment 
Interest rate subsidies 
Loan guarantees 
Free grants 
Prizes 
Export credit insurance 
Priority for land use 
Priority for government procurement 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
The criteria for choosing projects are announced in advance and applications are 
reviewed by a panel of experts95. For example, the Guangdong SEI Development Special 
Fund had a special stream just for the high-end electronics sector, worth at least RMB 1.35 
billion (USD 200 million), not including Shenzhen96. From this fund, a total of RMB 308.5 
million (USD 45 million) worth of interest rate subsidies were given to SEIs (about 2.6% 
of the total loan value), and approximately 25% of those subsidies went to the electronics 
industry97.  
The Guangdong government was one of the first provincial governments to start 
undertaking equity investments in private-sector projects, under the umbrella of special 
funds. The Guangdong SEI Development Special Fund supported equity investments of a 
total of RMB 395 million (USD 63 million) between 2013 and 2016, RMB 200 million of 
which (USD 32 million) went to a project by TCL to produce a 8.5 generation TFT-LCD 
screen project and at least another RMB 50 million (8 million) went to other electronics-
related projects 98 . Equity investments have been used more extensively under the 
Guangdong Industrial Upgrading Action Plan, accounting for 69.3% of total funding in 
201599.  However, it will take time for the industry at large to warm up to this approach. 
                                                 
95 Interview GZ08, footnote 37. 
96 Funds are also created at the city level. Provincial funds normally spend on firms throughout 
the province, but in this case Shenzhen was excluded. The funding number was derived by 
multiplying the annual fund of RMB 450 million over the three years for which calls were published 
(GEIC, 2010).  
97  Author’s calculations on data derived from various announcements on GEIC website 
(www.gdei.gov.cn). 
98 ibid. 
99 See footnote 94. 
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An interviewee from a business association warned that there is no clear legal framework 
outlining what the role of the institutional investor would be and how much of a voice the 
government would have in the funded project100. 
Additionally, there are state-owned provincial- and city-level venture capital funds that 
are encouraged to invest in promoted industries. The Guangdong SEI Venture Capital Fund 
is one such case. It invests through its financial arm, the state-owned Guangdong Finance 
Group into the also state-owned venture capital fund Guangdong Technology Electronics 
Venture capital in Huizhou. The hope is that investments in these funds would be 
augmented with contributions from the private and the SOE sector. The provincial 
investment would then be in the region of RMB 50 million (USD 7.4 million) for funds of 
5 to 10 times that in scale (GDRC 2013a,b,c).  
The target of the measures above are all firms, regardless of their ownership status, 
although in practice few foreign-funded firms apply for these101. Additionally, even though 
policy support has widened, policy-makers are still keen on designating key enterprises. 
For example, during the 12FYP, there was an annual announcement of firms that were 
considered ‘backbone’ (about 50 firms, including 8 previous champions) and a longer list 
of firms that are being ‘cultivated’ to become backbone (close to 100 firms) and these are 
prioritized in provincial funding and received preferential access to county-level funds. To 
be a backbone firm during the SEI initiative, a firm needed a high percentage of staff with 
university degrees (over 30%) and of staff dedicated to R&D (over 10%) and to have assets 
worth over RMB 50 million (USD 7.4 million) and revenue over RMB 100 million (USD 
14.8 million), out of which revenue from SEI-related products should make at least 70%. 
Over 3% of annual revenue should be spent on R&D and the companies should have 
patents and IP rights (GEIC, 2010).  
Finally, government procurement in China has been used to encourage indigenous 
innovation (Liu et al, 2011). A product could achieve the Indigenous Innovation status, if 
it was provided by an enterprise that both created and registered its intellectual property 
(IP) in China or if it was provided by a Chinese enterprise that had obtained the relevant 
                                                 
100 Interview F04, footnote 36. 
101 Interview with business consultant, GZ06, Guangzhou 23 March 2015. 
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IP rights or licenses. The products should also have a certification from the National 
Certification Administration (or its provincial departments), embody a high degree of 
creativity and innovation and be of reliable quality. Local firms supplying such products 
were given preference in bidding for procurement (as they were given a chance to lower 
their price if their initial offer was higher than that of a foreign competitor). The evaluation 
measures circulated also implied a higher scoring for indigenous innovation produces in 
price and technical evaluation (Boumil, 2012). However, China came under pressure to 
cease this measure and the State Council issued a statement announcing the delinking of 
indigenous innovation and procurement (USBC, 2014).  
Guangdong has discontinued its promotion of indigenous innovation products through 
procurement, but throughout the short time that it implemented the initiative, it had an 
effect particularly in the LED industry, as a large number was purchased for use on 
highways (GDST, 2011).  By 2014, the province had installed more than 2 million LED 
lamps on streets to cover more than 40 km of streets an almost five fold increase since 2011 
(GDST, 2014). However, Yang (2014) argues that in Shenzhen the combination of 
procurement and subsidies in LEDs led to rapid entry by domestic firms, but this was 
accompanied by overcapacity and little technological upgrading, indicating that in many 
cases firms are not disciplined into using rents for technological learning.   
4.8.2 Aligning FDI with Development Objectives 
A number of factors have come together since the mid-2000s to create an environment 
in which low value-added, labor-intensive manufacturing has become an increasingly 
untenable business. For Guangdong, the ‘bet’ is to be able to replace those investments 
with higher value added ones or to force existing operations to upgrade.  
First, corporate income tax reductions for foreign firms have been phased out since 
2008 in China and export-oriented projects are no longer listed as an encouraged category 
in the Guiding Catalogues for Foreign Investment. Incentives are given instead for high-
tech projects or for moving inland. In Guangdong there is now a closer scrutiny of 
investment projects to ensure they fulfill developmental objectives102 and tax incentives, 
                                                 
102 Interview F04, footnote 36. 
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even if they concern county taxes, are not used as frequently as before to attract 
investments103 . At the same time, the central government has attempted to centralize 
approvals for important projects so as to reduce competition between local authorities 
based on tax104. These developments have forced industrial parks to compete on the basis 
of service quality, proximity to supply chains, the extent of the local market and other 
business facilitating services, rather than tax incentives.  
Second, the centralization of permits for important projects has also been used to 
leverage FDI for technology transfer. For example, in 2009 in the LCD display segment, 
the NDRC only approved projects that had a Multinational Corporation (MNC) partner105, 
namely LG (in Guangzhou) and Samsung (in Suzhou), ostensibly because foreign partners 
agreed to share core technology (Chen and Ku, 2014). The pressure on TNCs to act as a 
technology provider is expected to increase as the Made in China 2025 unfolds, which 
explicitly promotes the transfer and the assimilation of foreign technology. The recent 
commitment of Apple to build an R&D center in Shenzhen may also be interpreted under 
this light. Such decisions also have cascade effects along the chain. In the case of Apple, 
Foxconn has considered building a new plant in Shenzhen to support Apple’s facility on 
advanced products106. 
Third, the provincial government launched the initiative of ‘double relocation’, under 
the slogan of ‘empty the cage for new birds to settle down’ (tenglong huanniao)107, coined 
by Wang Yang (Guangdong Party Secretary, 2007-2012). Low value added, labor-
intensive and polluting factories have been transferred from PRD cities into industrial parks 
of more peripheral cities and counties. The initiative, which later spread to other coastal 
provinces like Zhejiang and Jiangsu, can be interpreted as a way to encourage upgrading 
in the region, not by forcing existing operations to upgrade, but by inviting new, higher-
value added investments to take its place (Lim, 2016; see also Di Tommaso et al, 2013).  
                                                 
103 Interview GZ06, footnote 101. 
104 Interview with government official, F05, Foshan, 15 April 2015. 
105 Nevertheless, provincial projects without MNC partners also went ahead, as in the case of 
TCL in Guangdong, highlighting the lack of consistency encountered so often in Chinese policies. 
106‘Foxconn to Build Shenzhen Plant for Apple’, Sinocast Computers and Electronics Beat, 19 
January 2017. 
107 Miller, Tom ‘China’s plan to empty the bird cade’, Financial Times, June 10 2009 
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Fourth, wages and other factor costs have been increasing fast in the past few years, 
depressing margins even further, especially for small, labor-intensive operations. 
Migration flows of unskilled workers have ebbed, with fewer migrants making it to the 
coastal regions, as opportunities emerge inland. Even though wage increases are a welcome 
consequence of industrialization, they have also been encouraged by the government with 
its more stringent application of the Labour Law108.  
Fifth, the previous abundance of migrant labor has come to end. For example, Flex, a 
first tier supplier, cites lack of labor availability is one of its biggest problems. The firm’s 
Chief Financial Officer was quoted as saying at Forum in 2010109: 
“Labor as a percentage of sales is such a small number [that the wage increase] really 
doesn't impact margins significantly at all so we're not worried about it in that respect but 
it's certainly something that we have to be competitive [in].  In terms of labor availability, 
we've seen that there is less availability on the coastal regions compared to how it used to 
be. People are not migrating as much and so what you have to do is move inland and so we 
are moving inland with some of our facilities, or opening up new facilities inland to take 
some of the labor pressure away.” 
To respond to these developments firms have employed diverse strategies, some of 
which contribute to the sector’s overall upgrading.  
First, the erosion of margins in low-end projects has prompted many firms to sell in the 
domestic market instead, as revealed in chamber of commerce surveys (Amcham South 
China, 2014; CMA, 2013). This is a trend that is reflected in aggregate statistics as well. 
At their peak in 2008, FIEs in Guangdong exported 84% of their output, while in 2014 the 
percentage was 73% (GBSb, various years). A turn towards the domestic market may imply 
more back-end processes locating to China, as product design and adaptation tends to 
locate close to the market. For example, Flex established a Product Innovation Center in 
Zhuhai in 2013, whose main function is to adapt products for customers who want to sell 
in the region. The domestic brands have become increasingly important customers for such 
                                                 
108 See footnote 82. 
109 ‘Flextronics at CLSA AsiaUSA Forum’, CQ FD Disclosure, 3 March 2010. 
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first-tier suppliers110, so such trends may be accentuated in the future. Huawei is one of 
Flex’s largest customers and the two firms are even working together on Huawei’s 
sustainable supply chain standard111.  
Second, many firms are taking up the government’s financial incentives to move labor-
intensive facilities elsewhere, but keeping higher-end functions or headquarters in 
advanced regions, such as Shenzhen. The strategy of relocation has enjoyed varied success 
so far. One interviewed firm112 described its experience in a positive light. The firm was a 
producer of Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs), a relatively low-tech component in electronics. 
It was established in Shenzhen but the rising land and labor costs,made the cost prohibitive. 
The company opted to relocate under the scheme to Meizhou, the hometown of one of the 
owners. There, the firm found the new park well designed and with good wastewater 
management. The biggest problem for the firm was getting qualified staff to move there. 
In contrast, a first tier supplier manager suggested that moving inland was not a sustainable 
option, as the wage differential with inland provinces is often not large enough to 
compensate for the productivity gaps. Once the generous incentives expire (free buildings, 
no income tax), firms often come back113. 
Third, the pressure to find workers also has pushed some firms to make themselves 
more attractive to workers. An interviewed PCB manufacturer in Dongguan114 argued that 
he had to change his attitude towards attracting workers. In the past, the majority of workers 
were migrant females below 30 years old. Now, there are more men on the production line 
and older women. The firm has built flats for families and an experimental kindergarten to 
make it more attractive to workers and reduce turnover.  
                                                 
110 A manager working at an EMS factory in Guangzhou suggested that this is still not very 
widespread. The Chinese firms themselves are used to working with very low profit margins and 
sometimes – even the big brands – cannot afford to hire the large EMS firms and chose local, 
smaller scale suppliers. Interview GZ11, Guangzhou 19 November 2015. 
111 Huawei steps up standard to be the Chinese electronics industry’s poster boy for 
sustainability, Bien Perez, SCMP, 18 September 2016. 
112 Interview SZ01, Shenzhen 23 January 2015. 
113 Interview SZ04, see footnote 62. 
114 Interview DG01, Dongguan 28 October 2015. 
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Finally, firms have the option to upgrade their processes, supported by policy 
incentives to adopt intelligent manufacturing under the umbrella of Made in China 2025, 
discussed previously. Foxconn drew attention when it announced plans to fully automate 
its factories. Originally, the company wanted to move production inland and transform the 
Shenzhen plants into R&D and quality testing centers115, but in the end, some production 
facilities remained in Shenzhen and they were gradually automated, together with other 
facilities in China. The ‘foxbots’ as its robots are called, are developed and produced by 
Foxconn in China116.  
4.8.3 Indigenous Innovation for Upgrading 
Some authors have questioned whether policies to encourage indigenous innovation 
are compatible with a strategy of upgrading in globalized industries.  
For example, Chen and Ku (2014) posited that there might be a conflict between these 
two strategies if the incentives of upstream and downstream suppliers are not aligned. The 
authors suggest that TCL leapfrogged with heavy state support into advanced liquid crystal 
displays (LCDs) and the firm would suffer from high learning costs. However, TCL’s 
multi-decade experience in TV assembly meant that it was able to absorb the technology 
quickly and is now one of the fastest growing TV brands in the US market117, while getting 
ready to launch an even more advanced factory in Shenzhen. Moreover, it is a vertically 
integrated firm, able to absorb its own production. Similarly, Huawei and ZTE developed 
chipsets to be used in their own handsets, which are manufactured by TSMC, while they 
also make use of outsourced chips, notably by Qualcomm, thereby using both own-
developed components and global sourcing.  
Ernst (2014) also argues that the indigenous innovation initiative launched by the 
central government set targets for domestic R&D for firms in the semiconductor industry 
and encouraged firms to limit technology imports. Ernst argues that by doing this, the 
central government has constrained firms’ abilities to create global partnerships and access 
                                                 
115 ‘Hon Hai: To Transform Shenzhen Plants Into R&D, Quality Testing Centers’, Dow Jones 
International News, 18 August 2010. 
116 ‘Foxconn boosting automated production in China’, ETMAG.com, 3 January 2017. 
117 See footnote 29. 
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the most advanced technologies in the semiconductor segment. In this context, insisting on 
indigenous content may perpetuate the gap between Chinese and US firms.  However, it is 
not clear if firms supported by the Guangdong government were subject to quotas on R&D, 
as the author suggests, at the expense of technology imports or global partnerships. The 
industry did reduce technology imports, from 0.18% of output in 2005 to 0.04% in 2012 
(GBSc, various years), but the total funds for technology imports are only between 1-13% 
of what is spent on R&D on any given year. There is not much evidence in the policy 
documents or the interviews to suggest that in Guangdong firms were compelled to turn 
their attention to domestic innovation. This may be because of the tendency of Guangdong 
policies to use market instruments rather than fiat118, or due to the nature of consumer and 
telecommunication electronics, as opposed to semiconductors. In consumer electronics, it 
is possible to develop brands (at least in less mature markets) and still rely on imported 
high-tech components, but in semiconductors it is necessary to develop domestic 
capabilities to be able to design and fabricate the product.  
Moreover, despite the clear policy support in favor of developing domestic capabilities, 
the big brands of Guangdong remain embedded in global networks of technology and 
maintained an export orientation. Huawei, ZTE and TCL, as the most sophisticated brands, 
regularly go into technology partnerships and engage in global acquisitions. In 2016 
Huawei was ranked 50th in global brand BrandZ’s top 100 and 13th as a technology brand. 
In 2016 ZTE, was the third-largest seller of Android smartphones in 2016 in the U.S119.  
Beyond the flagship firms, many more have emerged. Oppo and Vivo are currently the 4th 
and 5th largest smartphone producers in the world, with fast growth in emerging markets, 
especially Southeast Asia and India120. The two brands are owned by BBK Electronics, 
which is based in Dongguan, a firm established in 1995 to manufacture VCDs and DVDs. 
Oppo, which is expanding aggressively abroad, sourced technology for its camera, one of 
                                                 
118 Interview with government-affiliated research centre, GZ05, 25 March 2017. 
119 Clover, Charles, ZTE rings up success in US smartphone market, Financial Times, February 
4 2016. 
120 ‘TrendForce Reports Global Smartphone Production Volume Reached 324 Million Units 
This Second Quarter’, Business Wire, 3 August 2017. 
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its key distinguishing features, from Corephotonics, an Israeli startup121, and frequently 
uses Qualcomm chipsets122. Other brands include the Coolpad brand of smartphones and 
tablets, which are produced by Yulong Computer Telecommunication Scientific, a 
company founded in 1993 in Shenzhen, and Skyworth, a TV brand founded in Shenzhen 
in 1988. 
In addition, the development of local firms has created a large source of demand for 
the components and subassemblies produced by foreign first-tier suppliers like Foxconn123 
and smaller second-tier suppliers. Far from being encouraged to try to develop technologies 
that cannot be absorbed locally as Chen and Ku (2014) and others have suggested, the firms 
that are promoted create downstream demands for the existing production base. The large 
manufacturing base that was created in the PRD, with its origins in the low-end foreign-
led operations of the 1980s and 1990s, is now also a source of attraction, not only for 
attracting higher value added FDI but also for new, hardware-based Chinese start-ups. For 
example, the large, foreign-owned, end-to-end outsourcing services firm PCH Electronics, 
not only continues its presence in the province despite the higher costs but also has gone 
on to employ 200 engineers to work on product design124. The main reason put forward, is 
that in the PRD, suppliers are always three hours away, the supply chain is predictable and 
the local factories can work on small-batch and low-inventory ways, which increases 
flexibility125. A similar reason was put forward by an interviewed large consumer drone 
supplier 126 . The company identified its main strength against better-funded foreign 
                                                 
121  Low, Aloysius ‘Oppo phones will soon have 5x loseless zoom’, CNETnews.com, 27 
February 2017. 
122 Li, Jane and Soo, Zen ‘Glass maker Schott dials China smartphone brands’, SCMP, 23 
February 2017.  
123 Wu, Debby and Cheng, Ting-fang ‘Exclusive: Foxconn to build new Huawei smartphone 
factory in western China’, Nikkei Report, 22 May 2016.  
124 Murgia, Madhumita ‘Meet Liam Casey: the man behind your Made in China tech’, The 
Telegraph Online, 6 October 2015.  
125 Kassei, Matthew ‘Manufacturing Guru Liam Casey Looks Back – and Ahead; The man 
known as ‘Mr China’ discusses the importance of selling and what China and the U.S. can learn 
from each other’, The Wall Street Journal Online, 8 June 2016. 
126 Interview with Chinese brand in consumer electronics, SZ07, Shenzhen 30 March 2017. 
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competitors as its proximity – and its relationships - to suppliers, which allows the firm to 
make prototypes within one day and turn out updated products faster.   
These developments highlight the positive synergies between industrial policy and 
upgrading within GVCs over time. Pursuing integration into the global economy through 
heavy reliance on FDI in the past allowed the emergence of large clusters of low-end 
suppliers, while industrial policies focused on developing stronger and more capable 
domestic firms with an outwards orientation. In the end, the former have acted as ‘industrial 
commons’, becoming a source of competitiveness for both foreign and domestic global 
players. Meanwhile the more advanced domestic firms have upgraded within GVCs, 
outsourcing their production and engaging in global innovation networks. Retaining the 
manufacturing competitiveness of supply clusters in the PRD will continue to feed these 
synergistic relationships and allow more firms to emerge and/or upgrade.  
 
4.9 Conclusions 
For years, Guangdong had a bad reputation when it came to innovation, being charged 
with imitation and copycat production. The weaknesses in core electronics components, 
such as semiconductors and the large swathes of low-end suppliers, have added to the 
perception that the PRD model was unsustainable.  
The provincial trajectory had been studied by scholars mostly with regards to the low-
end clusters in computer peripherals and mobile phones. However, these works have been 
unable to shed light on an increasingly diverse industry, featuring dynamic domestic firms 
alongside traditional foreign and domestic GVC suppliers. This chapter has shown that an 
account of Guangdong’s electronics industry needs an integrated perspective, taking into 
account the multi-level government structure in China and the multiple policies that have 
shaped industrial growth and upgrading. What have seemed like ‘separate universes’ - the 
supported and at times protected domestic large firms and the almost unregulated 
mushrooming foreign-led clusters - in reality begun their post-reform journey together and 
have now become further integrated. What the aggregate numbers hide, is a diverse 
industry, with frontrunners and laggards, which nevertheless form part of the same 
production system.  
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Overall, industrial policy in the context of GVCs in the case of Guangdong has relied 
on some old and tried tools: using good infrastructure to attract foreign investments, using 
instruments such as JVs to increase spillovers, offering the domestic market as leverage for 
technology transfer, incentivizing localization of more sophisticated components and 
putting in place funding and incentives for R&D and commercial application of high-tech 
research. However, the supported firms in Guangdong did not only focus on the domestic 
market, but also adopted a mixed strategy, using their integration at the lower end of export-
oriented global value chains to improve their technological capacity and compete in the 
domestic market. The champions, even as they grew and became vertically integrated, did 
not lose their connection to the global industry and relied on sourcing components and 
technologies from abroad to complement their production capabilities. As their capabilities 
have accumulated, they have been able to advance in vertical integration, tackling areas 
that are more sophisticated and capital-intensive, such as IC design and advanced display 
production.  
Policy-makers always wanted to encourage the domestic firms to reach the 
technological frontier. However, this has only become possible in the latest decade, 
indicating that learning is a long evolutionary process. Many of the firms that emerged as 
brands in this current phase have been around for decades, working at the lower end of the 
chain or having limited success with their own brands. Ultimately, innovation policies in 
this latest phase had more chances of success with a group of industrial firms that was 
already mature in the manufacturing process and had engaged extensively in the global 
market. However, policies are still not addressing the deficiencies of the innovation system 
in a comprehensive way, leaving question marks about whether the Guangdong electronics 
industry can reach its full potential. Funding to the private sector (especially SMEs), is 
constrained, and there remains a lot to be done on building quality higher education and 
increasing research capabilities in the public sector.   
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5 A Long Voyage to Ithaca: The Experience of Malaysia in the 
Electronics Industry  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The efforts of the Malaysian government to promote the development of the electronics 
industry exemplify an approach that relies on integrating and upgrading within Global 
Value Chains (GVCs). Integration has been pursued mostly by attracting export-led 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), first in semiconductor assembly and after the mid-1980s 
also in consumer electronics, computers and peripherals. Upgrading has been encouraged 
by putting conditions on FDI regarding local contents (until this clashed with World Trade 
Organization or WTO rules), Research and Development (R&D) expenditures, and other 
criteria related to the sophistication of processes within the firm, such as tax incentives 
dependent on the ratio of engineering and science and technology (S&T) staff to total or 
on R&D as share of revenue. Government programmes also aimed to increase incentives 
and resources for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to participate in GVCs, by 
encouraging linkages with large firms by providing tax incentives to the latter.   
The case of Malaysia demonstrates that, without industrial policy measures that provide 
incentives to firms to accumulate technological capabilities and an innovation system that 
can stimulate such behaviour, upgrading within GVCs is limited. As reviewed in Chapter 
2, the dynamics that exist within GVCs can contribute to the accumulation of technological 
capabilities within firms in developing economies over time. Foreign subsidiaries can 
obtain technology and management expertise from their parents and gradually engage in 
the production of more sophisticated products and the use of more complex production 
techniques. Over time, sourcing linkages may also develop and labour turnover can also 
diffuse technological capabilities in the local economy. The developments in the Malaysian 
electronics industry show that such developments are indeed possible, with many firms 
gradually upgrading and some domestic firms emerging as suppliers of equipment and sub-
contracting services. However, the Malaysian electronics industry, after nearly 50 years of 
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development, does not feature any firms at the technological frontier, global brands or at 
least sophisticated first tier suppliers. The situation is worse when considering the diffusion 
of capabilities to the domestic economy, where few firms have emerged.  
This Chapter argues that policy initiatives to promote the development of the industry 
in Malaysia have not been able to leverage the opportunities provided by integration into 
GVCs. The instruments used have not provided adequate incentives for learning, while 
manufacturing has often been overlooked as a source of innovation in favor of science-
based SMEs. Prioritizing inter-ethnic redistribution over technological capability 
accumulation as well as conflicts between the objectives of state and federal governments 
have also hampered upgrading.  Without access to a well-funded innovation system that 
reaches manufacturing firms and without adequate incentives for engaging in learning, 
firms have only upgraded incrementally, a process that has been too slow and has not 
enabled firms to engage in frontier activities.  
Moreover, it is argued that the industry has evolved over four phases, each with its own 
opportunities and challenges for upgrading arising from the changing policy instruments, 
the changing dynamics of the electronics GVCs and the evolutionary character of capability 
accumulation within firms. During the first phase (1957-1967) Malaysia undertook some 
import substitution efforts to stimulate industry, and the first factories in the industry were 
set up. However, it was during the second phase (1968-1985) that the industry really 
emerged based largely on the attraction of labour-intensive, export-oriented foreign 
investments. During this time the government made no efforts to develop domestic firms 
that could link to the industry or to target electronics FDI as a source of technological 
capabilities. The third phase (1986-2005) saw the promotion of high-tech activities in 
foreign subsidiaries and the emergence of some domestic firms. However, the incentives 
used were not enough to push firms to engage in learning, while the innovation system 
remained disconnected from manufacturing firms. During the  fourth phase (2005-now) the 
government has attempted to develop the capital-intensive parts of the value chain and paid 
more attention to the development of domestic firms. While the industry continues to 
operate far from the frontier, some of the recent initiatives are promising and may mark the 
beginning of a new phase in the development of the industry. 
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The Chapter is structured as following. Section 2 offers a review of the literature on the 
development of the electronics industry in Malaysia. Section 3 reviews the performance of 
the industry over time. Section 4 discusses three issues related to policy-making in the 
industry (the role of ethnic redistributive politics, the federal-state government relationship 
and the governance structure in the electronics industry). Section 5 discusses the dynamics 
of upgrading in each of the four distinct policy phases in the industry’s development. 
Section 6 contains the conclusions of this Chapter.  
 
5.2 Literature review 
 
The development of the electronics industry in Malaysia has been the subject of several 
studies during the last four decades. Over time, a consensus has formed in the literature, 
arguing that the Malaysian electronics industry has undergone significant upgrading since 
the industry took roots in the 1970s, but with few firms, if any, breaking into frontier 
activities, becoming first-tier suppliers or developing their own brands.  
The first studies on the Malaysian electronics industry used it as a case study to assess 
the contribution of FDI to local economic development. Influenced by dependency theory, 
these works set out to demonstrate the low-level of technological capabilities in foreign 
subsidiaries, the use of precarious, predominantly female labour to perform assembly tasks  
(Lim, 1978; Hui, 1975) and the relatively few opportunities for sourcing that materialized 
for Malaysian firms (Chee and Lee, 1979 on Japanese Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) 
including electronics; Anazawa, 1985).  
A series of works in the 1990s demonstrated that MNC subsidiaries in the industry had 
been upgrading since the mid-1980s (O’Connor, 1993; Rasiah, 1996; Hobday, 1999; 
Ismail; 1999; Capannelli, 1999; Goh, 1999; Ariffin and Bell, 1999). These studies, 
grounded in the technological capabilities framework, argued that contrary to the 
predictions of dependency theory, FDI-led export-oriented assembly operations could, 
under the right circumstances, upgrade into more sophisticated operations and diffuse 
managerial and technological skills throughout the economy. Ismail (1999) and Hobday 
(1999), both relying on interviews with firms in the early 1990s, found that while product 
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R&D remained limited, apart from exceptions such as Intel that conducted R&D on mature 
products, several firms undertook process R&D, such as Motorola and Texas Instruments. 
Moreover, the complexity of products started increasing (Arrifin and Bell, 1999), sourcing 
linkages started developing between foreign subsidiaries and local firms, facilitating 
technology transfer (Ismail, 1999; Rasiah, 1994; Noor et al, 2002) and upgrading increased 
demand for high-skilled labour (Rasiah and Nrayathan, 1992).  
The optimism of the 1990s about FDI-led industrial upgrading through labour turnover 
and linkages with local SMEs started to be replaced by fears of ‘stalled industrialization’ 
(Henderson and Phillips, 2007) as Malaysia’s manufacturing industries started ‘running 
out of steam’ (Tan, 2014). Adopting a GPN perspective, Ernst (2004) and Henderson and 
Phillips (2007) noted that local firms continued to occupy the lower-ends of the value 
chain, with few signs of upgrading. Recent surveys of firms in Penang (Rasiah, 2010) and 
Johor (Van Grunsven and Hutchinson, 2016) across local and foreign firms, confirm that 
upgrading “is not fast enough to help stimulate the catch-up process” (Rasiah, 2010 p. 316).  
Most studies on the Malaysian electronics industry concentrate on a few key factors 
behind the modest upgrading witnessed so far. First, Malaysia had been experiencing fast 
wage growth and many subsidiaries found the need to adopt labour-saving techniques, 
which increased the need for local sourcing as well as for higher skilled managerial and 
shop floor staff (Rasiah and Narayathan, 1992; Rasiah, 1999). Second, industrial policy 
measures implemented by the Malaysian federal government and the Penang Development 
Corporation (PDC) were seen as critical in facilitating the development and upgrading of 
the industry. The instruments that have been singled out are the efforts of the Malaysian 
Investment Development Authority (MIDA) and PDC to attract specific firms with 
incentives, targeted infrastructure and the establishment of the Penang Skills Development 
Centre (Singh, 2011; Athukorala, 2014), the role of the PDC in linking local firms to 
foreign subsidiaries (Rasiah, 1994; Rasiah 1999) and the efforts of the Malaysian 
government to provide incentives for R&D and increase the density and quality of the 
innovation system (Rasiah, 1999; Lall, 1995; Jomo and Edwards, 2003; Felker and Jomo, 
2007). The lack of sustained upgrading into high value added activities is mostly attributed 
to weaknesses in policy design and implementation, such as the lack of adequate 
monitoring and evaluation (Lim and Ong, 2007), badly designed instruments (O’Connor, 
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1993; Rasiah, 2015) and inadequacies in the support infrastructure for innovation (Best and 
Rasiah, 2003). The political economy of industrial policy in Malaysia has also put emphasis 
on ethnic redistribution often at the cost of promoting capability accumulation (Jomo and 
Gomez, 2000; Lee, 2007; Gomez, 2012; Henderson and Phillips, 2007).  
Overall, the literature has examined two key issues that are relevant to the framework 
of this research (as explained in Chapter 2): the role of the state in encouraging integration 
in GVCs by attracting FDI (rather than developing local suppliers that can integrate into 
GVCs), and the accumulation of technological capabilities in –predominantly foreign - 
firms. However, two gaps remain in the literature that this Chapter aims to fill.  
First, there is need to update the literature with more recent developments in policy. 
Much of the existing literature reviewed above, is based on the developments in the Penang 
cluster during the period 1985-2000, when automation and upgrading in several foreign 
subsidiaries took place and industrial policy became more strategic, compared to the 
previous decades (Lall, 1994). However, the literature has not examined the developments 
in policy after Mahathir stepped down in 2004. The brief retreat from strategic initiatives 
on manufacturing (2004-2009) during Prime Minister Badawi’s term was followed by the 
launch of the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) (2010-2020) by Prime Minister 
Najib. The ETP launched projects to diversify the industry and more funding became 
available to domestic investors.  
Second, most works have focused on foreign subsidiaries and the few works that focus 
on domestic firms are limited to those in supporting activities (such as tooling and 
machinery) (Rasiah, 1994; 1999; Best and Rasiah). This means that most studies on 
industrial policy in the electronics industry explore its impact on upgrading in foreign 
subsidiaries and on creating linkages with equipment suppliers, but they do not explore the 
factors that have constrained the emergence and growth of domestic firms in core 
manufacturing activities in electronics (e.g. semiconductor design and fabrication, 
assembly of semiconductors and boards and final product assembly). In contrast, this 
Chapter analyses the lack of domestic firm involvement in core activities as the result of 
the GVC-led development model adopted by the Malaysian federal and regional 
governments.  
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5.3 What the data says about upgrading 
 
As discussed in Section 5.2, the literature points to limited upgrading taking place in 
the Malaysian electronics industry, with technological capabilities developed in process 
and product R&D, but with no firms undertaking frontier innovations, or reaching lead firm 
status. This picture is also supported by the statistical data available for the industry that is 
reviewed in this section.     
The data presented here are drawn from the annual industrial surveys (1973-1989) and 
from the annual surveys of manufacturing industries (1993-2015), conducted by the 
Department of Statistics Malaysia (DSM). Data on investments have been collected from 
MIDA annual reports (1967-2015). The electronics sector in this section encompasses 
(unless otherwise stated) three classes of goods: manufacture of office, computing and 
accounting machinery (e.g. computers and peripherals); manufacture of television and 
radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods 
(consumer electronics) and; manufacture of semiconductors and other electronic 
components and communication equipment and apparatus (electronic components).  
It should be noted that the data has several limitations: 
 There are several missing years in the surveys. Instead of extrapolating values for 
missing years, data is presented only for the years available.  
 Surveys have used the three different versions of the Malaysian Standard Industrial 
Classification (MSIC). There were efforts to match these over time by the by the 
author.  
 Published survey data does not contain information on ownership.   
 
There is no doubt that electronics has become one of the most important industries in 
the Malaysian economy since the first operations were established in the 1960s. Electronics 
accounted for a mere 8% of total manufacturing output value in 1975, but by 1999 it 
reached a peak of 41%. Since 2001 the importance of electronics in Malaysian 
manufacturing has been declining. In 2015 electronics accounted for 21% of output, 18% 
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of value added, 15% of employment and 13% of fixed assets in the total manufacturing 
sector (Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1 Share of electronics industry in total manufacturing, Malaysia, selected 
variables and years 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on data from (DSM) (various years, a and b).  
 
The output value and value added of the electronics industry declined between 2005 and 
2012, although they recovered by 2015 (Figure 5.2). The organization of the electronics 
industry along GVCs implies a high share of intermediates in production, as each firm adds 
only a part to the final value added. In the Malaysian electronics industry the share of value 
added in output has varied widely over time. It was 31% in 1985, but started declining in 
the second half of the 1980s. In the mid-1990s it peaked again at 28% and then declined to 
a low of 14% in 2004-2005. It then recovered to 26% in 2012 and then dropped again to 
19% by 2015. The big drops in the share of value added in output between 1985-1989 and 
1996-2005 point to phases of ‘downgrading’. 
Figure 5.2 Output value, value added and share of value added in output, 
Malaysian electronics industry, 1985-2015 
Left axis: Malaysian Ringgit (RM) Billion, current prices. Right axis: Share, % 
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Notes: Values in current prices. Missing values have been extrapolated.  
Source: Author’s calculations on data from (DSM) (various years, a and b).  
 
The semiconductors segment used to account for almost the entire industry until the 
1980s, but the industry has diversified since then (Figure 5.3). The production of consumer 
electronics started increasing in the mid-1980s and that of computer and peripherals 
(primarily hard disks) in the mid-1990s. These two segments have accounted for 15% to 
20% of the industry’s value added since 2001.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Structure of the electronics industry in Malaysia, selected years 
Share of electronics segments in total electronics value added, % 
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Notes: Telecommunication equipment was included in semiconductor segment before 2001.  
Source: Author’s calculations on data from (DSM) (various years, a and b).  
 
The share of value added in output in semiconductors has been consistently higher than 
in other segments. This indicates relatively lower usage of intermediate inputs compared 
to the other electronics segments (Figure 5.4). However, in 2015 value added in output in 
the semiconductor segment dropped to 19%, the same level as the other major segments.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Share of value added in output for electronics segments, %, Malaysia, 
selected years 
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Notes: Telecommunication equipment was included in semiconductor segment before 2001.  
Source: Author’s calculations on data from (DSM) (various years, a and b).  
 
Labour productivity in the electronics industry has been rising continuously since the 
1970s, as measured by value added per employee. Between 1973 and 2015 value added per 
employee increased by 21 times (Figure 5.5), rising sharply since the mid-1990s.  This 
trend is consistent with increases in installation of labour-saving, numerically-controlled 
machines in semiconductor assembly facilities during that period, as described by Rasiah 
(1994). Wages and salaries per employee have been growing more than value added per 
employee, especially during the late 1970s and early 1980s and after 2004.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Value added and wages per employee, Malaysian electronics industry, 
1973-2015, 1973=100 
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Note: Based on current prices. Missing values have been extrapolated.   
Source: Author’s calculations on data from (DSM) (various years, a and b).  
 
Fixed assets per employee have increased by 38 times between 1973 and 2015 (Figure 
5.6). A steep rise can be observed between 1993 and 2001, matching the observation of 
higher automation in semiconductor facilities taking place at the rime. However, growth in 
fixed assets per employee slowed down after 2001 (even turning negative for some years) 
with the exception of the more recent figures for 2015. It is also worth noting that fixed 
assets per employee are higher for the manufacturing sector as a whole than in the 
electronics industry, suggesting that the electronics industry continues to be more labor-
intensive than other manufacturing industries in the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Fixed assets per employee, Malaysia, 1973-2015 
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Note: Missing values have been extrapolated.  
Source: Author’s calculations on data from (DSM) (various years, a and b).  
 
Unfortunately, there is no data on R&D as a share of sales or output in the industry 
before 2005. Data after 2005 shows a steep rise in R&D as a share of output in electronics 
from 0.5% in 2005 to 2.3% in 2012, and a drop to 1.4% in 2015. By comparison, the share 
for the total manufacturing sector (excluding electronics) has increased during the same 
period from 0.3% to 0.7% (Figure 5.7). On average, between 2005 and 2012, electronics 
accounted for 57% of total manufacturing R&D. Other sectors with high R&D 
expenditures included general-purpose machinery (5% of total) and automotive (4% of 
total).  The rapid increases in R&D as a share of output for electronics points to upgrading 
since 2005 until 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 R&D as a share of output, Malaysia, %, selected years 
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Source: Author’s calculations on data from (DSM) (various years, a and b).  
 
Exports and imports of electronics have been growing at the same rate since 1995, 
indicating that Malaysian electronics exports continue to be import-dependent (Figure 5.8). 
The trade balance has been positive, but it has been declining as a share of total trade since 
1999, indicating that the trade surplus has not grown as fast as total trade.  Data from the 
OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database reveal that the share of domestic value 
added in gross exports has been declining, from 50.6% in 1995 to 33.2% in 2011 (Figure 
5.9). This implies a higher reliance on imported intermediate inputs in the sector, and 
possibly ‘downgrading’. While a lower share of domestic value added in output is expected 
when industries integrate into GVCs, the Malaysian electronics industry has its origins in 
export-oriented manufacturing, so this change may not be purely due to greater integration 
following trade and investment liberalisation. However, the share of domestic services 
value added in exports also declined between 1997 and 2004, but it started rising again in 
2005 (Figure 5.9).  A higher share of services in value added implies that higher value-
added tasks take place beyond assembly, such as R&D and logistics.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Electronics trade, Malaysia, 1995-2016 
Left: Value in USD billion, current. Right: Share, % 
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Notes: Trade balance in secondary axis. Electronics are calculated from categories SITC 751, 
752, 759, 761-764, 772, 775, 776.  
Source: Author’s calculation on data from UNCTADstat (2017).  
 
Figure 5.9 Domestic value added as a share of gross exports in electronics, 
Malaysia, %, 1995-2011 
 
Notes: Electronics is calculated based on SITC codes 30, 32 and 33. 
Source: OECD TiVA (2016) 
Unfortunately the public statistics provided by the DSM do not differentiate between 
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unpublished DSM data note that in 2008 foreign-owned subsidiaries accounted for 38% of 
firms, but 74% of value added and 69% of employment. In 2000, these accounted for 52% 
of firms, 72% of value added and 70% of employment, which indicates the continued 
presence of large foreign subsidiaries. The latest foreign affiliates census includes data on 
at the broad industrial category of electrical and transport equipment (DSM, 2017). Foreign 
affiliates in the category were responsible for 82% of value added and 51% of 
employment127.  
Some indication of the extent of foreign involvement comes from investment data 
released by the MIDA. From 1987 onwards the share of foreign investment in the 
Electronics and Electrical (E&E) sector is consistently higher than in the total 
manufacturing sector as a whole, fluctuating between 80% and 98% of total annually. 
There is a noticeable drop in the share of foreign investment in the mid-1990s and another 
in the beginning of the previous decade (Figure 5.10). These seem to correlate with large 
Malaysian projects in 1997 and 2002-2003 (Figure 5.11), which probably represent the 
construction of two Malaysian-funded wafer fabs, Silterra and 1st Silicon.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Foreign investment in electrical and electronics (E&E) and total 
manufacturing, Malaysia, 1987-2016 
Share of foreign investment in total, % 
                                                 
127  Calculation by author based on data from foreign affiliate census and the latest 
manufacturing census.  
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Source: Author’s calculations on data from MIDA (various years) 
Figure 5.11. Domestic investment in projects over RM 100 million, electrical and 
electronics (E&E), Malaysia, 1994-2016 
Share of domestic investment in total, % 
 
Note: RM 100 million equals approximately USD 30 million.  
Source: Author’s calculations on data from MIDA (various years) 
 
The overall picture emerging from a review of the available statistics is one of 
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increase in R&D as a share of output in the industry. On the other hand, the value added as 
a share of output declined between 1996 and 2005, while capital intensity declined after 
2005.  Exports have been rising, but the trade surplus is of declining value compared to 
total trade. The share of domestic value added in gross exports has also declined between 
1995 and 2011.  
5.4 Policy-making in the Malaysian electronics industry 
This section will briefly discuss three issues that have a profound impact on policy-
making in the Malaysian electronics industry: (1) the role of ethnic redistributive politics 
(2) the federal-state government relationship and (3) the governance structure in the 
electronics industry.  
5.4.1 The role of ethnic redistribution politics 
Malaysia is a multi-racial society. The three major ethnic groups are the Malays, the 
Chinese and the Indians. In 1975, Malays and other indigenous people (known as 
bumiputera, meaning sons of the soil) made up 54.7% of the total population. The second 
largest ethnic group were the Chinese, comprising 34.2% of the total population, followed 
by Indians with 9% and other minorities with 2.1% (Ragayah, 2011). Malaysia’s colonial 
history played a large part in creating an ethnically diverse society. The British imported 
Chinese and Indian labour to work in tin mines and rubber plantations. The colonial 
administration favoured British and other foreign capital, but they also maintained 
privileges for the Malays in paddy cultivation and gave coveted positions in the 
administration to the small, educated Malay elite (Jomo and Gomez, 2000).  
Whereas the Malays were the most populous ethnicity, they were largely engaged in 
less lucrative activities, compared to the Chinese and the Indians. The Malays were 
concentrated in rural areas, engaging in low value-added rural economic activities, with a 
small middle class and a wealthy minority. By contrast, the Chinese found employment in 
mining, manufacturing and construction, earning higher incomes. Indian households 
tended to fall somewhere in between (Ragayah, 2011).  
The post-independence government was led by the Alliance, a coalition comprising the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the anti-communist Malaysian Chinese 
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Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). In 1973 the Alliance 
became Barisan National (National Front), and included regional parties. The Alliance had 
been groomed by the colonial government to take power and facilitated British interests 
post-independence to avoid capital flight (Jomo and Gomez, 2000). It also concentrated 
efforts towards increasing rural incomes to benefit the Malays by spending on rural 
infrastructure and land development programmes to raise agricultural productivity. 
However, resentment over income inequality across ethnicities was brewing, culminating 
in the race riots of May 1969 (Ragayah, 2011).   
Following the race riots, a new phase in Malaysian politics was initiated, with the 
overarching objective of creating a Malay capitalist class (Jomo and Gomez, 2000). The 
National Economic Policy (NEP) (1971-1990) was launched in 1971 with the twin 
objectives of poverty eradication and of altering the economic structure so as to eliminate 
the identification of race with economic functions.  The policy had specific goals, such as 
that the employment structure would reflect racial composition and that Bumiputeras 
would own 30% of commercial and industrial activities.  
The NEP goals were achieved by different instruments, such as by expanding rural 
industrialization programmes and by extending education opportunities specifically for 
Bumiputeras. More importantly, the government launched the Industrial Coordination Act 
(ICA) in 1975, which required manufacturing activities to be licensed and to provide a 30% 
share of Bumiputeras in employment and equity (Abidin, 2011). As Malays were 
considered new entrants in manufacturing, state-owned trusts and agencies were tasked 
with acquiring shares and reserving them for Bumiputeras. Such agencies included the 
Bumiputera Investment Fund, Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), Perbadanan Nasional 
(PERNAS), the Urban Development Authority, the Bank Bumiputera Berhad, the Bank 
Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad (Malaysia Development Bank) and the State Economic 
Development Corporations (SEDCs) (Ragayah, 2011; Abidin, 2011).   
Initiatives in the 1980s and the 1990s continued the promotion of Malay capital, albeit 
in a different form. The Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), which was 
established in 1980, did not only aim at increasing the scale and technological capabilities 
of heavy industries in Malaysia but also at creating Bumiputera enterprises that could enter 
these value chains. For example, PROTON, the national car project that was a joint venture 
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with Mitsubishi, developed a vendor development scheme, but this was only open to 
Bumiputera-owned companies (Rock and Sheridan, 2007).  In the 1990s the Privatization 
Master Plan was implemented, to encourage corporate ownership by Malays, by selling 
loss-making public enterprises (Abidin, 2011). Sapura, a Bumiputera-owned company in 
telecommunicati 
ons equipment that has since diversified into oil and gas, was created with the 
privatization of the Telecommunications Department (see also Tan, 2008).  
The emphasis on the development of Malay capital has had important implications for 
the choices made by the Malaysian federal and state governments in regards to the 
electronics industry. First, reducing rural Malay poverty was an important objective of the 
NEP (Ragayah, 2011). Export-oriented labour-intensive electronics assembly was a quick 
way to absorb rural unskilled Malay workers. Second, the decision by the Malaysian 
government to attract labour-intensive FDI was seen as a way to acquire capital and 
technology without supporting Chinese capital, a politically difficult choice (Jesudason, 
1989). Third, since the decision of the Malaysian federal and state governments to actively 
attract FDI was mostly based on the political considerations described above rather than 
lack of fiscal resources, the government was able to offer credible incentives to 
multinationals and to put conditions on technology transfer (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009). 
Fourth, policies affected the structure of Chinese capital and its ability to engage in 
economies of scale. Many Chinese businesses restructured into small units to evade ICA 
rules (Rock and Sheridon, 2007) or found it more difficult to obtain financing128. This 
constrained the ability of Chinese firms to accumulate capital (Drabble, 2000). Some 
coping strategies included the strengthening of ethnic networks to pool resources together 
(Heng, 1997) and arrangements in which Bumiputeras simply got the license or award for 
a contract and business was mainly conducted by Chinese partners (the ali-baba 
arrangement).  
Why didn’t the NEP lead to efforts to develop Bumiputera-owned electronics firms? 
Abidin (2011) argues that Malay businesses were not sophisticated at the time and that 
                                                 
128 Interview with Malaysian semiconductor packaging firm in Penang, 22 February 2016, 
PN01.  
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foreign investors insisted on full-ownership, leaving little room for manoeuver. Since the 
industry developed with wholly foreign-owned operations in Free Trade Zones (FTZs), it 
may have been difficult then for the government to impose joint ventures (Henderson and 
Phillips, 2007). However, as it will be argued later in the Chapter, it seems that the 
government also did not consider the electronics industry as a significant source of 
technological development, at least until the mid-1980s (Athukorala, 2014). Following that, 
the privatization initiatives and the development of the stock market shifted incentives for 
the Malay middle class away from manufacturing into real estate and finance, reducing 
interest in investing in electronics manufacturing firms (Tan, 2014; Jomo and Wee, 2014).  
The NEP and its successor policies failed to reach the stated target for Bumiputera 
policies. By 1990 Bumiputeras owned 20.3% of capital in the Malaysian economy, falling 
short of the 30% target. By 2008 the share of Bumiputera’s in the country’s capital had not 
changed much and remained at 21.9% (Abidin, 2011). Nevertheless, the NEP was 
considered a success, at least in easing ethnic tensions, allowing a peaceful, stable economy 
and creating Malay capital (Rock and Sheridan, 2007). Over time, the NEP requirements 
have been relaxed. The objective of ‘growth with equity’ continued in the National 
Development Policy (1991-2000) and the more recent Vision 2020, without specific targets.  
5.4.2 The Federal-State relationship 
An important dimension to consider in the political economy of industrial policy of the 
electronics industry in Malaysia is the role of the federal government vis-à-vis that of state 
governments.  
Malaysia is a federal country, made up of thirteen states. Peninsular Malaysia (West 
Malaysia) has eleven of those states, Perlis, Kedah, Pulau Pinang (Penang Island), Perak, 
Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka and Johor. East 
Malaysia is made up of two states on the island of Borneo, Sabah and Sarawak. There are 
also three Federal Territories, Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya. The states have their 
own governments, while the Federal Territories are governed directly by the federal 
government. The 11 states of Peninsular Malaysia formed the Federation of Malaya in 1948 
– upon a proposal of the British to combine different territories into a union – that gained 
independence in 1957. In 1963, the federation of Malaya was established, and this included 
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Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. However, Singapore left the federation in 1965 and became 
an independent and sovereign state (Wee, 1995, 2006, 2011).   
There is a high degree of centralization in Malaysia, but states also have their own fiscal 
resources. The federal government collects almost 90% of total government revenue and 
redistributes resources to lagging states. The amount of transferred resources differs 
annually and depends on perceived priorities at the federal level and the specific bargains 
that have been struck between states and the federal government when they became 
members of the federation (Wee, 2011). The main source of revenue for the states are rents 
from state property, receipts from land sales, import and excise duties on petroleum, export 
duties on timber and other products (for Sabah and Sarawak), taxes on forests, lands and 
mines, entertainment duties and various service fees and royalties. However, state 
governments can only borrow from the federal government constraining their ability to 
raise independently funds for large projects.  
While some aspects of industrial development (e.g. tariffs) are strictly within the 
purview of the federal government, states are responsible for local land development, local 
public services and state utilities, while social welfare, and some matters related to land, 
agriculture and forestry are shared functions (Wee, 2011). In addition to making direct 
investment by using their fiscal revenues, this division of responsibilities offers 
possibilities for states to be involved in industrial policy by developing industrial estates 
and offering related utilities and services. Such functions are mostly undertaken through 
SEDCs, which are tasked with promoting economic growth at the state level. The SEDCs 
are chaired by the Chief Ministers of state governments, highlighting their political role on 
top of economic objectives. While they had significant autonomy in the 1960s, SEDCs 
have been increasingly governed as federal government agencies since the 1980s, with 
employees being part of the civil service. In principle their resources are drawn from the 
state government and their own investments, although the federal government also provides 
grants and loans, especially to SEDCs of less developed states (Puthucheary, 2011).  
The control of some fiscal resources, even if limited, by states and the SEDCs, opens 
the door for autonomy in terms of industrial policy at the state-level. In the electronics 
industry, researchers have pointed out that the government of Penang has been much more 
active in encouraging upgrading than the governments of Selangor and Johor, where the 
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other two large electronics clusters are located. The Penang Development Corporation 
(PDC) actively courted foreign multinationals, initiated the Penang Skills Development 
Centre (PSDC) – a public-private initiative to support skills development in electronics – 
and took initiative in connecting local SMEs to foreign subsidiaries (Singh, 2011). Many 
researchers have therefore focused on the role of the Penang government in driving 
upgrading in the industry (Athukorala, 2014; Henderson and Phillips, 2007), even naming 
Penang a “developmental state” (Hutchinson, 2008). By contrast, the Selangor 
Development Corporation focused mostly on profit-making investments in real estate and 
services in nearby Kuala Lumpur (Puthucheary, 2011), while the efforts of the Johor 
Development Corporation were similarly underwhelming (van Grunsven and Hutchinson, 
2016). 
However, this Chapter focuses on the country level, rather than specific states, as after 
1985 the federal government has become the main driver of strategic initiatives in the 
industry.   
First, as mentioned earlier, the federal government has centralised power over SEDCs 
since the 1980s. It has also channeled funds to Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), 
which are controlled by the federal government, that often compete with SEDCs for funds. 
This means that, while SEDCs have been very important in spearheading industrial 
development, their power has somewhat declined in the last three decades.  
Second, tax incentives and other facilitations that are part of the “package” that all 
investors in the manufacturing sector receive are given by the MIDA, a federal agency. 
Similarly, other incentives and financing related to science and technology and industrial 
upgrading are handed out by federal level institutions.  State governments do not have the 
mandate to introduce tax incentives, significantly reducing the tools available to states to 
attract investments.  
Third, many of the efforts to drive the industry towards higher value-added activities 
have been led by the federal government, such as the Malaysian Institute for 
Microelectronics Systems (MIMOS) and the state-owned wafer fabs. This has also changed 
the spatial concentration of industry, away from Penang into the nearby state of Kedah and 
the region around Kuala Lumpur.  
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Fourth, the antagonism that has existed between the federal government and state 
governments that are led by opposition parties has hampered upgrading. For example, 
Penang, which is Chinese-majority and led by an opposition party, has been starved of 
investment funds from the government, thereby constraining upgrading (Henderson and 
Phillips, 2007)129.  
This chapter acknowledges the regional dimension in the implementation of industrial 
policy and makes specific references to state-level initiatives where relevant. However, for 
the reasons listed above the lens of analysis remains the federal state.  
5.4.3 The policy-making process and the governance structure 
The Malaysian government formulates indicative five-year plans (FYPs) and long-term 
plans that give broad policy directions and goals 130  that are issued by the Economic 
Planning Unit (EPU), a department under the Prime Minister. Currently, the government 
is implementing the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (11FYP) (2016-2020). In 2010 the Malaysian 
government also launched the New Economic Model (2010-2020), under which two twin 
plans for transforming the government and the economy were issued: the Government 
Transformation Program (GTP) and the Economic Transformation Program (ETP). The 
latter contains actions to upgrade the country’s economic structure, co-financed by the 
public and private sector (see also Section 5.4.1). The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MITI) has also issued three Industrial Master Plans since 1985, with the most recent one 
(Third Industrial Master Plan or 3IMP) formulated for the period 2005-2020. The 
Malaysian government does not issue policy plans specifically for the electronics industry, 
but as plans usually adopt a sectoral approach, they include dedicated sections for the 
industry131.  
State-level and regional (multi-state) development plans also include actions to support 
the industry. Malaysia has attempted since 2005 to formulate regional development policies 
with the creation of economic corridors, encompassing multiple states and regions. For the 
                                                 
129 Interview with think tank in Penang, 11 March 2016, PN11.  
130 For example, the New Economic Policy (1971-1990), the New Development Policy (1991-
2000), Vision 2020 (1990-2020) and the New Economic Model (2010-2020). 
131 Most government documents list the electronics and electrical (E&E) industries together.  
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electronics industry, the Northern Economic Corridor (NCER), which includes Penang, 
Kedah, Perlis and Northern Perak is of particular importance, as it includes the Penang 
cluster and the Kulim high-tech park where several semiconductor wafer fabs are located. 
Iskandar Malaysia in Southern Johor (Iskandar Regional Development Authority or IRDA) 
is also important as it contains the electronics assembly cluster that is located on the border 
with Singapore. The Northern Corridor Implementation Authority (NCIA) launched the 
NCER Development Blueprint (2016-2025) in 2017, which includes priority projects in 
Batu Kawan (mainland Penang) and Kulim clusters that have a high concentration in 
electronics manufacturing. At the state-level the Penang government formulated its own 
strategy for developing the industry, the Technology Roadmap for the Electrical and 
Electronics Industry of Penang (PSDC, 2007; see Socio-economic and Environmental 
Research Institute, 2007 for summary), but this does not seem like a regular exercise.  
The primary institution tasked with promoting the industry is the MIDA, an agency 
under the MITI (see Figure 5.12). A department within MIDA has more specific 
responsibilities for developing the electronics industry. Other key Ministries and agencies 
include the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI), the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Malaysia External Trade 
Development Corporation (MATRADE) also under MITI. At the state level, the SEDCs 
are tasked with developing land for industry and their investment promotion functions are 
under separate investment agencies. The corridor implementation authorities also provide 
support services and provide grants to firms.  Private-public and private-led institutions 
promoting multi-stakeholder dialogue and investments in high-technology are also 
important in voicing the vision of businesses and influencing policy. These include the 
Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT), a multi-
stakeholder group for promoting frontier technologies, the Malaysian American 
Electronics Industries (MAEI) under the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham), the 
Electrical and Electronics Association of Malaysia (TEEAM) and the Free Industrial Zone 
Penang Companies’ Association (Freepenca). The Semiconductor Fabricator Association 
of Malaysia was also established in December 2012 to spearhead the effort in promoting 
wafer fabrication during the ETP.   
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Plans touching upon industrial development in the country are made by consensus 
between MITI and MIDA and input is provided by other relevant agencies, business 
associations and private firms132. Plans, including the 2IMP and 3IMP usually offer vague 
calls for action without specific funding attached, but the ETP followed a different 
approach. The ETP organized ‘labs’, bringing many different stakeholders together, 
especially from the private sector, to chart specific projects and financing commitments.  
The leading institution for the ETP was the Performance Management & Delivery Unit 
(PEMANDU) a now-defunct unit under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).  
 
                                                 
132 Interview with deputy Chief Executive Officer or CEO of government agency in Kuala 
Lumpur, 14 March 2016, KL08.  
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Figure 5.12 Governance structure for the Malaysian electronics industry 
 
Source: Author’s illustration 
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Despite the attention to electronics in the above-mentioned plans, there are several 
important gaps in the governance of the industry.  
First, even though electronics is one of the priority industries, firms have difficulties in 
accessing financing (although not clear if this is more than firms in other manufacturing 
industries). In terms of bank financing, the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance 
Berhad is tasked with providing loans to all industries while several development finance 
institutions133 provide preferential loans to Bumiputera and SME entrepreneurs. However, 
little financing goes into manufacturing, with firms often relying on their internal funds 
(Chin and Jomo, 2000; Tan, 2014).  For example, out of the total gross loans and financing 
by Malaysia Industrial Finance (MIDF) in 2016, only 11.6% went into manufacturing, as 
opposed to 20% in financial, insurance and business services. At the same time, the 
government has provided capital grants to firms willing to undertake capital-intensive high-
tech manufacturing investments only since 2005 (Rasiah, 2015). Khazanah, the 
government’s sovereign wealth fund, invested in the country’s first wafer fab (SilTerra), 
but it does not have much of a presence in the industry otherwise. Government schemes 
for venture capital and other equity/debt investments support high-growth firms and are 
not appropriate for manufacturing-oriented firms (that require patient capital). The 
Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), now owned by Khazanah, 
started as a venture capital firm and invested in Globetronics in the 1990s. However, it 
quickly exited venture capital and switched to managing a mix of equity, grants and loans, 
on behalf of MOSTI. Now its focus is on biotechnology start-ups134.  
Second, there is a perception among interviewees that MIDA has an institutional bias 
towards attracting foreign investments, rather than developing domestic ones. The ETP 
                                                 
133 Development financial institutions that fall under the Development Financial Institutions 
Act 2002 (DFIA) include Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad (Malaysia Development Bank), 
Bank Perusahaan Kecil & Sederhana Malaysia Berhad (SME Bank), Import-Export Bank of 
Malaysia Berhad (EXIM Bank), Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad, Bank Simpanan 
Nasional, Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad (Agrobank). Development financial institutions outside 
the DFIA include MIDF, Credit Guarantee Corporation Berhad, Lembaga Tabung Haji, Sabah 
Development Bank Berhad, Sabah Credit Corporation   
(http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=fs&pg=fs_mfs_dfi&ac=162)  
134 Interview with CEO of government-owned fund management company in Kuala Lumpur, 
24 March 2016, KL11.  
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clearly stated that MIDA should expand its efforts to promote domestic investment. The 
agency was responsible for disbursing RM 1 billion (approximately USD 300 million) as 
part of the Domestic Investment Strategic Fund, established in 2012. However MIDA has 
an incentive to focus on foreign investment, both because it has over time developed 
capabilities in doing so, and also because export and FDI growth remains a key government 
target that can be achieved with export oriented foreign investments135.  
Third, there is an institutional gap in terms of encouraging the accumulation of 
technological capabilities in industrial firms.  Efforts by MIDA are mostly geared towards 
providing incentives to (largely foreign) firms conditional on local business spend and 
levels of R&D, while MOSTI’s efforts are geared towards technology-intensive local 
SMEs. Developing the capabilities of existing Malaysian manufacturing firms by tools 
other than tax incentives remains a weak. The recent move by MIDA to provide grants 
during the ETP is a positive step (see Section 5.4.1). Moreover, there are no 
institutionalized spaces in which the industry and the government can come together to 
drive upgrading in the sector, with the industry often coming under other broader 
manufacturing-related initiatives (e.g. the ETP labs). This gap was to be filled by the E&E 
Strategic Council, established in 2015, but the Council has yet to publish a blueprint136.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**** 
 
                                                 
135 Interview with senior government official in Kuala Lumpur, 3 March 2016, KL04. 
136 Interview with chairman of business association in Penang, 23 February 2016, PN02.  
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The following Sections will analyse the development of the Malaysian electronics 
industry by looking at the evolution of industrial policies as well as policies for encouraging 
integration and upgrading within GVCs. It will be argued that, while Malaysia put in place 
policies to encourage integration and upgrading within its GVCs, industrial policies have 
failed to stimulate the accumulation of technological capabilities in firms, and therefore the 
process of upgrading has eventually stalled. The discussion is divided into four phases, 
highlighting the different policy approaches during different periods.   
5.5 1955-1967: Stimulating industry after independence 
5.5.1 Import Substitution 
Malaya (later renamed Malaysia in 1963) gained independence from British rule in 1957. 
During the 19th century Malaya had been the most profitable British colony, owing to its 
rich mineral, forest and agricultural resources (Jomo and Rock, 1998). Transport, energy 
and telecommunication infrastructure was developed to serve the needs of the colonial 
export regime. The two main export commodities developed were tin and rubber, the 
former growing more popular following the decline of tin production in Cornwall after the 
mid-1850s and the rubber industry riding the wave of the motor industry boom in the first 
half of the twentieth century (ibid.). The two commodities accounted for 84% of total 
export earnings in 1947 (Alavi, 1996:28).  
The British authorities had little interest in developing manufacturing capabilities in the 
country. Nevertheless, given the level of economic activity in a small local manufacturing 
sector had developed for local consumption, such as food processing and furniture, 
accounting for 8% of GDP in 1955 (Alavi, 1996:30). The need to expand industrial output 
and diversify exports was heightened as prices of rubber and tin started falling. The creation 
of synthetic rubber and the gradual depletion of tin deposits put pressure on the two staple 
Malaysian exports. The large share in their GDP and the fluctuation in export earnings 
meant that dips in revenue were substantial, reducing available funds for infrastructure 
development and other services in the decade preceding independence (Lim, 2011).  
In 1955 a World Bank mission to Malaya argued that the country was in need of 
diversification into other export crops and manufacturing, which could be encouraged by 
import substitution. The report did not encourage large-scale industrialization, but 
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advocated industries that could use local materials and could find a reasonable domestic 
market137, such as furniture, ceramics, cement, pineapple canning, fish processing, and 
textile and garments (Wheelwright, 1963). Some of the recommendations of the report on 
industry found their way in the First Malaya plan (1956-1960), drafted by the colonial 
authorities and launched after independence. However, most of the emphasis was put on 
expanding commodity production to deal with falling revenue and low rural incomes. The 
top priorities for government expenditures were agricultural and rural development, 
transport infrastructure and electrification (Hutchinson, 2016).  
Nevertheless, towards the end of the 1950s there was a consensus that industrial 
production needed to be stimulated, by way of tariffs, tax incentives for industries, 
infrastructural and financial support, as enshrined in the 1957 Interim Statement of 
Industrial Development Policy (MIDA, 1968). Tariff protection was encouraged with the 
establishment of Tariff Advisory Committee, that was established in 1961 and its successor, 
the Tariff Advisory Board of 1963. Both of these institutions suggested tariff levels to the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry on an ad hoc basis and based on applications submitted 
to the board by producers and the private sector.  The use of tariffs increased more with the 
Action Committee on Tariff and Industrial Development in 1965, which considered urgent 
applications for tariff and non-tariff protection. Tariffs as an instrument was supposed to 
be temporary, with the country hoping that protected industries would eventually 
contribute to exports138.  
According to data cited in the First Malaysia Plan (1MP) (1966-1970), 214 tariffs were 
raised at the time, but most researchers argue that the levels of protection were not high 
enough (Alavi, 1996; Wheelwright, 1963). According to Wheelwright (1963) the applied 
tariff rates were relatively low, between 15% and 25%, and in many cases there were zero. 
                                                 
137 The Report did not advocate for the development of rubber-based products, as rubber was 
cheap to transport and processing could be done cheaply near home-markets (Wheelwright, 1963). 
Malaysia’s current market dominance in rubber-based products such as gloves and condoms serves 
as a reminder that such recommendations have often missed the mark.   
138 “In the long run import substitution and export promotion will become harmonising policies” 
(First Malaysia Plan, p.16). 
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Almost 25% of products from firms that received tax incentives did not receive any tariff 
protection (ibid.) 
On top of the modest tariff support, incentives for establishing manufacturing operations 
were also provided by the Pioneer Industries Ordinance (PIO) in 1958. The Ordinance gave 
incentives to firms that engaged in activities that had not already reached large scale in the 
country, but whose development had favorable prospects and was in the public interest.  
However, firms could apply for a 40% tax relief for two to five years depending on the 
level of investment. Losses could be carried over into the period after expiration of the 
Pioneer Status. Investments by pioneer firms, although they increased fast in the beginning, 
were not sustained for long. On the one hand, the level of qualifying investment was low, 
so many firms set up establishments only to profit from incentives, and on the other hand, 
the tax relief period was short, which penalised firms with long gestation periods (Lim, 
2011). 
Furthermore, investments in infrastructure and industrial estates were made. In the 
beginning, the most popular site was in Petaling Jaya, just outside Kuala Lumpur, where 
112 Pioneer firms were already in production by the early 1960s (Wheelright, 1963).  
Finally, institutional support to industry was provided by a dedicated government 
agency and a specialised banking institution. In 1965, the Federal Industrial Development 
Authority (FIDA) was established and took over several functions to centralise industrial 
development promotion. FIDA was responsible for organizing missions overseas, 
establishing a record of potential foreign and domestic investors to promote joint ventures, 
conducting research to identify new opportunities, providing advisory services and 
undertaking the functions of processing the pioneer applications (MIDA, 1967). The 
Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad (MIDF) was also established in 1960 
aiming to develop the manufacturing sector.  
The results of this modest effort to stimulate industrial investment were encouraging. In 
1960 manufacturing accounted for 8.5% of GDP and 6.4% of employment and in 1968 this 
had increased to 13% and 9.2% respectively (Lim, 2011:10). However, there were few 
large-scale investments, especially from domestic investors and in some areas there was 
overcapacity (Wheelright, 1963).  
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Various explanations have been put forward for the lukewarm ISI effort. Alavi (1996) 
argues that tariffs did not increase much because most interest groups with political 
influence would stand to lose from this. The Treasury would lose revenue from a potential 
fall in imports, importers would lose their business, and commodity producers would see 
input costs rise. At the same time, the segment that would be able to gain the most from 
import-substitution was the ethnic Chinese business, which were already running extensive 
commercial activities. However, the government did not want to be seen as openly 
supporting Chinese business, prioritizing rural Malay incomes instead (Alavi, 1986).  
Moreover, the industrialisation effort during this time did not have a strategic focus. As 
mentioned above, tariffs were raised only upon application by interested parties, and the 
Pioneer Ordinance did not list specific areas that were of strategic support. The World Bank 
report had recommended feasibility studies to be undertaken to determine what industries 
should be developed, but by 1962, no such assessment had been made (Wheelright, 1963).  
Even if it had, it is not likely that electronics would have been high on the agenda. The 
priorities of Malaysia at the time were not to attain technological independence, but to 
address rural poverty and achieve diversification.  
5.5.2 Openness to Foreign Capital  
Without a strategic vision to build up indigenous industrial capital, Malaysia encouraged 
foreign capital to take advantage of the Pioneer incentives. Foreign investment was relied 
upon to modernize the industry as well as to undertake labour intensive projects to reduce 
unemployment. The incentives were not different for foreign investors, but Malaysia 
implemented few restrictions on foreign capital flows to make it an attractive destination 
for investment. The country offered unrestricted repatriation of capital, unrestricted 
remittance of profits and dividends within the Sterling area and nominal controls outside 
it, and it had bilateral investment guarantee agreements signed with the US and West 
Germany (First Malaysia Plan or 1MP, 1966).  
In the end, foreign investments were the main driver of early industrialization efforts. 
Pioneer incentives were given to 110 firms between 1961-1965, and 61% of the project 
capital was foreign (1MP, 1966). This was true of the electronics industry as well, which 
emerged at the end of this period, largely thanks to Japanese firms (Capannelli, 1999). 
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Japanese firms were keen on setting up local assembly ventures to take advantage of the 
protected domestic market and were no strangers to Malaysia. Japanese investments into 
rubber and iron ore had flourished in the first half of the 20th century and political and 
economic relations between Britain and Japan were mended quickly after Second World 
War (Tomaru, 2000). Despite the bitter memories of occupation during the War, Japanese 
investments were welcome (Chee and Lee 1983).  
Matsushita Electric, now Panasonic Manufacturing Malaysia, set up the first electrical 
products manufacturing operation in Malaysia in Shah Alam in 1965 (Rasiah, 2010). The 
firm was a Joint Venture (JV) between the Matsushita group (43%), Tabung Haji (a fund) 
and the Army Cooperatives. A 5% was also held by Hagemeyer, a German firm, which 
distributed the Matshushita products until the firm set up its own sales subsidiaries. Tabung 
Haji and the Army Cooperative have sold their shares since and the firm is now listed in 
the stock market (Chee and Lee, 1983). A 1968 census shows that by that year 37 
enterprises had been set up in the manufacturing and repair of electronics and electrical 
goods. Even though foreign firms made up under one third of the total number, they 
accounted for 43% of value added, indicating their larger scale139. Approximately 34% of 
sales were from electric wires and cables, with the rest distributed between various 
appliances (DSM, 1969).   
 
5.6 1968-1985: Emergence of Malaysian electronics industry 
5.6.1 Stimulating domestic industry   
 
Incentives to promote exports were put in place with the Investment Incentives Act (IIA) 
of 1968. The Act expanded and amended some of the previous incentives and included 
(Drawing on MIDA, 1968, 1979; Liew, 1969): 
                                                 
139 As the category includes repairs, it is hard to know whether Malaysian firms were involved 
in manufacturing or not.  
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 Pioneer Status. This provided tax relief from 2 to 7 years, depending on the level 
of investment. An extra year of tax relief could be obtained if the factory was 
established in a declared development area or produced priority products.  
 Investment Tax Credits. Granted to companies that did not qualify for Pioneer 
Status, amounting to 25% of the capital expenditure and an extra 5% if project 
fulfilled any of the conditions listed for Pioneer Status.  
 Deductions for promotion of exports overseas. These could include expenses for 
advertising, providing samples, market research, preparing tenders, travel and 
others.  
 Acceleration depreciation allowance for exporters that have not obtained Pioneer 
Status or Investment Tax Credits.  
 Export Allowance.  
 Duty exemption on imports of machinery and equipment and certain raw materials 
used for manufacturing 
 Duty draw back on imported raw materials 
 Tariff protection for certain domestic manufactures.  
 Protection against dumping of foreign goods in local markets.  
As it can be gleaned from the list of incentives above, the intention was not only to 
support exports, but also to continue import protection for selected products. The effective 
rate of protection (ERP) rose from 25% in 1962 to more than 65% by the end of the decade 
(Table 5.1). However, tariff support140 was given primarily to agro-based industries. Out 
of the 21 products that received tariff support in 1970, only telephone equipment could be 
loosely connected to the electronics industry. The rest were drawn from food processing 
(MIDA, 1970:65). Moreover, even these tariffs were not connected to incentives for 
technological learning (Jomo and Edwards, 1993).  
Table 5.1 Effective rate of protection in manufacturing, Malaysia, selected years  
Year ERP in manufacturing 
(% on value added) 
                                                 
140 The Tariff Advisory Board was abolished in 1969 and FIDA took over additional functions 
in regard to applications for tariff protection. 
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1962 25 
1966 50 
1969 65 
1972 70 
1979 24 
1982 23 
Source: Jomo and Edwards, p. 19; 23 
In May 1969, race riots erupted, prompting the government to launch the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) (see Section 4.1). The priorities for industrialization were more clearly 
defined under the NEP: increasing employment opportunities for surplus labour and 
expanding local content in certain industries (especially resource-based manufactures) and 
exports. Whereas since independence the government’s role in industrialization was 
defined as one of providing assistance, incentives, and infrastructure (MIDA, 1968), under 
the NEP “the Government [would] take the initiative in industrialisation and [would] 
participate in the establishment of selected industries either by itself or in joint venture with 
the private sector” (MIDA, 1970:63). 
The role of the government further expanded under Mahathir, who became the Prime 
Minister of Malaysia in 1981 and his drive into heavy industries. Priorities in import 
protection shifted from targeting primary commodity processing to the establishment of 
heavy industries. The latter was facilitated by the operations of the state-owned Heavy 
Industrial Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), established in 1980 (Fourth Malaysia Plan 
or 4MP, 1981-1985). Proton, an automotive JV between HICOM and Mitsubishi, was one 
of the flagship projects of this initiative (see Jomo and Edwards, 1993).  
Despite the trend towards heavier state involvement during this period, the electronics 
industry was not a target for it. Electronics was perceived as an industry that was export- 
oriented and labor-absorbing, rather than one that should be encouraged strategically for 
its technological potential. The industry was first explicitly encouraged in 1970, with the 
Labour Utilization Relief, an extra tax relief incentive for electronics and hotel and tourism 
industries to encourage employment. This is in contrast to the automotive industry, for 
example, that was targeted as a strategic industry with FIDA encouraging local content 
already since the mid-1970s. In 1975, a list of priority industries was circulated that 
included 65 electronic and electrical components and products (out of a total 124 products), 
under the condition that they were at least 90% exported (MIDA, 1975: 173). The exception 
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to this was one capacitor and resistors joint venture with Bumiputera participation 
encouraged by FIDA in 1973 and some equity investments made by the PDC (Singh, 2011). 
By 1980 PDC had invested US$6.4 million in seventeen firms, although a small share of 
that was in electronics (Hutchinson, 2008; Singh, 2011).  
5.6.2 Integration into export-oriented GVCs 
Instruments For Integration into GVCs at the Federal Level 
The investments of large MNC subsidiaries were actively solicited and were further 
facilitated by the provision of dedicated infrastructure in Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs). On 
the one hand, firms located in FTZs faced simplified custom procedures and duty-free 
imports of raw materials, components, parts and machinery used in the manufacturing 
process. One the other hand, in areas outside FTZs, Licensed Manufacturing Warehouses 
(LMWs) status could be given to firms, granting similar rights. The FTZs, pioneered in 
Penang, were popular and by 1973 out of 43 industrial estates in Malaysia, six had been 
designated as FTZs (MIDA, 1973). The export-oriented industries were also helped by 
amendments to the Employment Act of 1955 in the late 1960s and the enactment of the 
Industrial Relations Act of 1967. These prevented unionization in export-oriented factories 
in FTZs, allowed shift work for women for the first time and restricted the right to strike 
(Jomo and Edwards, 1993: 25).  
The NEP requirements on Bumiputera corporate ownership were used to leverage the 
domestic market and encourage the creation of joint venture firms. For foreign firms that 
sold in the domestic market, equity requirements for Bumiputera ownership was at least 
51%, held by institutional and private investors or through public issue in the Malaysian 
Stock Exchange (now the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange). Some flexibility in the 
application of these rules was allowed, depending on project-specific circumstances (Chee 
and Lee, 1983). An example from the telecommunications sector is the JV between Nippon 
Electric Co. Ltd. (NEC) and PERNAS, a state-owned company specifically designed to 
increase Bumiputera ownership in the economy, to produce multiplexing equipment for 
telecommunications. NEC expected that by setting up a JV with PERNAS, it would be 
view favourably in government procurement.  However, the majority of foreign invested 
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firms were wholly foreign owned subsidiaries as for 100% export-oriented projects, there 
were exemptions of equity requirements (ibid.).  
Pursuit of Integration in Penang 
The integration of Malaysia into export-oriented electronics GVCs is intimately linked 
with the efforts of the Penang state government to industrialize. Penang had developed as 
an entrepôt, profiting from trade in Southeast Asia and the boom in tin and rubber exports. 
However, after Independence in 1957, business declined with the development of Port 
Klang as the main port in Malaysia, the development of other ports in Southeast Asia and 
eventually with the removal of its ‘free port’ status in 1967. The declining economic 
prospects of Penang were first met with an ISI program on the industrial estate of Prai, with 
some state-managed factories, but with little success (Athukorala, 2014; Singh, 2011).  
The Federal Government became concerned about the declining economic prospects of 
the island and commissioned the Penang Master Plan (PMP) in 1969 (Singh, 2011). Given 
the limited natural and agricultural resources of the state, the PMP recommended export-
oriented industrialisation and indicated where infrastructure should be built to 
accommodate industrial development. Its implementation was enhanced by the 
establishment of the PDC, headed by the chief Minister of Penang, Dr Lim Chong Eu, at 
its head in 1969 (ibid.).  
The PMP was also in line with the new priorities of industrialization in Malaysia, so 
there were few policy conflicts with the Federal government. Moreover, Lim, a long-time 
politician, negotiated the entry of his party Gerakan141 into the ruling coalition to form 
Barisan Nasional, the leading party ever since. Penang had a Chinese ethnic majority until 
recently, and that created frictions with the local Bumiputera community that felt 
disadvantaged by the PMP’s attention to foreign investment. However, the relationships 
Lim had with senior politicians, including Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, ensured the 
sustainability of the federal government’s support (Singh, 2011; Athukorala, 2014; 
                                                 
141 In 1969, Gerakan won the elections in Penang, ousting the local representative of the ruling 
Alliance Party. Gerakan was a social democratic, multi-racial party, that promised more 
independence vis-à-vis the federal government. Lim supported Razak in restoring order and peace 
following the May 1969 riots and Gerakan party joined the ruling coalition, to form Barisan 
Nasional (Hutchinson, 2008).  
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Hutchinson, 2008). FIDA was also actively supporting the efforts of the PDC, acting as a 
go-between the PDC and foreign investors in the beginning142.  
At the time, the efforts of the PDC were unique in terms of its attitude towards attracting 
investors in the electronics industry. It developed an investment guide and organized 
overseas missions to target specific companies, often headed by the Chief Minister himself. 
The relationships with existing investors were used to obtain intelligence on the industry 
and use that to draw more investors (Athukorala, 2014; Singh, 2011). Beyond, the PDC, 
the Penang government also paid attention to skills development. In 1970-1971, the Penang 
government, through the City Council of Georgetown, Penang’s capital, initiated an on-
the-job training scheme for school leavers. The scheme allowed participants to spend half 
a day working and half a day receiving technical education. Many of these graduates were 
employed at the electronics factories that sprung up (Singh, 2011).  
 
 
 
5.6.3 Quick industrialisation and shallow integration 
 
The incentives for export-oriented industrialization, enshrined in the IIA of 1968, and 
the creation of the FTZs gave a definite boost to integration into electronics GVCs, 
particularly in semiconductor assembly. National Semiconductor established the first 
export-oriented electronics facility in Penang in 1971 (Rasiah, 2010). By 1972, there were 
17 electronics factories in Penang, employing some 12,000 workers. By 1980 this had 
increased to 25 firms employing almost 25,000 workers in Penang only (Hutchinson, 2008). 
In 1982, total sales of electronics firms in FTZs or with LMW status in Malaysia as a whole 
accounted for 88% of the value of sales in the electronics industry (MIDA/UNIDO, 1985). 
However, the linkages of export-oriented firms with the domestic economy were poor, with 
only 2.9% of raw materials and 10.6% of capital equipment sourced locally  (Table 5.2).  
                                                 
142 FIDA brought a team to Penang by National Semiconductors to engage in talks with PDC 
and later featured Penang extensively in its promotional videos. National Semiconductors decided 
to locate in Penang, becoming the first semiconductor assembly facility in the island (Singh, 2011).  
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Table 5.2 Performance of export-oriented electronics firms, Malaysia, 1982   
 FTZ Firms LMW Firms Total FTZ and 
LMW 
Total Sales (USD 000) 1,433,231 198,302 1,631,534 
Exports (USD 000) 1,431,809 187,160 1,618,969 
Exports/Total Sales 99.9% 94.4% 99.2% 
Local Raw Materials/Total 
Raw Materials 
2.2% 8.9% 2.9% 
Local capital equipment/total 
capital equipment 
7.6% 22.4% 10.6% 
Value Added/Sales 21.5% 42.6% 22.6% 
Value Added/Employee 
(USD) 
5,838 4,515 5,563 
Notes: Original prices in RM, converted into USD by author. 
Source: MIDA/UNIDO (1985: 63)  
 
Nevertheless, in the late 1970s, some domestic SMEs started emerging as suppliers of 
tooling and simple equipment, predominantly in Penang. Such sourcing linkages were not 
easy to develop because most domestic suppliers were at the time small-scale and 
possessed low technological capabilities. Until the 1980s, almost all MNC subsidiaries 
undertook their own tooling, but demand for outsourcing precision engineering started to 
increase as local semiconductor assembly facilities begun automating their processing in 
the 1980s. The rapid change of pace in technology change meant that it was difficult to 
continuously import machinery and more economic to do in-house modifications or 
outsource locally. This demand was originally met by foreign suppliers, but it also created 
an opportunity for domestic firms to integrate into electronics GVCs. The efforts of the 
PDC were instrumental in fostering sourcing linkages with local SMEs. For example, Eng 
Teknologi, a large mould and die supplier, was connected to MNCs by PDC (Rasiah, 1998).  
 
5.7 1986-2004: Promoting high-tech activities in foreign subsidiaries & the 
emergence of domestic firms  
 
The attempt by the Malaysian government to pursue heavy industrialization in the 
beginning of the 1980s had been partly a response to the oil crisis of 1979. The sharp drop 
in export earnings (the trade deficit in 1982 reached 14.1% of GDP) prompted the search 
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for alternative sources of growth (Bowie, 1991). However, the situation did not improve. 
In 1983 the collapse of commodity prices reduced the fiscal space of the government, 
making the heavy industrialisation initiative increasingly difficult to finance. In 1985-86, 
a cyclical downturn in the semiconductor industry reduced output and exports in the 
Malaysian electronics industry, which at the time accounted for 13% of total industrial 
value added. With this background, the development model pursued since the 1980s 
promoted technological deepening, while at the same time encouraging FDI and exports 
(Jomo and Edwards, 1993).  
First, trade liberalization proceeded fast. Tariffs on IT goods were already low at an 
average of 11.1% in 1988, and were progressively cut in the run-up to WTO in 1995 and 
the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) in 1996. By 1997, tariffs in IT products were 
down to 4.4% and would reach zero by 2005. By contrast, Malaysia tried to secure higher 
tariffs for the automobile industry and some agriculture sub-sectors, while the former also 
benefited from import quotas on completely-built-up vehicles (WTO, 1997). For other 
(non-automotive) industries there was also an escalating tariff structure, with high tariffs 
for fully processed goods, lower for semi-processed and lowest for raw materials (see 
Gustafsson, 2007). The country also removed local content measures tied to incentives by 
2000 and phased out export subsidies in the manufacturing sector by 2003 (Ariff and 
Nambiar, 2011). 
Second, investment regulations were also liberalized and further encouraged export-
orientation. Investment regulations were liberalized with the PIA in 1986, easing equity 
restrictions and putting in place incentives for exports (discussed in Section 5.3.2). 
Restrictions on export orientation and equity were abolished altogether in 2003 (Felker and 
Jomo, 2007).  Additionally, incentives were extended to indirect exporters as well in 1986. 
This enhanced incentives for suppliers to relocate to Malaysia.  
At the same time, electronics GVCs started expanding rapidly since the mid-1980s 
increasing investment outflows in developing economies. The re-evaluation of the yen and 
other East Asian currencies in the mid-1980s, led to a sharp increase in the offshoring of 
Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean investments to locations in Southeast Asia, including 
Malaysia. The rapid increases in labour costs in Singapore, also led to an exodus of labour-
intensive consumer electronics and computer peripheral assembly (predominantly hard 
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disk drives), into lower cost locations, such as Thailand and Malaysia (O’Connor, 1993; 
Salleh and Meyanathan, 1993). U.S. offshoring also started to increase during this time, 
and large contract manufacturers for U.S. lead firms concentrated in Malaysia during the 
1990s, such as Flex and Jabil (Philips and Henderson, 2009).  
The attention to attracting GVCs was complemented by strategic policies during 1986-
2004 to leverage FDI for technology transfer and to develop domestic technological 
capabilities (Lall, 1995). This was witnessed by the following actions that are reviewed in 
more detail later in this Section: 
 MITI started issuing Industrial Master Plans (IMPs), with the first one was launched 
in the mid-1980s (Section 5.3.1). The IMPs aimed to increase local industrial value 
added and encourage the development of more sophisticated economic activities 
beyond simple assembly and processing.  
 Tax incentives were amended to encourage local value addition and R&D (Section 
5.3.2). 
 Efforts were made to increase the density and quality of the innovation system by 
establishing dedicated research and testing institutions, as well as cluster-related 
infrastructure and space for public-private dialogue. (Section 5.3.3). 
 Schemes were introduced to link domestic SMEs to MNCs and foster outsourcing 
linkages (Section 5.3.4) 
 The state channelled funds to build wafer fabs, the most capital-intensive part of 
the value chain  (Section 5.3.5).  
The combination of these policies exemplified an approach to industrial policy that 
attempted to leverage GVCs for industrial development. Instruments did not antagonize 
foreign investors but attempted to increase their incentives to source locally and upgrade 
their technology. The result was an expanded electronics cluster that showed some signs 
of upgrading and a few emerging domestic firms that grew in to service the upgraded 
foreign subsidiaries. However, weaknesses in the implementation of industrial policy, an 
innovation system that remained detached from the manufacturing heart of the industry, 
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and the lack of adequate incentives for firms to engage in learning, inhibited the 
development of firms that could sustain upgrading into the frontier.  
5.7.1 The First Industrial Master Plan (1IMP)  
Already since 1978, MIDA had begun studies for an Industrial Plan to improve the 
outcomes of its industrialization process. The 1IMP (1986-1995)143 was published in 1985 
and targeted 12 subsectors, stretching the resources of the state: resource based (food 
processing, rubber, palm oil, wood-based, chemical and petrochemical, non-ferrous metal 
products and non-metallic mineral products), and non-resource-based (electrical and 
electronic, transport equipment, machinery and engineering, ferrous metal, textiles, 
apparel).  
The 1IMP was a large, well-researched study with concrete proposals on how to develop 
strategically the industry in Malaysia. Regarding the electronics industry, three key 
challenges were identified: (1) the overreliance on semiconductor assembly; (2) the lack of 
indigenous firms in the industry; and (iii) the need to upgrade assembly operations. The 
following measures were recommended to address these (MIDA/UNIDO: 101-115):  
1. Preferential treatment for a limited priority product group (including tax incentives, 
protection of domestic market with predetermined declining schedule, and 
discounted loans) 
2. Incentives for export activities (including tax reductions on income earned from 
direct or indirect exports, exemptions from duties used in exports, export credit)  
3. Incentives for small scale firms  
4. Encouraging the government to be a catalyst for indigenous R&D capabilities, by 
fostering collaborative R&D efforts, by continuing the work of the Malaysian 
Institute of Microelectronic Systems (MIMOS) and with various tax incentives for 
R&D 
                                                 
143 There was also the Malaysian Industrial Policy Study (MIPS), also funded by the UNDP, 
but also by the World Ban and carried out by an Australian consultancy, IMG, published in 1984.  
Its recommendations were to reduce protection and increase competitiveness in the economy. The 
MIPS did not gain as much traction as the IMP (Edwards, 1993).  
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5. Establishing the Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) to act 
as a venture capital unit and a technology supplier 
6. Encouraging the development of engineering and technical manpower and 
incentivizing the training of employees 
7. Rewarding firms with fiscal incentives for local content 
8. Promoting the diffusion of microelectronics in the economy 
9. Improving market intelligence  
10. Strengthening the role of the industry associations 
The 1MP also made two suggestions regarding the structure of the industry. The first 
was to develop consumer electronics further that had started to develop rapidly in the 1980s. 
By increasing production of that segment, in which local content was frequently as high as 
30% to 40%, Malaysia could create downstream demand for the more sophisticated IC 
industry (MIDA/UNIDO, p.20). While developing backwards integration into 
semiconductor design and fabrication was also recommended, developing consumer 
electronics was seen as less technologically challenging (see also O’Connor, 1993). The 
second suggestion was to create ‘national champions’. The 1IMP rightly noted that there 
was no local firm large enough to become a leader in the industry, while the small, local 
firms with some technological capacity were overlooked when handing out incentives. The 
study encouraged the government to take bolder actions, by encouraging the merger of 
smaller firms or entering into a joint venture to create a firm that can operate in economies 
of scale. Such a firm would have to be encouraged to export, with the aim to become 
globally competitive.  
There were some efforts by MIDA to encourage consumer electronics by giving tax 
incentives, but the recommendations of the 1IMP that concerned protection of certain parts 
of the industry and the support of local champions were not implemented.  
5.7.2 Incentives for boosting local participation and technological deepening  
The Promotion of Investment Act (PIA) 1986 was introduced to widen incentives for 
export-oriented manufacturing. According to MIDA (1987) and KPMG (1987), these were: 
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1. Pioneer Status (exemption from income tax, development tax, excess profit tax for 
5 years irrespective of capital investment, or for 10 years for some industries).  
2. Investment Tax Allowance (this was the previously named investment tax credits, 
now for participating in promoted activities, up to 100% in respect of qualifying 
capital dependent on area of investment and local content, tenable for 5-10 years). 
3. Abatement of Adjusted Income  (5% for resident companies in designated 
promoted industrial areas, 5% for small companies since 1986, resident companies 
complying with NEP, up to 50% for FOB sales in relation to total sales plus 5% of 
the value of indigenous Malaysian materials used in the products which 
manufactures products for exports) 
4. Double deduction for Promotion of Exports (for resident companies expenses to 
seek market opportunities for exports) 
5. Reinvestment Allowance (up to 25% of capital expenditure between 1979-1988, 
not compatible with Pioneer or Investment Tax Allowance 
6. Accelerated Depreciation Allowance (not compatible with Pioneer or Investment 
Tax Allowance) 
7. Export Credit Refinancing by the Central Bank – provides exporters with 
preferential credit (currently charged at 5%, also for indirect exporters) 
The change in (1) effectively shifted the emphasis of the Pioneer incentive from the 
protected capital-intensive industries to export-oriented industries. The export orientation 
was reinforced with (3), (4) and (7) and local content clauses were put in (2) and (3). 
Investors whose pioneer status expired, could continue to receive tax incentives with (5) 
and (6). Equity ownership rules were also relaxed, allowing 100% ownership to new 
applicants if they exported more than 50% of output in products that do not compete with 
Malaysian firms, or if they employed 350 Malaysians and more. If products were of high 
technology or priority, a majority foreign share (51%) could still be retained even if the 
project was domestic market-oriented.  
The levels of tax incentives and their duration changed almost annually. Eventually total 
tax relief was reduced and it was announced that 100% tax exemptions would be given 
only on a case-by-case basis (MIDA, 1991). In 1995, MITI announced that to obtain 
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Pioneer Status, firms had to spend some RM 55,000 (USD 20,000) per employee (although 
it is not clear what expenditures qualified) or satisfy other criteria, such as value added of 
30% or more, 15% of the workforce in managerial, technical or supervisory positions, or 
location in promoted areas or activities beneficial to Malaysia’s progress (Felker and Jomo, 
2007).  
Under the PIA, 24 electronics products and parts were promoted, including computers 
and peripherals, consumer electronics, appliances and upstream components related to 
semiconductor assembly, as suggested by the 1IMP. In contrast to previous policies, these 
projects did not need to be export-oriented (MIDA, 1987). Local content in the industry 
was promoted by being tied to tax incentives. However, achieving a high percentage of 
local value added in semiconductors was difficult: even if all the materials, excluding the 
wafers, were sourced locally, total value added would rise by probably less than 10 
percentage points (O’Connor, 1993: 216). Moreover, incentives for local content had to be 
phased out by 2003 as part of Malaysia’s commitments to WTO. For this reason, 
government attention turned towards establishing wafer fabs in the mid-1990s.  
More funding also started to become available for manufacturing industries. The New 
Investment Fund (NIF) was launched in 1987 to channel RM 1 billion (USD 400 million) 
of funds by the central bank to commercial banks for on-lending to investment projects in 
new productive capacity in the manufacturing, agricultural, tourism and mining sectors, at 
a maximum rate of 7.75%, which was below market prices (MIDA 1987). Loans were 
between RM 250,000 (USD 100 thousand) to RM 50 million (USD 20 million) (up to 75% 
of expenditure) for five years (KPMG, 1990). In 1989 the industrial Technical Assistance 
Fund for Small and Medium Scale Industry was established to provide grants, with an 
initial amount of RM 50 million (USD 20 million).  
Incentives were also set up to encourage skills development. In 1993 the Human 
Resources Development Fund (HRDF) was set up for all industries above 50 workers and 
in 1996 extended to SMEs. Firms would put 1% of payrolls into a fund and could apply for 
reimbursement of a percentage of expenses on approved training programs (Felker and 
Jomo, 2007).  
Incentives for R&D and training had been considered since 1980 (MIDA, 1980), but it 
was in the late 1980s that these started to be fleshed out. MIDA put in place generous tax 
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incentives to encourage firms to conduct or contract R&D, including various tax 
exemptions and deductions for capital expenditures. During 1984-1994 the 
electronics/electrical industry received 61.6% of the approved R&D tax deductions. These 
were worth a total of RM 80.8 million (USD 31 million), and were spread among 21 firms 
(Rasiah, 1996).  The effort to increase R&D in research institutes and the private sector 
was coordinated by the Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development (APITD), 
launched in 1990. The APITD identified electronics as a sector that needed support for 
technological improvement (along with ceramics, chemicals, machinery and engineering, 
plastics, wood, textiles, food and rubber). It was also a key technology to be supported by 
government R&D (together with automated manufacturing, advanced materials, 
biotechnology and IT). The sectoral goal for electronics was to support Integrated Circuit 
(IC) design, radio frequency engineering, an automated assembly process for electronics 
called Surface Mount Technology (SMT), digital signal processing and design for 
peripherals (Felker, 2003:143).  
Government funding for R&D was coordinated by the Intensification of Research in 
Priority Areas (IRPA), a scheme launched in 1988 to link public R&D to strategic areas 
for development. Some RM 117.16 million (USD 45 million) was approved under the 
scheme, with RM 25.6 million (USD 9.8 million) going to the industrial sector. Joint 
research between private sector and research institutes was encouraged (MIDA, 1994). In 
practice, however, many of the allocations were driven by the interests of the government 
research institutes and not the private sector (Felker, 2003). The first direct subsidy for 
private R&D was given in 1997, with the Industry R&D Grant Scheme and the Technology 
Acquisition Fund (each with and allocation of RM 100 million or USD 36 million), 
managed by the MTDC (ibid.). There is no data on the share of these funds that were 
absorbed by the electronics industry.  
The uptake of R&D-related incentives and funding by private firms was low, either due 
to lack of interest or because of the complexity of applications (Felker, 2003). The low 
capabilities in the electronics industry, particularly in domestic firms, made it difficult to 
design R&D projects, state their expected results and handle the complex applications 
system. In contrast, thanks to their higher capabilities, foreign subsidiaries made use of 
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R&D-related tax incentives, increasing their research in process R&D and product 
adaptation.   
5.7.3 The creation of an innovation system 
A number of institutions were established during this time to increase the ability of firms 
to innovate by providing capital, research and testing services, and specialized 
infrastructure. This section discusses the contributions of these institutions to the 
Malaysian electronics innovation system.  
Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT) 
MIGHT is a consultative forum that was launched in February 1993 to bring together 
stakeholders for the development of high technology industry. It was set up by the 
Malaysian Business Council and the National Council for Scientific Research and 
Development. The direction came from a steering committee chaired by Datuk Dr. Omar 
Abdul Rahman, the PM’s Science Advisor and Tan Sri Dato Hj Basir Ismail (former 
Chairman of Petronas), while a support unit was stationed at Dr Omar’s office144. MIGHT 
was meant to engage in ‘strategic foresight’ to identify areas for investments and policy 
options to build competitiveness.  
However, the institution was not involved in the electronics industry, focusing instead 
on aerospace, biotechnology, photonics, nanotechnology and advanced manufacturing145. 
As a consequence of MIGHT’s focus, many of the manufacturing firms that were 
conducting R&D at the time in electronics (e.g. Intel) were not part of the group.  Motorola 
was the only electronics MNC to join MIGHT by 1995146. The emphasis of MIGHT on 
R&D, ignoring the accumulation of technological capabilities that can take place during 
                                                 
144 NTIS Alert Foreign Technology US Department of Commerce ‘Malaysian Government, 
Industry Collaborate on New Technologies’, 1 April 1994. 
145  MIGHT suggested a Masterplan to develop the telecoms industry proposing a vendor 
supplier system focused on local SMEs This could have stimulated parts of the industry given the 
convergence of telecommunications and digital technologies in the 1990s and the role of the local 
telecommunications provider as a large buyer, but not much came of it. (Kaur, Lashvinder 
‘MIGHT’s Masterplan to Develop Telecoms Industry’, 17 September 1994, Business Times.) 
146 Hamid, Hamisah ‘Shift to Technology-Intensive Industries’, 12 August 1995, Business 
Times.  
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complex production, were highlighted by a controversial suggestion the group made that 
manufacturing licenses should be made conditional upon R&D expenditures to ‘jolt’ the 
economy into the high-tech era147. However, given its support for advanced manufacturing, 
MIGHT promoted the idea of establishing wafer fabs148. 
Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) 
The MTDC was a government-run venture capital fund established in 1992. Its original 
mandate was to find technologies developed by research Institutes and universities to 
commercialise by providing venture capital, but few such opportunities emerged (Felker, 
2003). In the beginning, some of MTDC’s activities were helpful in growing the domestic 
electronics sector. Within a couple of years, MTDC invested RM 6 million (USD 2.3 
million) in eight firms that were operating in the sector (consumer electronics, computer 
peripherals and software) (Rasiah, 1996). The most notable example of these is 
Globetronics. However, after that there was scarcely any investment by MTDC in 
electronics projects (Rasiah, 1996).  
Science parks and clusters  
A major thrust of the post-1986 development policies in Malaysia was the promotion of 
clusters to encourage upgrading. This was done by providing specialized infrastructure and 
targeted incentives for firms locating in the parks/clusters. In the electronics industry, the 
science parks/clusters of importance were: 
 Technology Park Malaysia (TPM), established in Bukit Jalil, near Kuala Lumpur in 
1995. TPM housed MIMOS, the government-owned research agency in 
microelectronics.  
 Kulim High Tech Park (KHTM), built in 1996 in the state of Kedah opposite Penang. 
Even though it is not in Penang, the KHTP has easy access to the island and has 
benefitted from proximity to it. The park was envisioned to be a modern science city, 
bringing together R&D, design and engineering in industries, such as 
                                                 
147 FMM – Might suggestion unwise, 25 April 1997, Business Times, Sheares, Michelle.  
148  Bujang, Asiah ‘Time to develop chip-designing industry – Omar’, 6 November 1998, 
Business Times.  
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microelectronics, robotics and bio-technology149 .  KHTP developed appropriate 
infrastructure to attract wafer fabrications, and it housed the first large-scale such 
operation Malaysia, SilTerra. 
 The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) established in 1996 as a large cluster, which 
encompassed Kuala Lumpur, nearby Putra Jaya and the Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport. A purpose-built city with specialist infrastructure, Cyber Jaya, was built in 
the area. The MSC encouraged ICT companies working on software and hardware 
in telecommunications, multimedia and other IT applications, leveraging the 
convergence of information technologies with telecommunications (Tham and Loke, 
2011). 
 In Johor there is the Technovation Park and the incubator UTM-MTDC Technology 
Centre hosted at University Technology Malaysia (UTM), established in 1995 and 
1999 respectively (Malairaja and Zawdie, 2008).  
The parks provided much-needed specialized infrastructure for firms engaged in 
software and science-base activities (e.g. biotech). However, the fact that these were not 
located in Penang, apart from KHTM that is at least in close proximity, has hindered 
linkages with the manufacturing industry150 (Singh, 2011). Another issue has been that 
these initiatives were not able to bridge the institutional gap between promoting industry 
and promoting Science and Technology (S&T) capabilities.  TPM came under the Ministry 
of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI) and MSC and has been led by the 
Malaysia Digital Economy Corporation (MDEC), also under MOSTI. By contrast, KHTM, 
owned by the Kedah State Development Corporation, was set up by MITI for firms that 
received MIDA’s high technology status (Felker and Jomo, 2007). The focus of MOSTI 
on non-manufacturing, science-oriented start-ups has meant that many of the initiatives led 
by the Ministry have not been established with the needs of the electronics industrial cluster 
in mind.   
                                                 
149 Wooing MNCs to high-tech park, The New Straits Times, 19 March 1996.  
150 Interview PN11. Interview with senior government official in Kuala Lumpur,  
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Malaysian Institute for Microelectronics Systems 
MIMOS was established in 1985 as a unit under the Prime Minister’s Department. 
MIMOS was an R&D unit during 1985-1990, became an agency between 1991-1996 and 
a corporation in 1997. The Institute quickly diversified its main business from just 
conducting research to creating business ventures (in internet infrastructure, computer and 
peripherals manufacturing and wafer fabrication).  
It was envisioned that MIMOS could take a similar role to that of ITRI in Taiwan, but 
the institute never managed to become a driving force in the industry. The wafer fabs 
created by MIMOS (more on that in Section 5.3.4), were small and with mature technology 
that was a few generations from the frontier.   
Part of the reason lies with the way MIMOS was managed; the focus of MIMOS 
expanded too broadly and too quickly, with projects not getting enough resources, and 
management decisions became increasingly political151. More importantly, MIMOS was 
not only far from the ecosystem it meant to serve in Penang, but also it did not have enough 
firms to serve. The foreign firms in the cluster relied on their parent firms for designing 
and prototyping, and there were few domestic firms that had an interest in designing IC 
chips and use MIMOS’ services. Without downstream demand for MIMOS, the agency 
attempted to diversify into business, as noted earlier152.   
It is also possible that the capital and human resources at MIMOS were not enough 
during this time for the kind of role it was asked to play. In 2004 MIMOS spent RM 34 
million (USD 8.9 million) on R&D, almost half of what the Malaysian Palm Oil Board 
(MPOB), another Government Research Institute, spent on palm oil related research, while 
palm oil as a sector contributed six time less value added in the economy (Yusuf and 
Nabeshima, 2009:167). Moreover, in MIMOS only 4% of researchers had a Ph.D and 18% 
a Masters. By contrast in MPOB those percentages were 36% and 20% respectively and in 
                                                 
151 Interview with government-owned research agency in Kuala Lumpur, 26 February 2016, 
KL02.  
152 Interview KL02, footnote 151. Also Interview with senior government official in Kuala 
Lumpur on 1 April 2016, KL12.  
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SIRIM (Scientific and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia) 24% and 27% respectively 
(ibid: 168).   
Nevertheless, MIMOS achieved a lot of firsts for Malaysia. It created the first IC wafer 
fab and it introduced the first locally designed IC in 1994, a 16-bit RISC microprocessor. 
The operations of MIMOS created relevant human talent153 and government expertise that 
became useful. Setting up the wafer fan was a learning experience for Malaysia, 
highlighting the importance of infrastructure, the technology involved and the scale needed, 
which inspired the plans to build the dedicated Kulim High Tech Park154  (see also Section 
5.3.5).   
5.7.4 MNC-SME linkage schemes 
Efforts were made to provide more institutional support for linkages between foreign 
firms and domestic ones, going beyond matchmaking. Even though the Vendor 
Development Programme (VDP) is more widely known for the automotive sector, when it 
was launched in 1988 for Proton, there was also an electronics component scheme launched 
in 1992, with Sapura (a large domestic telecommunications supplier) and Sharp (a Japanese 
consumer electronics firm) as anchor firms (Rasiah, 1996). Little is known about the results 
in this segment, but Sapura reportedly made extensive use of the programme (Rasiah, 1996). 
The companies participating in the VDP met local content and linkage criteria for tax 
incentives155. More companies joined over time, with Sony subsidiaries, Motorola, SGS-
Thomson Microelectronics (now ST Semiconductors), JVC electronics and Hitachi 
Electronics among the large corporations that signed VDP agreements in 1994156. Sapura 
and Sharp spent some RM 3 million (USD 1.1 million) in two years to develop 5 vendors 
each157 and the government channelled RM 9 million (USD 3.4 million) to the two firms 
                                                 
153 Interview with Vice President of foreign-invested firm in Kulim High Tech Park, 22 March 
2016, KH01.  
154 Interview KL02. Footnote 151. 
155 Jacobs, Jennifer, ‘Electronics Sector Spurred to Set Root’. 11 August 1993, Business Times.  
156 K’Zaman, ‘Bahaman, Firm Base of Support Industries by 2000’, 25 January 1994, Business 
Times. Yeow, Jimmy, ‘MITI picks 50 more firms to Join SMI Vendor Scheme’, 4 March 1994, 
Business Times.   
157 Mansor, Lokman,  RM64M Allocated to Help Develop SMIs This Year’, 24 August 1994, 
Business Times.   
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for loans to vendors. Moreover, financial institutions, such as MIDF and Bank 
Pembangunan Malaysia also set aside RM 40 million (USD 15.2 million) together for Soft-
Loan schemes aimed at SMEs that wanted to become vendors for large firms (MIDF on 
Modernisation and Automation, while the latter for Bumi engagement in Furniture and 
Food industries) 158. 
Some firms developed from this scheme, such as Akamai Electronics, a Bumi firm in 
Ampang Jaya that provided precision stamped parts for automotive firms, mobile phone 
components for Motorola Semiconductor and computer board assembly for SharpRoxy159. 
However, several problems persisted. Some of the anchor companies that signed 
memoranda did not follow through with proposals, while in other cases the anchor 
companies did not provide the mentorship or prioritise the suppliers in their work plans. 
Sometimes, suppliers would receive unrealistic orders and did not have enough information 
on the financial facilities available160. At the same time, the low level of expertise among 
SMEs was noticeable. Sapura vice chairman Rameli Musa commented that “[Sapura] had 
to practically station [its] engineers in these factories to teach them everything, from stock 
control, quality control and production control to sourcing of equipment”161. 
5.7.5 Backward linkages: establishing wafer fabs  
Integrating backwards into higher value added functions in the semiconductor value 
chain had been a goal since the 1IMP, but the Second Industrial Malaysia Plan (2IMP, 
1996-2005) was even more ambitious in this regard. It advocated the establishment of at 
least three wafer fabs, one for each type of wafer: DRAM (Dynamic Random Access 
Memory), ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits) and Microprocessors, possibly 
with joint ventures. The wafer fabs were described in 2IMP as the ‘missing link’ of the 
                                                 
158 Laur, Lashvinder, ‘SMI Development Gets Further Boost of RM10.6M’, 14 February 1994, 
Business Times.  
159 Sulaima, Siti Hajjar, ‘Couple Turns Electronics Firm into Success Story’, 18 June 1994, 
Business Times. 
160 ‘More vendor companies wanted under development programme’, the New Straits Times, 
10 April 1996. 
161 Jacobs, Jennifer, ‘Local Participation in Electronics Industry Wanting’, Business Times, 12 
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value chain, putting pressure on the trade balance, as the expensive silicon wafers had to 
be imported. While assembly accounted for only 8% of the value of the semiconductor, 
fabrication accounted for 35% (2IMP: 70). The establishment of wafer fabs was also seen 
as a way to draw in other upstream activities, such as R&D and design, and provide an 
anchor for smaller firms in the semiconductor value chain.  
In the beginning, Malaysia’s only fab was a small 4-inch facility by Motorola in 
Seremban producing discrete semiconductors. Another local effort and the first wafer fab 
for ICs to operate in Malaysia was MIMOS in 1996. The fab would produce 6-inch wafers 
at 1.5 micron162, with a possibility to upgrade to sub-micron processes in the future163. 
MIMOS also built an 8-inch facility in 2002. The process technology has since improved 
to 0.35 microns for IC and 0.8 microns for discrete devices (ibid). The technology was not 
advanced and the capacity was small, not really aiming to be a commercial fab, but a 
learning project that suits prototyping and small-scale mature needs of local players.  
Other planned projects by foreign investors prior to the launch of the 2IMP never got 
off the ground. First, Taiwan’s Hualon Microelectronics Corp was considering a USD 260 
million joint venture with local Malaysian firm Carsem Malaysia since 1990 to be located 
in Kulim and assistance would be provided by MIMOS for ASIC design164. However, first 
the government decided to build the KHTP in the area, delaying the project for a couple of 
years165 and then the Hualon’s chairman was embroiled in a financial scandal166. The 
project, which had received USD 112 million in local loans and a 10-year tax-free 
treatment167, never got off the ground. Second, Hitachi was also considering building a fab 
for DRAMs in Malaysia in 1991, even sending 15 engineers from its assembly facility in 
                                                 
162 At the time the frontier was at 8 inches and already at sub-micron level.  
163 Dennis, William ‘ Malaysia OKs Fab Funding’, Electronic Buyers’ News, 12 August 1991. 
164 Dennis, William ‘Hualon to Locate Fab – Taiwan Electronics Maker Investing in Malaysian 
Semiconductor Joint Venture’, Electronic World News, 9 April 1990.  
165 See footnote 164.  
166 Taiwan’s Hualon in Big Malaysia Investment – Report, Reuters, 22 March 1992.  
167 Hualon to set up eight-inch silicon wafer plant in Malaysia, Taiwan Economic News, 2 July 
1994 
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Penang to Japan for training168. In 1996, LG jointed the project169. Hitachi first delayed the 
project to invest in Munich instead170 and then the project was put on hold in 1996 by the 
Malaysian government reportedly because it was worried the terms were too favorable to 
foreign investors. The terms had included 100% foreign ownership, an RM 600 million 
(USD 238 million) loan at a 4.2% rate (around half the prevailing market rate) and a 10-
year tax holiday (twice the normal rate)171. Eventually, sharp drops in the prices of chips 
by 1996 and the Asian Financial Crisis led to the Hitachi-LG project to be cancelled 
altogether.  
The government soon stepped in to shoulder some of the direct investment costs and 
support wafer fabrication by using its investment arm, Khazanah Holdings. Khazanah was 
under the purview of the Ministry of Finance and was chaired by Mahathir, by establishing 
SilTerra in 1997172. Khazanah eventually held 70% of SilTerra’s shares, with LSI and 
Seiko Investments also holding small shares173. SilTerra ended up operating at a modest 
                                                 
168 Hitachi’s plan to build chip plant adds to country’s electronics industry, Electronics Times, 
26 September 1991. 
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170 See footnote 168. 
171 See footnote 169. 
172 Khazanah, together with Bank Industri Malaysia and BI-Walden Ventures set up a joint 
venture named Wafer Technology Bhd. It the mid-1990s the venture had two projects. The first 
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pulled out of the project in the middle of the Asian Financial Crisis (Lien, Jennifer ‘US chipmaker 
Atmel’s Malaysian venture delayed’, Business Times Singapore, 13 May 1998). 
173 Hamid, Jialil ‘Malaysia to offer incentives to foreign wafer investors’, Reuters News, 26 
July 2001 
233 
 
profit, focusing on mature technologies and fabrication of advanced logic, mixed signal, 
radio frequency and high voltage ICs. It commercial production in 2001 at 0.18 micron, 
upgrading to 0.13 micron in 2004174. While SilTerra had potential, the company also 
operated as a political project, with leadership at the helm that was inexperienced to drive 
the commercial fab forward 175 . Khazanah also made some other investments in the 
semiconductor value chain to complement its fabrication facility176.  
Another project financed by the state, was “InterConnect Technology”. It was backed 
by the state of Sarawak, but was also suspended in 1997. This was supposed to be a foundry 
built by the Sarwak Economic Development Corporation, Malaysian and foreign investors 
and chaired by Penang’s chief Minister Lim Chong Eu,177 who eventually resigned amid 
financial difficulties and disagreements. The fab was later finished by the Sarawak 
Economic Development Corporation and operated as a wholly owned venture named 1st 
Silicon and started with a 0.25 micron processing line. Sharp provided technology for the 
project and was the major client178. However, the company quickly became loss making 
since it started operations in 2001 and by 2004 it had amassed some USD 640 million in 
losses179.   
By 2001, following the Asian Financial Crisis, the mood in the government had changed, 
and Mahathir promised sweeteners to foreign investors in fabs, such as tax incentives and 
100 percent ownership180. However, the protracted semiconductor downturn did not help. 
                                                 
174 SilTerra demos new SRAM technology, New Straits Times, 23 December 2005.  
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As mentioned above 1st Silicon had accumulated losses and there was not much interest for 
new fabs as significant capacity existed globally at the time.  
5.7.6 Few local firms and some upgrading  
The result of the policy mix adopted during this time was limited upgrading in the 
electronics industry, diversification of the products assembled and the emergence of a 
handful of local electronics firms.  
Foreign subsidiaries between the mid-1980s and end of 1990s diversified and upgraded 
their product range, increased the complexity of their process and invested in automation 
(Arrifin and Bell, 1999). The inflows of foreign investors from Japan and Taiwan led to 
increases in the share of consumer electronics in total output and exports. In 1984 consumer 
electronics accounted for 4% of total value added in the electronics industry; by 1995 its 
share had jumped to 30%.  
However, there was little product development taking place (Ismail, 1999). The 
exceptions were a handful of large subsidiaries, such as Intel, Motorola, Sharp-Roxy and 
Matsushita, which conducted R&D on mature products (Ismail, 1999). Sharp-Roxy 
introduced a locally developed mini CD stereo in 1995 and developed processing 
machinery (an assembly machine for turn-tables)181. According to surveyed subsidiaries, 
firms did not locate product R&D in Malaysia due to the lack of trained personnel, markets 
and production experience in the country and fears over intellectual property leakages 
(Rasiah, 1996). In contrast, process R&D was much more common. All firms interviewed 
by Ismail (1999) engaged in some form of R&D on production methods and processes, 
with Texas Instruments, Motorola, Harris and Quality Technologies the most advanced in 
this respect. Frontier R&D activities were always retained at parent sites (Rasiah, 1996). 
Even so, the innovation activities of foreign subsidiaries were advanced compared to what 
local firms were doing. Sony was the top holder of Malaysian patents (among private firms) 
between 1989-2006, with a total of 7 patents, followed by Motorola Semiconductor with 5 
(Yusuf and Nebeshima, 2009). Rasiah’s survey (1996) suggests that government incentives 
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caused the shift towards more technology-intensive activities in foreign subsidiaries. 
Foreign subsidiaries claimed 91% of all R&D expenses in 1993 (Rasiah 1996) and firms 
reported that the R&D incentives were important in their locational decisions for ‘re-
designing’ activities (ibid).  
There is also some evidence that backward linkages increased for the industry during 
this time. Tham and Loke (2011), using input/output analysis note that backward linkages 
from the E&E sector to the rest of the economy increased significantly between 1987 and 
1991, but subsequently fell somewhat until 2005. The relocation of foreign suppliers from 
Japan to Malaysia following the yen devaluation of the mid-1980s and from the United 
States to Malaysia, following the emergence of fist-tier manufacturing contractors, the 
development of local sub-contractors and the SME linkage programmes helped to increase 
local sourcing. However, it seems that despite the formal requirements for local content in 
place, the government was hesitant to enforce them (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2009).  
Moreover, some of the domestic firms that had emerged during the previous phase (e.g. 
Eng Teknologi) to provide tooling and other machining services and components to MNC 
subsidiaries started to become more sophisticated. The Promotion of Investment Act in 
1986 contained incentives for indirect exports and extended them for smaller-sized firms, 
thereby encouraging domestic SMEs to supply foreign subsidiaries. These sourcing 
linkages proved decisive in helping local firms grow. For example, Intel supplied Eng, 
LKT, Prodelcon and Metfab with capital to upgrade its equipment, technical expertise, 
prototypes and bilateral staff visits (Rasiah, 1999).  
Additionally, as MNC subsidiaries focused on more complex products and automated 
their manufacturing processes, demand increased for subcontracting by local firms in labor-
intensive tasks such as simple semiconductor assembly. Several domestic firms emerged 
during this time to absorb this demand including Globetronics, Unisem, Carsem, Inari and 
AIC semiconductor. Many firms were set up by former MNC employees, who set up their 
own firms to provide subcontracting services to their former employers. Globetronics was 
established by a former Intel engineer, Pentamaster by a former employee of National 
Semiconductor, Vitrox by a former HP employee and Aemulus by a former Alterra one. In 
some cases, government helped with expansion or with initial capital. MTDC took a 30% 
stake in Globetronics a couple of years after its establishment and helped with its expansion. 
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AIC benefited from loans from Bank Industri Malaysia to expand operations. However, 
there were no systematic efforts by the government to encourage the growth of spin-offs.  
5.8 2005-now: Promoting capital-intensive and high-tech activities in the entire 
industry 
Even though the broad policy approach towards the electronics industry did not change 
radically during the last decade, the industry seems to be at an inflection point. First, the 
Malaysian government started offering capital grants on top of tax incentives in 2005. This 
attracted companies in the more capital- intensive parts of the value chain. Second a 
dedicated fund was set up by MIDA to fund domestic firms. Third, the global developments 
in the electronics industry have encouraged the Malaysian electronics industry to diversify 
into new value chains. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) reduced foreign investments in 
electronics and put pressure on the margins of labour-intensive manufactures. Additionally, 
the emergence of China as a large consumption and production hub has led GVCs to 
consolidate in China, rather than expand in Southeast Asia.  
5.8.1 Industrial Policy: frequent changes and some promising initiatives 
Mahathir stepped down in 2004 and was succeeded by Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi. During Badawi’s brief tenure (2005-2009), there was a retreat from strategic 
initiatives, as pressures mounted to reform government finances. Malaysia recovered 
quickly from the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997-1998, but that was largely due to 
expansionary government spending and a ballooning government deficit. Private 
investment was growing 15% per annum between 1991-1997, but declined by -0.6% on 
average during 1998-2012 (Jomo and Wee, 2014).  
As part of the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) restructuring, there were efforts to sell the 
wafer fabs that had struggled to become profitable182. Khazanah has been seeking to sell 
SilTerra since 2008183, with no success so far. The company, after a brief period of positive 
                                                 
182 Burton, John, 3 June 2005, Khazanah chief defends his record at driving change, The 
Financial Times.  
183 Leong, Doreen, 19 April 2010, Corporate: Silterra up for sale again?, The Edge Malaysia 
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profit racked up RM 1 billion (USD 290 million) in losses in 2007184. 1st Silicon in Sarawak 
was sold to Germany-based X-fab in 2006. Khazanah made no other investments in the 
electronics industry until 2015, when it invested in Aemulus, a semiconductor testing 
equipment firm. Nevertheless, during Badawi’s tenure the government (via wholly-owned 
subsidiary Cyberview) established Fabtronic. Its aim was not as ambitious as that of 
SilTerra, pointing instead to develop advanced semiconductor packaging and to offer 
outsourcing services to MNCs located in Penang. The venture has been modestly 
successful185. It is essentially a “factory within factory”, located in the facilities of AMD 
in Penang186.  
Moreover, many of the previous initiatives that aimed to build local capabilities lost 
their dynamism during Badawi’s tenure. In an effort to streamline the various initiatives, 
the Multimedia Development Corporation (MDeC), MIGHT and MTDC that used to be 
under the Prime Minister’s office, came under the purview of the MOSTI in 2004. It 
therefore became more difficult for businesses to participate in the elaboration of industrial 
policy objectives and initiatives, as industrial policy for the electronics industry continued 
to be shaped by the Prime Minister’s office187 . Second, the move implied that these 
initiatives ceased to be considered of strategic priority for the government188. MIGHT was 
transferred back to the Prime Minister department under the Science Advisor again in 2011 
and then in 2014 under a minister in the same department.  
Despite a lack of strategic vision for manufacturing, in 2005 government support 
switched to offering a mix of tax cuts and grants (spurring capital-intensive investments). 
The grants, inspired by the Singaporean model of support, were administered by MIDA189. 
Specific funds were set up for this purpose, such as the Strategic Investment Fund and the 
Automation Fund. Foreign investments responded and set up wafer fabrication plants (e.g. 
Infineon, Fuji, ON Semiconductor, Osram) and chip design facilities (e.g. Alterra) (Rasiah, 
                                                 
184Puah, Pauline, 4 November 2008, MPs question Khazanah’s investment in Silterra, The Edge 
Financial Daily.  
185 Interview KL02, footnote 151.  
186 Karamjit Singh, 24 August 2009, Net Value: Transforming Cyberjaya, The Edge Malaysia 
187 Hassan, Nezrin, 12 April 2004, My Bit: Keep a few doors open, The Edge Malaysia 
188 Interview with CEO of government-business group in Kuala Lumpur, 17 March 2016, KL10.  
189 Interview with Chairman of tax advisory firm in Kuala Lumpur, 14 March 2016, KL07.  
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2015; Rasiah and Shan, 2016). MIDA was also given a Domestic Investment Strategic 
Fund (DISF) to disburse among domestic investors. According to an announcement by 
MIDA, between July 2012 and September 2017, RM 1.3 billion (USD 350 million) was 
disbursed to support 264 projects. The majority of the projects were in Penang (76), 
followed by Kedah (13)190.   
In 2009 Najib became the new Prime Minister and launched the Economic 
Transformation Programme (ETP) (2010-2020). The ETP reflected a turn towards a more 
targeted approach to industrial policy. The Ninth Malaysia Plan (2005-2009) and the 3IMP 
(2006-2020) had advocated clustering, promoting higher value-added activities, improving 
skills in the workforce and increasing the service content of production, but were short on 
concrete measures. In contrast, the ETP focused on twelve New Key Economic Areas 
(NKEAs) and proposed specific projects to achieve the stated goals. The goals and projects 
were developed through large workshops with key stakeholders. The NKEAs that relied on 
public support for a significant portion of total investment were the infrastructure projects 
in Kuala Lumpur and the Greater Klang Valley, Agriculture and Education. The total 
planned investment for the ETP was RM 795.2 billion (USD 247 billion) out of which 14% 
would come from the public sector. Among ΝΚEAs regarding industries, electronics 
featured the highest planned investment from the public sector, with  8.7% of the total  (see 
Table 5.3).  
Within the E&E industry, four segments were chosen to be promoted: (1) 
semiconductors; (2) Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs); (3) solar; (4) industrial electronics & 
home appliances. Previous areas of growth such as passive components (e.g. resistors, 
capacitors, inductors), Personal Computers (PCs), computer peripherals and consumer 
electronics were not promoted any more under the ETP, indicating an intention to diversify 
and upgrade. For each segment 15 key projects were identified (later extended to 18).  
 
 
 
                                                 
190 Rosnani Saad, 14 September 2017, MIDA approves RM 1.3 bln DISF Grant Till July 2017, 
Bernama Daily Malaysian News.  
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Table 5.3 Planned investment in New Key Economic Areas, RM billion 
NKEAs 
Private 
Investment 
Public 
Investment 
Public 
invest. as 
share of 
Total 
Share of total 
public invest. 
1. Greater KL/Klang Valley 114.1 57.8 33.6% 58.8% 
2. Oil & Gas 113.3 0.6 0.5% 0.6% 
3. Financial Services 64.6 0.6 0.9% 0.6% 
4. Wholesale and Retail Trade 66.7 0.4 0.6% 0.4% 
5. Palm Oil 56.8 2.9 4.9% 3.0% 
6. Tourism 132 4.6 3.4% 4.7% 
7. Electronic & Electrical 58.2 8.5 12.7% 8.7% 
8. Business Services 30 3.1 9.4% 3.2% 
9. Communications Content and 
Infrastructure 
29.3 1 
3.3% 1.0% 
10. Education 9.58 10.27 51.7% 10.5% 
11. Agriculture 10.7 8.2 43.4% 8.3% 
12. Healthcare 11.6 0.3 2.5% 0.3% 
Total 696.9 98.27        14.10% 100% 
Source: Author’s summary based on the ETP (PMO, 2010)  
The mix of instruments to support the ETP is similar to what was used in previous 
periods, but became more targeted to specific areas of interest.  
 Tax credits and holidays for silicon producers and solar wafer and cell producers.  
 Investment tax allowances for scaling up advanced semiconductor packaging plants  
 Grants and loans prioritizing R&D and training in the LED sector 
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 Creating local champions in solar (namely IntaMAS and DSEM), by disbursing loans 
through the SME Corporation and offering technical support by MOSTI. 
 Targeting MNCs to relocate to Malaysia to build wafer fabs in mature technologies and 
to engage in IC design  
 Encouraging MNCs to outsource IC design to Malaysian firms 
 Facilitating infrastructure for IC design (e.g. electronic design automation tools, 
prototyping lab and certification testing lab). 
 Improving power quality in the Kulim high-tech park 
 Developing vendor development programs (e.g. Agilent as an anchor firm in Penang)  
 Conditions on FDI made stricter, encouraging technology transfer measured by key 
performance indicators and reviewed every three to five years  
 Incentives given to firms willing to establish local R&D centres 
The specific incentives that firms receive are not standard and are part of a ‘package’ 
that is negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Incentives include corporate tax exemptions, 
import tax exemptions, withholding tax, corporate tax exemptions and permits for hiring 
expatriate staff191. Requirements for getting incentives have increased, with MIDA looking 
closely at the share of engineers and technicians in production or the type of equipment 
used in production, and the level of local business spending192. Some of these conditions 
are putting pressure on firms to upgrade193. However, it should be mentioned that there are 
still weaknesses in monitoring of these requirements and a general unwillingness to cease 
incentives once these have been granted (Lim and Ong, 2007). Moreover, even though 
incentives are not given anymore to small labor-intensive firms194, they are still disbursed 
                                                 
191 Interview KL07, footnote 189.  
192 This is a condition inspired by the Singaporean authorities. Since making tax incentives 
conditional on local content is not allowed under WTO, the condition has changed on local business 
spending, but there is no restriction (at least in publically available information) on what this 
spending entails.  
193 Interview with senior manager in electronics manufacturing service firm in Penang, 30 
March 2016, PN15. 
194 Interview with CEO of contract manufacturer in Penang, 9 March 2016, PN08.  
241 
 
to firms that are large employers and have a long history, even if they still engage in low 
value-added assembly activities195.   
A positive outcome of the ETP has been the renewed attention to MIMOS as a body 
that can provide valuable services to the local electronics clusters. First, in 2006 MIMOS 
changed its mandate, shedding all its business units and focusing again on R&D in 
semiconductors, industrial electronics and ICT and on offering supporting services to firms 
in the sector, especially in IC design and failure testing, at below market rates. The fab 
facilities of MIMOS focus on niche products, but companies can use them for prototyping. 
Under the ETP, MIMOS received funding (RM 224 million or USD 75.6 million) to build 
specialized shared facilities for the industry, namely the Centres of Excellence for Board 
and Systems, Test Development and Material Science and Packing and Testing Labs for 
Wafers, a Contactless Testing Lab and a Failure Analysis Lab. MIMOS also conducted 
skills development courses for university students and graduates. Between 2012 and 2015 
MIMOS trained 186 engineers and offered support services to 145 companies (PMO, 2015).  
There have also been some recent efforts to increase the technology-intensity of the 
industry by creating institutions that bring actors together to chart strategic initiatives. The 
Collaborative Research in Engineering Science and Technology (CREST) was created in 
2012 to bring together industry (mainly the large MNCs but also SilTerra), academia 
(University of Malaya and University of Science Malaysia) and the government (e.g. NCIA 
and Khazanah) to enable collaborative research.  CREST provides R&D grants for 
collaborative research between academia and businesses, covering at least 50% of project 
costs or more for targeted projects that will benefit the whole ecosystem. When it covers 
more than 50% of project costs, CREST owns the intellectual property and engages in 
revenue sharing with the company and university involved. CREST’s budget was RM 900 
million (USD 291 million) for ten years. RM 100 million (USD 33 million) was provided 
by the government, with the balance coming from the private sector196. The efforts of 
CREST have concentrated on the diversification of the electronics industry in line with the 
                                                 
195 Interview PN15, footnote 193. 
196 CREST to Receive RM 800 mln for E&E R&D, 10 June 2012, Bernama Daily Malaysian 
News 
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ETP. In 2014, it was announced that it would spend RM 170 million (USD 52 million) over 
five years to set up two laboratories and conduct R&D on LEDs197. While it was envisioned 
that CREST could enable collaborations between firms, this has not materialized as firms 
involved have found it difficult to agree on how to share the intellectual property198.  
Additionally, the E&E Strategic Council was established in 2015, an initiative driven 
by Dato’ Wong Siew Hai, Chairman of MAEI and a former Intel Malaysia director.  The 
aim of the Council is to bring together the key stakeholders in the industry and elaborate 
strategic initiatives to upgrade the industry in Malaysia. However, government 
stakeholders have been reluctant to operationalize the Council 199  and there have no 
strategies coming out of the Council so far.   
5.8.2 Towards diversified GVC linkages  
Attracting foreign investments in capital- and technology-intensive parts of the 
electronics value chain was the primary mode of integrating and upgrading into global 
value chains since 2005. As can be gleaned from Table 5.4, the level of foreign investments 
in the industry increased sharply in the mid-1990s and again after 2005, reflecting most 
likely the large capital investments needed for wafer fabrication. They have accounted for 
more than 90% of all investments during the last ten years. 
However, the last five years have seen a drop in the level of foreign investments. This 
is most likely related to a cyclical downturn in the semiconductor industry, with 
profitability dropping between 2008-2009 and in 2011-2012 (Bauer et al, 2016). While 
measures were taken to improve infrastructure and the business environment in Kulim High 
Tech Park (e.g. fixing power quality issues and providing waste management), it has 
become more difficult to attract investments to the park. Policy shifted towards increasing 
capacity in existing plants instead (not in upgrading) (PMO, 2014).  
Table 5.4 Foreign investments, Malaysia, 2010 RM constant prices 
Period Foreign investments Share of foreign investments 
in total 
                                                 
197 CREST allocates RM170 mln to set up labs, conducts R&D on LED, 18 December 2014, 
Bernama Daily Malaysian News. 
198 Interview KH01, footnote 153. 
199 Interview PN02, footnote 136.  
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1987-1990 14,126.1 90% 
1991-1995 17,728.1 73% 
1996-2000 41,847.5 73% 
2001-2005 46,339.8 84% 
2006-2010 58,229.1 91% 
2011-2015 47,319.6 91% 
 
Notes: Data for 1986 are not available so period contains only four years. The investment 
figures have been deflated using the Producer Price Index provided by DSM.  
Source:  Author’s analysis based on MIDA (various years)  
 
In the low-end assembly segments, the country’s industry also suffers stiff competition 
from China. For example, in many of Malaysia’s top exports, the country’s market share 
in the U.S has declined over time, while that of China’s has skyrocketed (Figure 13). 
However, in the more sophisticated segments (e.g HS code 8542: electronics integrated 
circuits), Malaysia has actually gained market shares rapidly. Malaysia accounted for 37% 
of U.S imports in electronics integrated circuits in 2015, up from 13% in 1995. By contrast, 
U.S imports from China have remained stable for the past 15 years at 7% of total. Given 
the cost and market advantages that China provides, the Malaysian government is 
encouraging a “China plus one” strategy, pushing for subsidiaries to remain in Malaysia 
by retaining high-value added services, such as design, prototyping and ramp-up 200 . 
Malaysian firms such as Qdos (flexible Printed Circuit Board or PCB manufacturer) and 
UNISEM (semiconductor assembly) are following this strategy, expanding their 
production in China, while keeping more sophisticated R&D and manufacturing at home. 
Intel is also expanding operations in Vietnam and China but retaining its facilities in 
Malaysia to conduct mature product R&D.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
200  Interview PN02 (footnote 136) and interview with Penang senior government agency 
official, 10 March 2016, PN10. 
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Figure 5.13 Shares of Malaysia and China in total US imports, %, key 
commodities and years  
 
Notes: All codes in Harmonized System (HS) as reported, four-digit level. 8471: Automatic 
data processing machines and units thereof; 8473: Parts and accessories for use with machines of 
heading 84.69 to 84.72; HS code 8517: Electrical apparatus for line telephony or line telegraphy; 
8541: Diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices; 8542: Electronics Integrated Circuits 
Source: Author’s elaboration based UN Comtrade database, https://comtrade.un.org/data/  
 
Moreover, the global market has also experienced turbulence as demand has been 
shifting away from desktops and laptops towards mobile phones, servers and components 
related to the Internet of Things (IoT). In this context, many of Malaysia’s leading MNCs 
have been trying to find new markets and are changing their product lines towards 
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components that are needed in these new industries201. Looking at the change in markets 
and the increased competition from China on mature products, the ETP has encouraged 
diversification away from standard semiconductor packaging towards development of IoT 
components, sensors, LEDs and Radio-Frequency Identifications (RFIDs). For example, 
Globetronics, a Malaysian firm based in Penang, shifted from semiconductor assembly and 
packaging to developing sensors, benefitting from a R&D grant from MIDA (company 
annual reports).  
Not only is the Malaysian electronics industry diversifying in terms of products, but the 
industry is also diversifying in terms of actors with more domestic firms entering the value 
chain. Firms that were established in the 1970s-1990s (Globetronics, Carsem, UNISEM, 
Eng Teknologi, Pentamaster, Salutica) have increased their capabilities. For example, Eng 
has expanded production in overseas subsidiaries and increased R&D activities in Malaysia 
(Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2009) and Carsem is upgrading into advanced semiconductor 
packaging technologies and offers more high value-aaded services, such as wafer probing 
and testing services. Meanwhile, new firms have also emerged, such as Vitrox, Ceedtec 
and Aemulus in equipment manufacturing and Inari Amerton in electronic manufacturing 
services. Many domestic firms have made use of government grants in recent years to 
upgrade and diversify (see Table 5.5).  
Table 5.5 Incentives and grants to domestic firms in Malaysian electronics 
industry 
Company Profile Government support 
Electronics component manufacturing and services 
Carsem 
 
Originally Malaysian-Australian 
venture, purchased by Chinese 
Malaysian conglomerate Hong Leong 
Industries in 1984.  
Provides semiconductor packaging.  
Part of Malaysia Pacific Industries 
together with Dynacraft Industries 
that manufactures leadframes.  
Pioneer Status for selected 
products 
Reinvestment allowances3 
 
UNISEM Est. in 1992 with 3,800 employees 
and provides semiconductor 
packaging.  
Pioneer status (1993-1998) 
Pioneer status in 2000 (design 
and production of ICs). 
                                                 
201 Interview PN01, 128.  
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Subsidiaries in Indonesia and China.  
Acquired specialised UK-based test 
and assembly provider. 
Set up JV with Advanpak and 
FlipChip for wafer bumping. 
Surrendered pioneer status in 
2003 to switch to reinvestment 
allowances.  
Grants of RM 12.7 million (USD 
3.3 million) in 2004, RM 3.3 
million (USD 960 thousand) in 
2007 and RM 4.4 million (USD 
1.2 million) in 2008  
Globetronics Established in 1991. 
Semiconductor assembly and 
packaging.  
JV in 1994 with Sumitomo for 
ceramic packages 
Listed in 1997.  
MTDEC was original 
shareholder  
Grant RM 3 million (USD 900 
thousand)  (2008) 
Grants RM 20 million  (USD 5.4 
million) (2014-2014) 
Unspecified tax incentives 
Recent 10-year pioneer status for 
the development of proximity 
sensors 
Salutica Established in 1990 as plastics 
component manufacturer. Now a 
contract manufacturer for consumer 
electronics (Bluetooth devices) and 
branded ones.  
Grant by MIDA (at least RM 3.9 
million or USD 1 million).  
Inari Established in 2006.  
Listed in 2011.  
Electronics Manufacturing Service 
provider.  
Acquisition of Ceedtec (2012) 
Acquisition of US-based Amerton 
Inc., a contract manufacturer (2013) 
Pioneer status for selected 
products. 
RM 9.2 million (USD 2.9 
million) Matching MIDA grant 
(2014) 
Unsecured interest-free loan of 
RM4 million by NCIA (2012) 
RM 7.6 million (USD 1.8 
million) MIDA matching grant 
(2017) 
Equipment Manufacturers 
Ceedtec Established in 2005. 
Inari acquired 51% stake in Ceedtec 
in 2012. 
Provides high-end PCB assemblies. 
High-mix, low-volume.  
Also manufactures 
telecommunication and testing 
equipment.  
RM 9.8 million (USD 3.2 
million) grant from NCIA for 
design and development of 
power supply products (2012).  
MSC status (2012-2017) 
RM 8 million (USD 2.5 million) 
matching MIDA grant (2013) 
 
Pentamaster Established in 1991. 
Manufactures automation equipment.  
Listed in 2004.  
MSC status 
Pioneer status for certain 
products 
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RM 32.5 million (USD 9.6 
million) grants for R&D from 
MIDA (2006-2015) 
Aemulus Established in 2004 and listed in 
2015. 
Manufactures semiconductor testing 
equipment 
Kazanah has 15% stake.  
RM 4.4 million (USD 1.4 
million) matching R&D grant 
from MIDA for two years (2013) 
RM 120 thousand (USD 38 
thousand) training grant from 
MIDA for two years (2013) 
Vitrox Established in 2000. 
Manufactures automated vision 
inspection equipment.  
MSC status (2004)  
Pioneer status for selected 
products  
Matching grant by MIDA for 
Centre of Excellence on 
Machine Vision (2013) 
Matching grant from MdeC for 
R&D on embedded inspection 
technologies (2013) 
Notes: Other Malaysian-owned firms include SilTerra (a chip manufacturer) and Qdos (a 
flexible PCB manufacturer), which are not listed in the stock market and do not report publically 
grants and other incentives.  Eng Teknologi was listed in 1993 but privatized in 2012.  
Source: company annual reports, websites and interviews.  
 
Despite these positive examples of upgrading, on the whole, the industry continues to 
be far from the frontier. As surveyed in Section 3, the aggregate indicators of upgrading 
either show stagnation or high volatility during the last five years. Survey data paints a 
similar picture. Out of approximately 103 firms surveyed by Rasiah (2010), only 11 
engaged in product R&D and only 1 firm was involved in new product development, with 
elements of Original Business Manufacturing (OBM) activity. In a 2014 follow-up survey 
of 25 firms in the semiconductor sector (21 foreign and 4 domestic), no firms were found 
to engage in frontier technology development, although 7 foreign firms engaged in mature 
R&D. Out of the domestic firms, only one engaged in early-stage R&D (Rasiah, 2015). A 
look at the annual reports of the domestic firms presented in this Section, reveals that only 
Vitrox and Aemulus spend over 2% of their revenue on R&D with 8.3% and 22.7% 
respectively, similar to industry leaders such as Intel (20%) and Samsung (7.3%) (Table 
5.6). 
Table 5.6 Share of revenue spent on R&D, key domestic electronics firms, 
Malaysia 
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 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Carsem1 0.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.4% 
UNISEM 1.7% 0.6% 0.4% 0.7% 
Globetronics 0.8% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 
Inari     0.3%2 0.2% 
Salutica    0.7% 
Pentamaster   3%3 2.7% 0.6% 
Aemulus    8.3% 
Vitrox   4.9% 14.7% 22.7% 
Notes: 1Figures are for the Malaysia Pacific Industries Group. 2Figure is for 2012. 3 Figure is 
for 2006.  
Source: Company annual reports 
 
In conclusion, the electronics industry in Malaysia seems to be at an inflection point. 
On the one hand, FDI continues to account for the overwhelming majority of investments 
in the industry, especially in capital-intensive operations. On the other hand, market 
downturns, changes in consumer demand and increased competition from China are 
creating pressure to diversify. In this environment, domestic firms are increasing their 
capabilities and sophistication. Some are steadily upgrading their processing operations 
(e.g. Carsem and Unisem), others are spending high sums on R&D to develop original 
products (Aemulus, Vitrox), or are engaging in international Merger and Acquisition 
(M&As) to increase their reach and competitiveness in electronic manufacturing services 
(e.g. Inari’s acquisition of Amerton). These trends may mark the beginning of a new phase 
in the development of the Malaysian electronics industry, characterised by increased 
technological capabilities among domestic suppliers, that is yet to be reflected in the 
aggregate statistics.   
5.9 Conclusions 
The Malaysian electronics industry has developed primarily by integrating into GVCs. 
Semiconductor assembly subsidiaries in the 1970s were followed by consumer electronics 
assembly facilities in the 1980s and electronics manufacturing service providers in the 
1990s. After several decades of development, wafer fabs and IC design houses also started 
setting up operations in the country. However, despite its sustained growth, the industry 
remains technologically weak and lacks domestic firms with advanced capabilities in the 
core parts of the value chain.  
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Why hasn’t the gradual upgrading of the Malaysian electronics industry led all the way 
up to the frontier? The country’s federal and state governments followed much of the well-
trodden path on leveraging GVCs for development: the country had few investment or trade 
restrictions, it offered market-based incentives for technological upgrading and linkages, it 
offered infrastructure and financing, set up research institutions to provide skilled human 
capital and so on. Nevertheless, despite some limited upgrading over time, the country’s 
industry has not actually moved further up the chain to first tier supplier or knowledge-
intensive supplier or brand.   
During Phase I (1955-1967) and Phase II (1968-1985) the industry was seen as a 
potential employer, with incentives put in place to attract labour-intensive subsidiaries.  No 
efforts were made to build a technological base and diffuse technologies to local firms. 
During Phase II (1986-2004), many of the initiatives pursued had some positive results 
(e.g. higher R&D spending by foreign subsidiaries, creation of linkages), but there was a 
mismatch between the instruments adopted and the needs of the industry (capital grants 
should have been used earlier; rewarding innovation in manufacturing, not only R&D; 
building up research and networking infrastructure in Penang where the main 
manufacturing hub was located). There were few efforts to spur the development of 
domestic firms (e.g. with targeted lending or grants) and incentives to encourage them to 
become bigger (e.g. government procurement) or engage in branding (e.g. protected 
domestic markets). The incentives for R&D were inappropriate for the small, 
unsophisticated domestic firms that were emerging and the infrastructure to help them was 
built far away and was targeted to science-oriented firms. During the latest phase (2005-
now) some positive initiatives have been undertaken (e.g. attention to MIMOS and 
domestic firms, the offer of capital grants) but the frequent policy changes and the more 
challenging GVC dynamics continue to constrain upgrading.  
The lack of sustained upgrading to “the top” of the chain demonstrates the limits of a 
GVC-led development strategy. On the one hand, Malaysia never became a strategic 
location for investments by Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in technology-intensive 
tasks and foreign subsidiaries continued to be reluctant to shift frontier activities to the 
country. On the other hand, the country’s industrial policies were always out of synch with 
the needs of the industry, with the exception perhaps of the last few years. This prevented 
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industrial policy from creating the right incentives for firms to engage in learning and 
taking advantage of the opportunities created by GVCs to further upgrade.  
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6 Conclusions 
Research on Global Value Chains (GVC) has proliferated during the last two decades 
and several international development organizations have taken up the GVC framework 
(Neilson, 2014). Despite this increased attention to GVCs as a way to encourage industrial 
upgrading, an in-depth understanding of what the role of the state should be in the GVC 
context is lacking in this literature. It has been suggested that industrial policy requires a 
radical rethink, with the state’s role confined to facilitating integration and helping local 
firms upgrade by adopting a more supportive stance, foregoing interventionist measures 
such as vertically-integrated ‘national champion’ initiatives (Gereffi and Sturgeon, 2013; 
Yeung, 2014, 2016; Coe and Yeung, 2015) or tariffs, that could discourage GVCs from 
taking root (Baldwin, 2014). However, these contributions have focused on a narrow range 
of industrial policy tools, such as tariffs and subsidies, and the arguments put forward do 
not stand up to theoretical and empirical scrutiny.  
This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature by exploring the scope for implementing 
industrial policy in the context of global value chains (GVCs). This is achieved by creating 
a theoretical framework that is the first to link the theory of industrial policy with that of 
GVCs by using insights from the innovation economics literature, and then by using that 
framework to examine the empirical case studies of industrial policy in the electronics 
industry in Guangdong province of China and in Malaysia. The implication of this research, 
supported by both theory and empirical evidence, is that while integration into GVCs can 
provide firms with (complementary) incentives and resources for upgrading, in the absence 
of industrial policy, developing country firms often find it difficult to accumulate enough 
capabilities to operate in the technological frontier, even after decades of supplying lead 
firms. The role of industrial policy in providing incentives for firms to invest in learning, 
in investing in the hard and soft infrastructure needed for an effective local innovation 
system, and in providing incentives to foreign firms to engage in technology transfer are 
crucial in the context of GVCs.  
The conclusions of this thesis will present a synthesis of the main arguments made in 
this research and then it will consider the limitations of this work and avenues for further 
research.  
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6.1 A brief synthesis of the argument 
6.1.1 Why industrial policy is important  
Free market approaches to development argue that the choices that agents make based 
on market prices, will lead to an optimal allocation of resources, and over time, this will 
lead to development. The theory of comparative advantage, for example, argues that the 
removal of trade barriers will lead each country to specialize in the production of the good 
they have a relative cost advantage in, either because of relative abundance of the factors 
of production needed for their production or because of relative greater productivity (see 
Milberg and Winkler, 2013 for an overview). Some have theorized that countries’ 
comparative advantage even changes through time, from agricultural and labour-intensive 
goods to capital-intensive goods, allowing developing countries to eventually catch-up 
with developed ones (Lin, 2017; Balassa, 1979). However, the theory of comparative 
advantage relies on strict theoretical assumptions (e.g. perfect competition; no mobility of 
capital; access to same technology and equal capabilities of using that technology) that 
when relaxed do not predict gains for all countries from liberalization (Deardorff, 2005). 
In contrast, new trade theories attempt to incorporate market imperfections (e.g. economies 
of scale at the industry level) (see Krugman, 1985). Even though some of the new trade 
theory models show that government intervention could be an optimal choice (e.g. to 
subsidize costs so that a new industry can achieve sufficient scale to compete with foreign 
imports), mainstream theorists continue to support free-trade as a means to develop, on the 
grounds that interventions may sometimes be optimal in theory, but in practice the risk of 
government failure is too high to try (Krugman, 1992). 
The other side of the debate holds that free-markets cannot bring about development, 
owing to the existence of pervasive market failures in industry (e.g. increasing returns to 
scale and technological spillovers), the industrialization process (e.g. weak financial 
markets and scarce private capital in developing countries) and in accumulating 
technological capabilities (long investments in learning are required to enable firms to 
innovate and become competitive). Some of these are quickly reviewed below.   
First, firms need to gain experience and skills in production in order to drive their 
production costs below those of their competitors. A period of temporary support to the 
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infant industry can make producers able to compete. If this rent is invested by firms in 
learning, their unit costs of production will fall down over time and the industry could 
become globally competitive, without need for sustained support (List, 1983 [1885]; 
Chang, 2002).  
Second, industrial policy could serve to mobilize (state-owned) capital to invest in 
firms and industries that are deemed strategic, especially in developing countries where 
domestic private capital is scarce. The state can also coordinate complementary 
investments, when these fail to be coordinated on the basis of market signals (e.g. when an 
upstream industry is profitable only when a local downstream industry has reached a 
certain scale) (see for example, Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943).  
Third, and finally, industrial policy can encourage firm-level accumulation of 
technological capabilities and solve market failures that arise from the nature of firm-
behaviour, firm-level learning and technology development (Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 
2009). Developing country firms need to engage in learning to develop technological 
capabilities, a necessary precondition not only for effectively absorbing technology from 
abroad but also for engaging in minor innovations (see also Ernst et al, 1998; Katz, 1984). 
However, firms can only develop capabilities gradually and cumulatively, progressing 
from simple, less risky areas to increasingly more complex tasks and this process is 
influenced by the innovation system in which firms operate (e.g. the density, quality and 
type of interactions between firms, academic institutes and governments)  (Lundvall 1992; 
Nelson 1993; Freeman, 1995). Industrial policy can help build and enhance domestic 
innovation systems (e.g. by building research institutes and encouraging linkages between 
them and local firms) and by providing incentives for firms to invest in learning, by, for 
example, lowering the cost of capital and increasing the supply of skills in the economy 
(Lall, 1992).  
6.1.2 Why industrial policy is (wrongly) seen as incompatible with the expansion of 
GVCs 
Traditionally market-oriented institutions have seen the expansion of GVCs as further 
justifying a hands-off approach to the economy (e.g. OECD, WTO and World Bank, 2014). 
This view is largely based on two observations that have weak foundations. The first is that 
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even if selective instruments were successful in the past, such instruments are not relevant 
any more due to the fact that GVCs are organized according to tasks, not sectors (Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). However, there is a great deal of asset specificity in production 
and both GVC governance (Gereffi et al, 2005) and systems of innovation (Malerba and 
Nelson, 2011) differ greatly by sector. This means that even if firms undertook the same 
tasks in different sectors, they would still face distinct opportunities and constraints to 
upgrading, arising from these unique sectoral characteristics. The second argument is that 
tariffs cannot be used since trade is essential for value chains and tariffs will disrupt them. 
However, tariffs are not normally implemented as an across-the-board measure, but as a 
highly differentiated policy tool that can be applied differently depending on whether 
imports are for the domestic market or for exports (e.g. duty-drawback system on imported 
inputs used for exports), or according to the stage of production  (Akyüz, 2009).  
The second line of critique against industrial policy in a GVC context is that grooming 
national champions is less likely to be effective nowadays, given the tight race at the top 
of the chain. Nolan (2001) has convincingly shown that there is an ongoing unprecedented 
struggle for market dominance between the top global lead firms in almost all sectors. 
These firms keep on growing by conducting M&As, which are feasible given their superior 
access to financial resources and high market capitalizations. They then invest in enormous 
R&D expenditures to sustain their technological dominance, branding power and state-of-
the-art IT infrastructure, erecting formidable barriers to entry. In this context developing 
country firms are even more disadvantaged than before, as they have far fewer resources 
(even with industrial policy measures) and it would not be able to compete on price since 
cheaper production sites are also available to lead firms through outsourcing. Indeed, 
becoming a global leader today is indeed much harder than it was before the ‘Global 
Business Revolution’. However, there are three further considerations one should take into 
account. First, technological leadership often changes not in ‘head-to-head’ battles over 
established business, but when there is a new technological ‘window of opportunity’ (Lee, 
and Malerba, 2016), but this requires the existence of firms that have already built 
considerable capabilities, which necessitates industrial policy measures. Second, 
developing country firms can also access large networks of suppliers, bypassing the 
cumbersome task of building advanced manufacturing capabilities in-house (Sturgeon and 
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Lester, 2004). Third, becoming a global lead firm is one measure of success of many. 
Taiwan has secured a high standard of industrial performance not by having lead firms, but 
by being home to the top first-tier suppliers in the electronics industry.  
Based on a combination of the arguments above, the view of the GVC literature, as 
represented by Gereffi and Sturgeon (2013), Coe and Yeung (2015) and UNCTAD 
(2013b), is one that envisions a role for industrial policy in developing local supplier 
capabilities but in a way that aligns with the interests of lead firms and buyers. This is 
achieved by emphasizing horizontal, rather than selective measures (e.g. infrastructure, 
human capital and R&D support, to both indigenous and foreign firms) and a liberalized 
trade and investment environment. However, successful building-up of technological 
capabilities often needs targeted action, as seen in the experience of Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Chang, 1994). More importantly, it 
is crucial to consider the role of industrial policy in areas where a conflict exists between 
the needs of lead firms and national economic development (UNCTAD, 1999; 
Christopherson and Clark, 2007; Evans, 1995).  
6.1.3 An integrated framework 
The framework considered here argues that there are three dynamics to consider in the 
context of industrial policy and GVCs. First, industrial policy can complement the 
endogenous incentives firms have for investing in innovation by shaping the environment 
faced by them, through changing relative prices, reducing uncertainty by providing 
markets, and encouraging cooperation between firms (Lall, 1992; Pack and Westphal, 
1986; Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009) (Arrows 1.1 and 1.2). Second, industrial policy can 
be used to promote integration into GVCs (e.g. by selective tax incentives to FDI; 
encouraging standard-compliance; promoting specialized supplier clusters) and the type of 
policies pursued may depend on the GVC (Arrow 2). Third, integration into GVCs can 
enhance learning for suppliers, as lead firms may provide technical assistance to them as 
well as incentives for improving their technology (Hobday, 2001; Ernst and Kim, 2002; 
Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011), while foreign subsidiaries also contribute to the local 
innovation system  (Arrows 3.1 and 3.2). The level and nature of technology transfer and 
the type of industrial policies pursued will also change with the level of technological 
256 
 
capabilities of the domestic supply base (Arrows 1.3 and 3.3). These relationships are put 
into the Figure 6.1 below to provide a visual representation of the framework.  
 
Figure 6.1 Determinants of upgrading 
 
Policy needs to be adapted in terms of the development stage of the country and the 
stage of maturity of a sector (Chang, 1994; Livesey, 2012). Infant industry policies 
(including subsidizing FDI) would be needed in the beginning to establish new sectors that 
are mature in the world stage. Then, as economy-wide technological capabilities evolve 
and suppliers can undertake more complex functions, the main goal of industrial policy 
would shift to maintaining competitiveness in the already existing segments and to 
promoting upgrading to higher value added segments. This dynamic is highlighted in the 
two case studies of this thesis, Guangdong province of China and Malaysia in the 
electronics industry. Using the framework developed here, this thesis reviewed the role of 
industrial policy in encouraging integration into GVCs and in developing the capabilities 
of domestic firms in the two cases. Moreover, following an evolutionary approach, the 
analysis identified different “periods” in which these dynamics differed.  
6.1.4 Industrial Policy and GVCs in the Guangdong electronics industry 
The province of Guangdong has successfully integrated into the electronics GVCs. 
Every large first-tier supplier in electronics has facilities in the province, while the clusters 
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that have formed undertake a range of tasks, from design, prototyping and procurement to 
manufacturing and logistics services, predominantly in telecommunications equipment and 
computer peripherals. The province is also home to some domestic firms with brand-power 
(e.g. Huawei, ZTE, TCL, Oppo), which are sophisticated and conduct frontier R&D. 
However, this has not been the outcome of simply opening-up and encouraging integration 
into GVCs, leaving the rest to inter-firm knowledge transfers, but it is the result of 
complementary industrial policies that created the conditions for firms to develop their 
technological capabilities, which allowed them to upgrade within GVCs, and eventually 
even creating their own GVCs.  Where industrial policy remains weak in the province is in 
the public-sector education and research capabilities, and in providing access to patient 
credit to the private sector, especially SMEs. This has constrained the development of a 
dense system of innovation in the province, making it difficult for firms that do not have 
large internal resources, to invest in R&D and commercialize it.  
Even though the province is well known in the literature for pursuing an outward-
oriented path for industrialization (Yeung anf Chu, 1998; OECD, 2010; Vogel, 1989), this 
is the first effort in the literature to provide a comprehensive account of the province’s 
trajectory in the electronics industry, the province’s largest exporting sector. This is 
achieved by providing an account of the development of state-owned and state-supported 
firms (national champions), other indigenous firms and foreign subsidiaries, rather than 
focusing selectively on one of these categories, and by updating the analysis of the 
province’s development to include the last ten years, which is important given the change 
of direction in policy that has taken place since 2008, pushing the province away from 
labor-intensive manufacturing towards technology-intensive activities.  
Guangdong first integrated into GVCs in the electronics industry during 1979-1992, by 
providing fiscal incentives towards FDI. While the aim was to attract high-tech investments 
and to diffuse advanced technologies, most of the operations that were set up were low-
end, labor-intensive ones and few (if any) incentives were put in place to change that. 
However, the industry was not entirely new to the province.  A small number of electronics 
factories had been created during the Maoist period (1949-1978), with the aim of securing 
self-sufficiency in the province for basic components, especially in radio and 
telecommunications equipment. As the province opened up, central and provincial 
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government leaders saw this as an opportunity to harness openness for learning in the 
domestic sector, made up mostly of SOEs at the time. Domestic firms were not only the 
beneficiaries of import-substitution policies and support schemes enacted by the central 
and provincial governments, but were also encouraged to integrate into GVCs as chosen 
partners for large JV projects or suppliers in processing trade arrangements. Firms in 
Guangdong province were therefore employing a mixed strategy, on one hand using 
integration into GVCs to earn foreign exchange and additional income and to learn how to 
export and meet foreign market demand, and on the other hand, they could produce for a 
protected home market.  
During the next phase (1993-2005), the provincial government continued its mixed 
strategy, but the emphasis shifted towards encouraging greater scale in indigenous firms 
and in building up the local infrastructure to lower the cost of exports. The provincial 
government chose 10 enterprise groups and 16 ‘backbone enterprises’ to support, most of 
them top brands already and state-owned, with the exception of privately owned Huawei. 
Due to the provincial government’s budget constraints, support was disbursed by way of 
preferential policies and loans, with priority given to projects that boosted the industry’s 
technological development. The champions were expected to invest on key projects of 
importance during this time, which were in general prioritized at least in terms of finance 
and land availability (Liu, 1995). However, these firms remained integrated into GVCs (as 
suppliers) and continued to import most of their sophisticated components from abroad, 
with only gradual efforts to substitute them for own-produced ones. Central-level policies 
also provided learning rents to the telecommunication segment, by, for example, allowing 
only a handful of local suppliers to provide mobile phone equipment to the domestic market. 
As a result, large telecommunications equipment and consumer electronics companies 
emerged, such as TCL, ZTE, Huawei and Konka, which launched their own brands and 
developed notable technological capabilities. Owing to the province’s sustained efforts to 
improve transport and telecommunication infrastructure and the continued migration of 
small-scale suppliers from Hong Kong and later from Taiwan to the province, Guangdong 
also became a favored destination for the assembly facilities of large lead firms and first 
tier suppliers (e.g. Foxconn and Flex), which local firms could also use to outsource 
manufacturing. One of the reasons that GVC-led development and industrial policy were 
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complementary during this period undoubtedly has to do with China’s large domestic 
market, which provided a vast space for learning for domestic firms (and the possibility to 
reach minimum efficiency scale), while also accommodating imports from selected foreign 
firms. Additionally, the threat of exposure to global competition after entry into WTO and 
the attention of Guangdong primarily to well-performing firms, may have acted as 
instruments of discipline for domestic firms that enjoyed rents.  
During the latest phase (2006-now) industrial policy has not only focused on a handful 
of chosen firms, but has been supporting the upgrading of capabilities in their entire 
industry, including in foreign firms and the private sector. Instead of subsidizing capital 
construction, instruments are focused on applications of sophisticated technologies in 
industry, the renewal of equipment and funding of R&D. Moreover, approval of FDI 
projects has become stricter, especially for the more advanced cities of the province, in an 
effort to align FDI with the developmental objectives of the province. Industrial policy 
during this phase has increased in ambition (regarding the technological capabilities of 
firms), in tandem with the shift of the industry from a state of catching-up to one where 
reaching the frontier is possible. Going forward, further enhancing the quantity and quality 
of research institutes and universities and their linkages with local firms, as well as 
improving access to patient finance for all firms, will be important in allowing the 
provincial electronics industry to catch-up.  
A summary of the policy phases in Guangdong and their characteristics is presented in 
Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 Summary of Guangdong’s experience in the electronics industry 
 Industrial Policy Policies for integration 
into GVCs 
GVC developments Result 
 
1949-
1978 
Centrally-planned 
development of 
research and production 
units. Emphasis on self-
sufficiency and 
development in remote 
inland areas.  
No integration (largely 
closed off to foreign 
investment and trade, 
apart from agricultural 
goods). 
Expansion of GVCs 
starts in the 1960s 
with the offshoring 
of assembly 
activities. 
No integration, but 
a small (state-
owned) domestic 
production base 
develops, albeit 
with low 
technological 
capabilities.  
1978-
1995 
State-owned capital is 
injected to create a seed 
of domestic firms 
(SOEs) in Shenzhen 
and Guangdong. 
Marketisation reforms 
State encourages JVs 
between SOEs and large 
export-oriented firms.  
Processing trade is 
promoted, involving 
Acceleration of 
GVC expansion. 
Rising wages and 
the appreciation of 
the Japanese Yen in 
the mid-1980s 
Dual integration.  
1) Small-scale 
labour-intensive 
FDI-led suppliers 
create vast P&A 
clusters; 2) Some 
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are implemented. Some 
measures to incentivize 
upgrading are put in 
place.  
both domestic and 
foreign firms.  
Foreign investors flock 
in, particularly from 
Hong Kong.  
Infrastructure and 
incentives in place in 
SEZs and elsewhere.  
 
incentivise firms to 
relocate production 
from Easy to 
Southeast Asia and 
China. US firms 
undertake large-
scale outsourcing in 
the 1990s. 
SOEs engage in 
export-oriented 
production and 
use knowledge to 
produce branded 
products at home.  
1996-
2005 
1996-2000: Guangdong 
selects a handful of 
firms to support with 
subsidies and loans. 
Reform of the 
innovation system and 
incentives in place for 
high-tech production 
2001-2005: Firm-level 
support wanes and 
industry adjusts to entry 
into WTO.  
Incentives from previous 
phase continue.  
Acceleration of 
infrastructure build-up 
and proliferation of 
industrial zones and 
parks. Liberalisation of 
tariffs ahead of WTO 
entry. Heavy 
investments in 
infrastructure.  
 
Outsourcing/offshori
ng becomes 
widespread.  
Some Guangdong 
firms become 
domestic brands 
and venture 
overseas. 
Innovation 
capabilities are 
still low. FDI by 
first tier suppliers 
and brands 
increases..  
Labour-intensive 
assembly 
continues.  
2006-
now 
Subsidies, tax 
incentives & financing 
(often given on a 
competitive basis) to 
innovative large firms. 
But few measures to 
improve higher 
education and public 
research, while private 
sector continues to lack 
access to formal 
finance.  
Incentives for FDI 
eliminated. Labour-
intensive, low-tech 
assembly discouraged. 
China emerges as a 
coveted consumer 
market. Innovation 
activities become 
commoditized and 
outsourced. The rise 
of smartphones has a 
major impact on 
GVC leadership, 
with new firms 
emerging.  
Guangdong firms 
are increasing 
their innovative 
capabilities and a 
few are becoming 
global brands. 
Hardware start-
ups flourishing.  
 
6.1.5 Industrial Policy and GVCs in the Malaysian electronics industry 
The Malaysian electronics industry developed primarily by integrating into GVCs. 
Semiconductor assembly subsidiaries were established in the 1970s were followed by 
consumer electronics assembly facilities in the 1980s and electronics manufacturing 
service providers in the 1990s. The country now boasts TNC subsidiaries that perform IC 
design (e.g. Altera), product R&D (e.g. Intel) and first tier suppliers (e.g. Flex and Jabil). 
However, the industry, on aggregate, remains technologically weak and lacks domestic 
firms with advanced capabilities in the core parts of the value chain. Even though the 
Malaysian government followed almost all the prescriptions of what would be considered 
GVC-friendly industrial policy in electronics (no import-substitution, tax incentives for 
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R&D, investments in skills development), the firms (including TNC subsidiaries) have 
upgraded only to a limited extent and do not possess frontier technological capabilities. In 
Malaysia industrial policies did not create adequate incentives for indigenous firms to 
invest in technological learning and investments in the innovation system were too often 
not done in a way that did not maximize linkages with local firms (e.g. the Malaysian 
Institute for Microelectronic Systems – MIMOS- was not based in Penang where most 
indigenous firms were emerging, but near Kuala Lumpur).  
The industry has evolved over four phases, each with its own opportunities and 
challenges for upgrading arising from the changing policy instruments, the changing 
dynamics of the electronics GVCs and the evolutionary character of capability 
accumulation within firms.  
During the first phase (1957-1967) Malaysia undertook some import substitution 
efforts to stimulate industry, and the first factories in the industry were set up. However, it 
was during the second phase (1968-1985) that the industry really emerged based largely on 
the attraction of labour-intensive, export-oriented foreign investments. Electronics was 
simply viewed as an industry that could absorb extra labor, especially in areas that lacked 
vast primary resources, such as the region of Penang. Industrial policy during this time 
focused on FDI attraction, with targeted missions by the Penang and federal governments 
to attract investments, tax incentives and dedicated infrastructure provision. During this 
time the government made no efforts to develop domestic firms that could link to the 
industry or to target electronics FDI as a source of technological capabilities. 
The third phase (1986-2005) saw the promotion of high-tech activities in foreign 
subsidiaries and the emergence of some domestic firms. Industrial policy shifted course 
and the government started populating the innovation system with research institutes, 
specialized science parks, tax incentives and (limited) grants for R&D, and invested in its 
own semiconductor fabrication facilities to drive the industry forward.  However, the 
incentives used were not enough to push firms to engage in learning, especially domestic 
firms that were small in size and technologically weak, the resources mobilized were small, 
particularly for semiconductor manufacturing, and manufacturing firms were often 
excluded from initiatives on innovation (e.g. incentives and funding programmes by 
MOSTI were not open to established manufacturing firms). Some successful firms 
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emerged as former TNC employees saw an opportunity to supply products that subsidiaries 
were looking to outsource, but this was also not encouraged by the government (with the 
exception of Globetronics), and firms found it difficult to gather the requisite financial 
capital. However, by making tax incentives more selective and conditional on R&D 
performance, and given the trend towards automation in electronics assembly in the latter 
half of the 1980s, many TNC subsidiaries upgrade their operations.  
During the fourth phase (2005-now) the government has increased grants, not just for 
R&D, but also for capital-intensive manufacturing investments, and has earmarked grants 
specifically for domestic firms. While the industry continues to operate far from the 
frontier, some of the recent initiatives are promising and have sparked the emergence of a 
few sophisticated domestic firms that undertake advanced electronics manufacturing 
services and manufacture semiconductor fabrication equipment.  
A summary of the policy phases in Malaysia and their characteristics is presented in 
Table 6.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 Summary of Malaysia’s experience in the electronics industry 
 Industrial Policy Policies for integration 
into GVCs 
GVC developments Result 
 
1955-
1967 
Import substitution 
policies and tax 
incentives for capital-
intensive production 
(not targeted to 
electronics).  
Openness to foreign 
capital.  JVs promoted 
for domestic market 
oriented projects.  
Beginning of 
assembly activities. 
Tariff-hopping 
domestic market 
oriented FDI mainly 
by Japanese firms.  
First electrical 
machinery 
assembly 
operations 
established by 
Japanese 
investors, directed 
for domestic 
market. 
1968-
1985 
Tax incentives for 
encouraging export-
orientation in industry. 
Tariff protection and 
state involvement in 
heavy industries, but 
not in electronics.  
Creation of Free Trade 
Zone, complete with 
infrastructure and tax 
incentives.  
Expansion of GVCs, 
particularly in 
semiconductor 
assembly.  
Integration into 
electronics GVCs 
expanded 
primarily through 
FDI in 
semiconductor 
assembly in 
Penang.  
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1986-
2004 
Tax incentives for high-
tech production and 
R&D, grants offered for 
R&D, incentives 
extended to SMEs. 
Cluster infrastructure 
established in Selangor, 
Kedah and Johor. 
Research centres and 
institutions to bring 
together private and 
government 
stakeholders 
established. State 
owned capital flows 
into wafer fabrication.  
Schemes to encourage 
SME-MNC linkages. 
Investment and trade 
liberalisation.  
Acceleration of 
GVC expansion. 
Rising wages and 
the appreciation of 
the Japanese Yen in 
the mid-1980s 
incentivise firms to 
relocate production 
from Easy to 
Southeast Asia and 
China. US firms 
undertake large-
scale outsourcing in 
the 1990s. 
Expansion of 
electronics 
production in 
other regions 
(Kedah, Selangor, 
Johor), 
diversification 
into consumer 
electronics & 
emergence of 
local small-scale 
subcontractors 
and suppliers.   
  
2005-
now 
Mix of tax and capital 
grants to encourage 
capital-intensive and 
R&D intensive projects. 
Funds earmarked for 
domestic firms. 
Governance for S&T 
and industry continues 
to lack integration.  
Stricter conditions for 
FDI. FDI encouraged in 
R&D and semiconductor 
wafer design fabrication.  
China emerges as a 
coveted consumer 
market. Innovation 
activities become 
commoditized and 
outsourced. The rise 
of smartphones has a 
major impact on 
GVC leadership, 
with new firms 
emerging. 
Diversification 
into solar and 
LED sectors. 
More domestic 
firms enter the 
value chain. 
Continued lack of 
frontier R&D 
capabilities.  
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6.2 Limitations and areas for further research   
This thesis has studied the electronics industry in Malaysia and Guangdong province 
of China, but each place integrated in different parts of the electronics GVCs. In 
Guangdong, the industry developed on the basis of TNC-led assembly in consumer 
electronics and telecommunications equipment, which allowed domestic firms to integrate 
by producing simple components and then to launch their own-branded products with 
imported components. By contrast, semiconductor assembly offered a more limited scope 
for local sourcing, as components and equipment for semiconductor fabrication are highly 
complex. Nevertheless, even when consumer electronics facilities started being set up by 
TNCs in Malaysia in the mid-1980s, this did not stimulate domestic catch-up, which 
indicates that the findings of this thesis still hold despite the differences in the types of 
facilities that were first established in the two places.  
 The two case studies are also different in terms of level of government: Guangdong is 
a province and Malaysia is a country. This represents a problem as even though Guangdong 
is larger than Malaysia (Guangdong has a population of 110 million people, whereas 
Malaysia 31 million) and it has significant autonomy in setting policy agendas, the region 
has been influenced by China’s national policies and the province was able to leverage the 
country’s vast domestic market. This has been addressed in this thesis by making references 
to relevant central-level decisions and their impact on the industry where possible.  
Future research should be extended to include more regions (within and outside of 
China) and other countries. For example, extending this research to provinces in the 
Yangtze River Delta in China would also show a different style of industrial policy and 
integration into electronics GVCs, one that has also been relatively successful, since the 
region is now home to many of China’s local and foreign semiconductor facilities. The 
experience of countries such as Mexico and Costa Rica would also provide more evidence 
on the limitations of GVC-led development strategies, as these countries, similar to 
Malaysia, have struggled to develop their own firms and upgrade into the upper parts of 
the value chain. Research in more regions and countries can enrich our understanding of 
the dynamics between industrial policy and GVCs by revealing ways in which they can 
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interact and encourage (or not) industrial upgrading.  It could also lead to the construction 
of a typology of industrial policy and GVCs that could help determine why certain regions 
or countries adopt certain approaches and why they have been successful or not.  
6.3 Future prospects for industrial policy and GVCs 
The main concern of this thesis is the scope for implementing industrial policy in the 
context of global value chains (GVCs), but in a connected economic system, this also 
depends on conditions outside the scope of national or regional economies.   
First, there is the question of policy space for governments to use industrial policy tools 
in the context of global agreements on trade and investment (see also Chapter 2). When the 
research for this thesis begun in 2013, it seemed clear that while industrial policy was back 
on the agenda of some developed and developing economies (for example the Advanced 
Manufacturing Partnership launched in the United States in 2011 and the Plan for the 
Development of Strategic and Emerging Industries launched in China in 2010), the policy 
space to implement industrial policy interventions remained narrow (Chang, 2006; 
UNCTAD, 2014). The world has not stood still. Most notably, tensions between the United 
States and China over the trade and investment are rising, with the United States threating 
a protectionist stance202.  An optimistic scenario would be that this represents a historic 
moment to open up policy space for developing countries to implement interventions and 
help their economies to upgrade. The pessimistic scenario would be that developing 
countries are not part of this renegotiation of global governance rules and have to continue 
an uphill battle towards catching up.  
Second, there is also the question of whether the ‘new production revolution’ (OECD, 
2017), made up of emerging technologies (e.g. Big Data, artificial intelligence, robotics, 
3D printing, biotechnology and nanotechnology), will change the shape and geography of 
GVCs and reduce opportunities for developing economies to integrate into GVCs and 
leverage this to upgrade. For example, Adidas has set up a fully automated factory in 
Germany and Atlanta that undertake flexible, customized production that can reach 
customers within the same season. The factories have 150 workers each and will be 
                                                 
202  
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producing 1 million pairs a year (compared to 407 million pairs mass produced in Asia)203. 
There is not only high uncertainty over how these technologies will shape the production 
system in developed and developing economies, but also on what competences are needed 
for firms to succeed in the future and what skills the labour force should be equipped with. 
This calls for further reexamination on the tools and aims of industrial policy to ensure 
catch-up in a changing context (see Bianchi and Labory, 2018; OECD, 2018 for the case 
of Chile; Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar, 2018).  
Further research on the shifting global governance rules and the changing industrial 
landscape is necessary to ensure the debate on industrial policy remains relevant and 
forward-looking.  
 
 
  
                                                 
203 Green, D, ‘Adidas just opened a futuristic new factory – and it will dramatically change how 
shoes are sold’, 26 April 2018, Business Insider. Online, available at: 
http://www.businessinsider.fr/us/adidas-high-tech-speedfactory-begins-production-2018-4, 
accessed 5 August 2018.  
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Appendix 1. Chosen Champions in Guangdong, Business Details 
and Mode of Entry into GVCs 
Name of Company Establishment 
information  
Mode of entry into GVCs Product range 
Shenzhen Huaqiang 
Group 
SOE, established in 
Shenzhen in 1979. 
Privatized in 2005. 
JVs with Sanyo. In 1993 for 
laser heads, in 1998 for color 
TVs. 
OEM services and attempts to 
make own brand products. 
 
Electronic components, 
trading services, 
cultural industries  
Konka Group  Sino-foreign JV 
(with SOE partner), 
established in 
Shenzhen in 1979. 
Now state-
controlled listed 
company.  
OEM services for Hong Kong 
partner and compensation trade 
in the beginning.  
Brand development in late 
1980’s and international sales 
since 1995.  
Color TVs, mobile 
phones, consumer 
appliances, set-top 
boxes, LED products  
TCL Group Sino-foreign JV 
(with local 
government), 
established in 
Huizhou in 1981. 
Gradual reduction 
of state shares since 
1998.  
OEM & JVs with European, 
Japanese and US firms. 
Focus on domestic brand since 
early 1990’s. 
‘Going out’ by acquisition of 
Alcatel (2004), Thomson TV 
division (2003) and Schneider 
(2002) 
TVs and mobile phones.  
Shenzhen Electronics 
Group 
SOE, established in 
in Shenzhen in 
1986 as a 
horizontally 
organized 
conglomerate. 
JVs with companies from 
Hong Kong, Japan for color 
screens.  
JV with SGS-Thomson for IC 
packaging, testing and IC 
design for exports.   
Electronic components 
and devices, 
semiconductor 
assembly and design, 
trading and property.  
Foshan Electronics 
Group (now part of 
Foshan Gongying 
Investment Holding) 
SOE, established in 
Foshan in 1966. 
Restructured into 
other entities since 
1998.  
 Electronic components 
Guangdong Colour 
Picture Tubes (now 
part of Dongguan 
Development 
Holdings) 
SOE, established in 
Dongguan in 1988 
Imported Japanese technology 
(Hitachi) and set up JVs with 
Japanese companies.  
Recent JV with Hong Kong 
company for LED chips.  
 
Used to manufacture 
color picture tubes, now 
switched to LEDs. 
Overall group is 
diversified with main 
business road 
construction.  
SED electronics 
group (now China 
Electronics 
International 
Information Service 
Co. Ltd) 
SOE, established in 
Shenzhen in 1987.  
By 1992 it had almost 20 
domestic, sino-foreign JVs and 
subsidiaries 
Used to manufacture 
electronic and 
telecommunication 
products but now a 
service provider 
offering logistics, 
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trading, advertising, 
exhibitions, 
engineering, property 
development.  
DESAY Group 
  
SOE, established in 
Huizhou in 1983. 
Since the 1980’s it established 
more than 30 sino-foreign JVs, 
among them with Siemens, 
Philips, Radioshack, Solectron, 
GE and Sony  
Automobile electronics, 
rechargeable batteries, 
LEDs, IC design   
Fenghua Advanced 
Technology 
SOE, established in 
Zhaoqing in 1984. 
Acquired 40% Taiwan’s 
Viking Tech in 2015. 
New electronic 
components, passive 
components.  
Guangzhou 
Electronics Group 
SOE, established in 
Guangzhou in 
1996. 
 Electronic components 
manufacturing  
Shenzhen Primatronix 
(Nanho) 
Sino-foreign JV 
with SOE partner, 
established in 
Shenzhen in 1980.  
OEM for Hong Kong partner.  Telephones, LEDs.  
Guangzhou Radio 
Group 
SOE, predecessor 
established in 
Guangzhou in 
1957.  
JV with Hong Kong company 
in 1984 to enter naval 
communications.  
JV with Ericsson in 1993 to 
produce mobile 
communication products 
Mainly OEM services and 
branded military-related 
products.  
Wireless 
communications, 
banking electronics for 
the military, property 
management and 
trading.  
Huawei Technologies 
Co. Ltd 
Private company, 
established in 
Shenzhen in 1987. 
Initial importer and distributor. 
Later OEM supplier and finally 
brand development since early 
1990’s.  
Rapid international expansion 
since mid-1990’s.  
Network technologies, 
telecommunications 
equipment and services, 
mobile communication 
devices.  
China Great Wall 
Computer Shenzhen 
Co. Ltd 
SOE, established in 
Shenzhen in 1987.  
 
Three JVs with IBM (1994, 
1995 and 2004) for the 
production of PC boards, PCs 
and servers.  
JVs with Hitachi and Kingston 
for hard disks.  
Own brand computers and 
devices as well as EMS/OEM 
services.  
Computers and digital 
products, information 
security products, cloud 
computing technology, 
LCD displays and EMS 
services.  
Shenzhen Kaifa 
Technology Co. Ltd 
SOE, established in 
Shenzhen in 1985.  
JV with Epistar Taiwan for 
LEDs 
OEM services.  
Full turnkey 
manufacturing services. 
Specialized in hard disk 
rives, smart meters, 
automation equipment, 
touch panel, and LEDs.  
Shenzhen Yuebao 
Electronics 
Technology Co. Ltd.  
SOE, established in 
Shenzhen in 1984.  
Imported technology from 
Japan for audio heads.  
ODM supplier  
Magnetic sensing and 
identification 
components, precision 
manufacturing.  
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Chaozhou Three 
Circle Group 
Originally SOE, 
established in 
Chaozhou in 1970. 
Employee owned 
since 1999 
ODM supplier Ceramic products for 
optic 
telecommunications, 
machinery and 
environmental 
protection  
Shinwa Industries 
(China) Ltd  
Sino-foreign JV, 
established in 
Huizhou in 1986 in 
Huizhou.  
Production/assembly for 
Japanese partner  
CD/DVD drives, Blue 
Tooth modules, 
UV/Camera filters and 
Coating and other 
electronic components 
 
Zhongshan Kawa 
Electronic Group 
Established in 
Zhongshan 1994. 
Now owned by HK 
group 
 Electronic viedo and 
audio equipment 
Dongguan Shengyi 
Futongban (Now 
Shengyi Technology 
Co. Ltd) 
JV with SOE 
partner, established 
in Dongguan in 
1985.  
OEM supplier Copper clad laminates 
(used in PCB board 
manufacturing) 
Guangdong GoWorld 
Co. Ltd 
SOE, predecessor 
set up in Shantou in 
1957.  
JV with US company to 
introduce LCD technology.  
JV with Hong Kong company 
for telecommunication 
equipment. 
ODM and OEM supplier. 
Sensors, PCBs, LCDs, 
Transducers, Copper 
Clad Laminates and 
other components.  
Guangdong Jiali 
Group (Now Sanshui 
Liping) 
Established in 1994 
in Foshan.  
OEM supplier. Batteries, rechargeable 
batteries  
Tianma Group SOE, established in 
Shenzhen in 1983. 
Compensation trade with Hong 
Kong companies in the 
beginning.  
Now ODM supplier with 
established international sales 
offices 
LCD and LCM display 
products 
Shenzhen Jinghua 
Electronics Co. Ltd 
(Jingwah) 
SOE, established in 
Shenzhen in 1980. 
 
JVs with Japanese companies 
for car audio systems.  
ODM supplier 
 
Tablet PCs, handheld 
devices, IT digital 
products, navigation 
systems, automotive 
electronics, LEDs 
Shenzhen Xianke 
Enterprise Group  
SOE, established in 
Shenzhen in 1984. 
ODM manufacturer Audiovisual equipment, 
appliances, mobile 
communication devices.  
AF Technology Co. 
Ltd  
Sino-foreign JV 
with SOE partner, 
established in 
Zhuhai in 1989.  
OEM supplier System simulators and 
precision engineering 
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Appendix 2. Output and Value Added in the Malaysian 
Electronics Industry 
 
Output 
Value 
(RM 000) 
Output Value as Share 
of Total 
Manufacturing  
Value Added 
(RM 000) 
Value Added as Share 
of Total 
Manufacturing 
Value Added 
as Share of 
Output 
1973 291,851 4% 147,218 6% 50% 
1974 524,477 5% 205,056 7% 39% 
1975 821,347 8% 277,963 9% 34% 
1976 1,202,663 9% 360,938 10% 30% 
1978 1,859,671 10% 470,067 9% 25% 
1979 2,678,576 11% 680,921 10% 25% 
1981 3,896,833 10% 258,075 13% 7% 
1982 4,124,633 11% 314,846 3% 8% 
1983 4,959,042 12% 1,363,041 13% 27% 
1984 6,051,306 13% 3,788,734 31% 63% 
1985 4,964,418 11% 1,556,602 13% 31% 
1986 6,119,053 14% 1,665,727 14% 27% 
1987 8,598,138 17% 1,916,486 14% 22% 
1989 16,337,111 20% 3,377,691 16% 21% 
1993 48,128,644 29% 10,008,777 23% 21% 
1994 65,239,105 33% 15,136,110 31% 23% 
1996 91,197,397 33% 25,783,183 36% 28% 
1997 98,013,071 33% 23,082,306 29% 24% 
1999 148,529,122 41% 31,789,298 36% 21% 
2001 143,774,383 36% 26,655,497 28% 19% 
2002 149,951,222 33% 27,605,764 25% 18% 
2003 180,293,845 35% 31,991,483 26% 18% 
2004 195,807,352 33% 35,683,894 26% 18% 
2005 208,071,652 32% 28,317,413 24% 14% 
2006 205,998,309 29% 28,088,664 22% 14% 
2007 206,811,501 28% 31,832,026 22% 15% 
2008 174,587,755 21% 30,476,932 19% 17% 
2009 155,706,416 21% 25,207,896 18% 16% 
2010 174,032,308 21% 31,035,494 18% 18% 
2012 153,807,177 17% 39,975,510 20% 26% 
2015 245,080,507 21% 47,427,590 18% 20% 
Source: Author’s own calculation on data from (DSM) (various years a and b). 
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